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BEYOND STATE INTERVENTION 
IN THE FAMILY: FOR BABY JANE 
DOE 
Martha Minow* 
Newspapers and broadcasters gave major billing to the story. 
Headlines announced: "The Life or Death Question of Baby 
Doe;" and "Baby Doe's Parents Call U.S. Action Intimidating."1 
The medical care decisions about this infant born with spina 
bifida, microcephaly, and other severe disabilities,2 not only at-
tracted mass media attention, but also led to both state and fed-
eral court proceedings. Legislative hearings raised the issue of 
her care. Many commentators debated what should happen to 
this infant of Long Island parents.3 This article instead will ask: 
what was all the attention about?; why are cases like this so riv-
eting?; and might the reasons for public fascination and anguish 
illuminate alternative legal responses? 
Several themes dominated public discussion of the Baby Jane 
Doe case: first, the scope of the parents' legal and moral rights to 
refuse surgery to enclose the spine of their child born with spina 
bifida and other conditions; second, the role of a person with no 
relationship to the family who challenged the parents' decision 
in both state and federal courts; and finally, the reach of govern-
mental power to obtain information about the child's medical 
condition and to review the parents' decisions about their child's 
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1. Detroit Free Press, Nov. 11, 1983, at Bl; N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1984, § I, at 45. 
2. See infra text accompanying note 8 (explaining these conditions). 
3. See, e.g., Hentoff, Come Sweet Death and Judge Baby's Quality of Life, VILLAGE 
VOICE, Mar. 27, 1984, at 6; Margolick, Battle for 'Baby Doe,; N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1983, 
at BL Public debates were held about the case. See, e.g., Chambers, Specialists Debate 
the Issues in Baby Doe Case, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1983, § 1, at 63, col. 1 (debate spon-
sored by nonprofit agency); see also Curran, Quality of Life and Treatment Decisions: 
The Canadian Law Reform Report, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 297 (1984) (relating Doe case 
to reform efforts); Kuzma, The Legislative Response to Infant Doe, 59 IND. L.J. 377 
(1984) (discussing legal response to earlier case of Down's syndrome baby in Indiana). 
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medical care. Each of these themes poses a question concerning 
the relationship between the state and the family. Can parents 
count on the state to secure for them a sphere of private deci-
sion making about their child's medical care? Can a stranger to 
the family ask the courts to review parents' medical care deci-
sions about their child? Can the government itself initiate such 
review, and supplant the parents' choice? Central to all these 
questions lies the problem commonly termed "state intervention 
in the family." Baby Jane Doe's case is an emblem of this con-
troversial legal issue. 
Thus, the case seems a prime candidate for analysis in this 
Symposium on state intervention in the family. This article be-
gins by examining arguments over state intervention in the con-
text of legal developments arising around Baby Jane Doe, but it 
then identifies the conceptual ambiguity and emotional com-
plexity that permit debates on these issues to continue without 
resolution. The article then rejects the framework of "state in-
tervention" by showing that arguments cast in those terms over-
look the variety of possible forms and directions of state inter-
vention, and obscure the inevitable role of the state in any 
possible allocation of power to decide the infant's medical 
treatment. 
Further, this article demonstrates how vociferous exchanges 
over the substantive and procedural choices for the state pro-
duce a polarized set of alternatives that fail to express the posi-
tions people actually wish to take, much less the complexity of 
the problem. Rigid and polarized alternatives do not contribute 
to solutions, and instead express and deepen distrust among po-
tential decisionmakers. Yet the polarized structure of the de-
bates seems to tap conflicting parts of the human psyche and, in 
particular, conflicts for each individual over identifying with and 
separating from others. This article maintains that more produc-
tive problem solving would emerge by addressing these very 
sources of conflict and developing approaches that acknowledge 
both the experiences of separateness and of connection that un-
derlie people's responses to cases like Baby Jane Doe's. 
As initial steps in this direction, the article proposes processes 
for decision that: (1) emphasize the obligations of both the state 
and the family in the continuing care of the infant; (2) provide 
for exchanges of information in nonadversarial settings to im-
prove estimates of the experiential meaning of the child's medi-
cal condition and the role of the child's caretakers in shaping 
that meaning; and (3) promote the development of general treat-
ment guidelines removed from crisis situations and with the par-
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ticipation of medical professionals, political authorities, and 
members of the public. These suggestions are not offered as 
cures for the problem, but instead as examples of a problem-
solving approach that addresses the issues of trust and connec-
tion, and distrust and separation in disputes over medical treat-
ment for severely handicapped infants. 
These steps will not yield consensus nor will they produce mu-
tual trust. Yet they may frame the problem in forms that chal-
lenge preconceptions about the handicapped infant, about the 
opponents' positions, and about the decisionmakers' role in the 
options available to the infant. 
Before suggestions of these sorts can be developed, the pre-
vailing conceptions of the problem must be challenged. Section I 
of this article takes on the debate over state intervention by 
demonstrating the multiple meanings signified by "state inter-
vention" in the context of actions taken to affect Baby Jane Doe 
alone, and rejects the terms of the state intervention debate as 
ambiguous and distractingly charged with symbolic meaning. 
Section II recasts the problem as a set of both substantive and 
procedural choices for the state, and suggests how each of these 
choices importantly implicates parents, medical and legal per-
sonnel, and the broader society in the prospects of the infant. 
Because these interpersonal connections may remain obscured 
even when the problem is cast as a set of substantive and proce-
dural choices, the article turns in Section III to reconsider the 
problem expressly in terms of psychological notions of distrust 
and identification. On the basis of this psychological analysis, 
Section III then explores the legal steps that could address 
sources of distrust between parents and children, families and 
governments, and families and strangers. The article in essence 
maintains that deep conflicts about the relationship between the 
self and others-and about the power of the community to make 
individual lives more or less· meaningful-are implicated in each 
decision about medical treatment for a handicapped newborn, 
and that failing to acknowledge these conflicts will not help 
avoid them. Instead, the article proposes taking such conflicts 
seriously as the starting point for making decisions, and adopt-
ing strategies that help address both these deep conflicts and the 
power of the community implicated in the decisions made about 
vulnerable people. 
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I. STATE INTERVENTION: VARIETIES, HOPES, AND FEARS 
In an era when the state intervention problem has manifested 
itself in such controversial issues as abortion, teen-age contra-
ception, and family violence, framing any given case in terms of 
state intervention does not lead to an obvious solution. One's 
view about state intervention often depends upon the result one 
desires in a particular conflict. For example, amid debates over 
Baby Jane Doe, individuals who in other situations argue against 
state intervention in the family found themselves urging state 
involvement. 4 · 
Additionally, state intervention in the family takes various 
forms. Intervention in each instance involves the state in moni-
toring or altering conduct or decisions that would take place 
within a family. The medical treatment of Baby Jane Doe occa-
sioned a variety of governmental actions, not simply an either/or 
choice about the wisdom of state intervention. This Section ex-
amines how the case of Baby Jane Doe illustrates the many 
dimensions of "state intervention" and implicates broader con-
troversies about power, the family, and the state. This Section 
suggests that the state intervention framework adopted by both 
legal and media debate is unhelpful, because it fails to corre-
spond to the variety of choices involved in a case like Baby Jane 
Doe's, and because it expresses but does not explore deep 
sources of distrust about the family and the state. 
A. Varieties of State Intervention 
When people argue about whether the state should intervene 
in family decisions about infant medical care, they could mean 
any one of a combination of governmental actions. As a result, 
arguments cast as a dichotomous choice between "state inter-
vention" and "nonintervention" are misleading and confusing. 
Once the government has the authority to intervene which it 
may or may not exercise-and, indeed, the authority to consider 
its own authority to intervene-the idea of state intervention 
4. See Hentoff, They're Putting Babies on Death Row in Oklahoma, VILLAGE VOICE, 
May 1, 1984, at 8 (discussing civil rights lawyer Martin Gerry). See generally Biklin & 
Ferguson, In the Matter of Baby Jane Doe: Does Reagan Really Agree with Us?, Soc. 
PoL'Y, Summer 1984, at 5, (discussing ironic alliances and strange bedfellows); Hentoff, 
The Awful Privacy of Baby Doe, ATL. MONTHLY, Jan. 1985, at 54, 56 [hereinafter cited as 
Hentoff, The Awful Privacy of Baby Doe]. Here and elsewhere, the debate rests on an 
oversimplified conception of "state." See infra text accompanying note 44 and note 148. 
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fails to have a sharp edge. Debates over medical treatment deci-
sions, however, identify particular governmental powers that 
could be exercised as instances of state intervention to be chal-
lenged or justified. Yet the very variety of governmental powers 
that could be exercised in a given case, like Baby Jane Doe's, 
blurs the notion of state intervention as an either/or proposition. 
Given the legal actions surrounding Baby Jane Doe alone, the 
meaning of state intervention in medical care decisions made by 
parents of disabled infants includes: (1) state judicial availability 
for challenges under parens patriae power or state child protec-
tion statutes; (2) federal judicial review of whether existing law 
governing the disabled applies;11 (3) initiation of federal regula-
tory action to require new procedures within health care institu-
tions; ( 4) enactment of new legislation, whether triggered by 
federal agencies or undertaken independently by state govern-
ments. Governmental involvement can take place at both the 
state and federal level, and can work through legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial action. 6 
All these options could share a direction; all could make it 
more difficult for parents and their own physicians to determine 
the treatment for a disabled newborn. In the current debate, the 
argument against state intervention seems to claim this substan-
tive outcome: intervention by the state is opposed in order to 
secure private choice-making room for parents and doctors. Yet 
the techniques of governmental activity alleged to threaten this 
realm of private choice could also be used to enlarge parental 
and physician choice. In the instance of Baby Jane Doe, this va-
5. Even if the result of the review is a finding that the governing law does not apply, 
the act of judicial review itself "intervenes" and indeed incurs costs in terms of time, 
money, and emotional drain. See Chambers, Baby Doe: Hard Case for Parents and 
Courts, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1984, § 21, at 1, col. 1 (noting that Doe's parents incur 
$36,000 costs in legal fees); Chambers, Parents of 'Baby Doe' Criticized 'Intrusion' by 
U.S., N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1983, at L45, col. 2. The reviewing court in the Baby Jane Doe 
case combined its own independent assessment of whether the parents' medical decision 
was "in the best interest of the infant" with a conclusion that because the decision was 
in the infant's best interests, "there is no basis for judicial intervention." Weber v. Stony 
Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587,589,467 N.Y.S.2d 686,687, aff'd, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 
1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983). Intervention, in this sense, 
must mean judicial supplanting of the parents' decision rather than the exercise of judi-
cial power to assess whether to supplant the parents' choice. Other meanings of interven-
tion are also possible. See also text accompanying note 52. 
6. A form of government intervention may also occur when the government itself 
asks whether it has the authority "to intervene"-that very inquiry involves government 
action of some sort. See infra section II. Governmental power to -determine its own 
power is a standard bootstrap and also a self-monitoring device. Cf. United States v. 
United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (every court has capacity to determine 
its own power to hear the case before it). 
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riety of strategies for state intervention comes together in one 
vivid case study. 
At the heart of this case was a set of disagreements over the 
facts of ihe condition that Baby Jane Doe manifested at birth, 
and related disagreements over the meanings of those condi-
tions. Press critics disputed the facts initially reported in news 
stories about Baby Doe. 7 As initially reported in the major news-
papers, Baby Jane Doe at birth had multiple medical problems, 
including an opening of the bones and coverings of the spinal 
cord, known as spina bifida; an abnormally small head, known as 
microcephaly; and an accumulation of fluid in the cranial re-
gions, known as hydrocephalus. Doctors told her parents. that 
Baby Jane Doe "probably had brain malfunction" and that "the 
part of the brain that controls much of our awareness was either 
missing or not entirely formed." 8 After lengthy consultation with 
medical, religious, and social work professionals, her parents 
chose to decline the option of surgery to close the spinal open-
ing; they approved other measures to respond to the infant's 
conditions. Perhaps, given a different set of descriptions of her 
conditions and her prognosis, Baby Jane Doe's parents would 
have decided differently. As other private and public actors en-
tered the case through a range of intervention strategies, ea~h 
brought their construction of the facts to decisions about the 
infant. 
1. State judicial review- Within two weeks of Baby Jane 
Doe's birth, the state trial court in Suffolk County, New York, 
agreed to hear a challenge to the parents' choice of medical 
treatment for the infant,9 and authorized a guardian ad litem to 
consent to surgical procedures on the infant's behalf.10 This ac-
tion represented several kinds of state involvement. First, the 
state permitted a person unconnected to the family to invoke 
state judicial power to review the parents' decision about the in- · 
7. See Baer, The Half-Told Story of Baby Jane Doe, CoLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov.-
Dec. 1984, at 35 (criticizing press coverage for overly pessimistic estimates of infant's 
prognosis); Hentoff, A Case of Deformed Journalism at 60 Minutes, VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 
3, 1984, at 6 (same); see also infra note 57. 
8. Chambers, Parents of 'Baby Doe' Criticize 'Intrusion' by U.S., N.Y. Times, Nov. 
6, 1983, at L45, col. 2. 
9. A. Lawrence Washburn, a resident of Vermont who had no relationship with the 
New York family of Baby Jane Doe, initiated the lawsuit. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 
60 N.Y.2d 208, 211, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, 64, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 
1026 (1983). Washburn had also initiated or intervened in many prior lawsuits involving 
abortions. Chambers, Advocates for the Right to Life, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1984, § 6 
(Magazine) at 94, 97, 100. 
10. See Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 211, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1187, 469 
N.Y.S.2d 63, 64 (1983). 
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fant's treatment. 11 Second, the state appointed someone other 
than the parents to stand as guardian for the infant. Third, the 
state authorized that guardian to consent to surgery for the 
child but did not authorize the guardian to reiterate the parents' 
decision to forego surgery. The trial court used the notion of 
state intervention to mean an opportunity for judicial review of 
the parents' decision, and to mean judicial authority to super-
sede the parents' decision through an appointed guardian. 
When Baby Doe's parents appealed the trial court decision, 
the appellate division endorsed the notion that courts have 
parens patriae power to review parents' choices about medical 
care for their children. The court nonetheless rejected the exer-
cise of state intervention to supersede the parents' decisions in 
the Baby Jane Doe case. The court concluded that the parents' 
refusal of surgery did not constitute a decision to bring about 
the child's death, as no imminent risk of death absent the sur-
gery existed.12 The appellate court's opinion itself highlighted 
the equivocal meanings of state intervention. The court stated 
that it found "no basis for judicial intervention" even though 
the court itself intervened by interposing its judgment, indepen-
dently reviewing the record, and finding the parents' determina-
tion "to be in the best interest of the infant. "13 The appellate 
division also implicitly affirmed the power of the trial court to 
hear a challenge brought by a private person unrelated to the 
family. 
The initiation of legal proceedings by someone unrelated to 
the family formed the basis for the decision of the New York 
Court of Appeals on review. 14 The Court of Appeals reasoned 
that the petitioner had no direct interest in the medical treat-
ment of the infant because he had no direct relationship to the 
infant; therefore, the trial court should not have entertained pe-
11. Nonrelatives are commonly authorized or even obliged to become involved in 
family health problems through state child abuse and neglect reporting requirements 
placed on teachers, doctors, and other professionals who routinely encounter children. 
See generally R. GoTIESMAN, THE CHILD AND THE LAW 42-43 (1981) (reporting statutes). 
The premise of such requirements is that such individuals have some relationship with 
the child or some professional obligation to guard against risks to children. The person 
permitted to initiate judicial review of the decision by Baby Jane Doe's parents did not 
fall within these categories, and did not act under authorization from a child neglect 
reporting statute, but claimed a sense of obligation to the infant from afar. 
12. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686-87, aff'd, 
60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983). 
13. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686-87, a/f'd, 
60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983). 
14. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983). 
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titioner's suit. The court did acknowledge that the state Depart-
ment of Social Services properly could have invoked review of 
the parents' decision by the state judiciary. As the state agency 
did not take this route, the state judiciary did not belong in the 
medical care decision. 111 Accordingly, the highest state court lim-
ited the power of the state judiciary to cases brought by the 
state bureaucracy rather than by a private person with no rela- . 
tionship to the family. 16 And the New York state court identified 
the state Department of Social Services as the avenue for state 
governance of family affairs. 17 
2. Federal judicial review- Another form of state interven-
tion arose with federal action in the case. The federal govern-
ment entered the fray when the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) filed suit in federal district court against 
the hospital treating Baby Jane Doe under the federal statute 
prohibiting discrimination against the handicapped, section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.18 The federal court accepted 
the suit as a proper invocation of federal judicial authority 
under the statute, but rejected the agency's claim because the 
government failed to establish that the hospital violated the 
statute and discriminated against a handicapped person.19 The 
court additionally concluded that section 504 did not authorille 
the federal government to force the hospital to release its 
15. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983). 
16. The court neither precluded nor invited suits initiated by other family members, 
nor did the court define who, in addition to a parent, has "direct interest" in such a case. 
The court expressly identified only the state child protection agency as entitled to initi-
ate judicial proceedings to challenge parental judgments: "All other persons and entities 
may only file a petition if directed to do so by the court." Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 
60 N.Y.2d 208, 212, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, 64. The court additionally 
warned that any contrary rule permitting others to initiate judicial action in this context 
would "challenge the most private and most precious responsiblity vested in the parents 
for the care and nurture of their children-and at the very least to force the parents to 
incur the not inconsiderable expenses of extended litigation." Id. at 213, 456 N.E.2d at 
1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 65. 
17. See infra text accompanying note 34 ( describing action taken by N. Y. Depart-
ment of Social Services). 
18. United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (invoking 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504 codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)), 
aff'd, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3040 (Aug. 6, 1985) (No. 84-
1529). 
19. The court reasoned that the hospital declined to perform surgery on the infant 
not due to discrimination against a handicapped person, but due to her parents' refusal 
to consent to surgery; the court also concluded that the parents' refusal was reasonable. 
United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607, 614-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (invoking 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504 codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)), 
aff'd, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3040 (Aug. 6, 1985) (No. 84-
1529). 
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records to the agency or the court. 20 And the court denied stand-
ing to sue to the individual who initiated the state court suit for 
the appointment of a guardian for Baby Jane Doe. 21 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
firmed the district court's conclusion but rephrased the issue to 
consider whether section 504 even reached the situation of a pa-
rental medical treatment decision for a disabled newborn. 22 The 
court examined the terms of the statute, which forbid recipients 
of federal funds from denying to any "otherwise qualified handi-
capped individual" any benefits of any program receiving federal 
assistance, and also prohibit discrimination against such persons 
by these programs. 23 Finding any application of this language to 
the medical treatment of an infant less than clear, the court con-
cluded that Congress did not intend the statute to deal with the 
issue raised in the case of Baby Jane Doe, and affirmed the dis-
trict court's denial of the Department's claim.u 
20. The court approved the government's intervention given its interest in federal 
funds received by the hospital, but the court found no reason to grant access to the 
infant's medical records to the government, under the facts of the case. United States v. 
University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607, 613-14, 616 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (invoking the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973, § 504 codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)), aff'd, 729 F.2d 
144 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3040 (Aug. 6, 1985) (No. 84-1529). 
21. United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607, 610, 613-14, 616 (E.D.N.Y. 
1983) (invoking the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504 codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 
794 (1982)), aff'd, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3040 (Aug. 6, 
1985) (No. 84-1529). 
22. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 54 
U.S.L.W. 3040 (Aug. 6, 1985) (No. 84-1529). 
23. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. 
granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3040 (Aug. 6, 1985) (No. 84-1529). 
24. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 154-55, 156-61 (2d Cir. 1984), 
cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3040 (Aug. 6, 1985) (No. 84-1529). Both courts' reasoning 
rests on solid ground. The language of § 504 itself gives no authority for federal review of 
parental decisions about medical treatment for their severely disabled infants. Parents 
are not governed by the Act, which prohibits discrimination "under any program or ac-
tivity receiving federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973). The government 
itself has conceded that parents are not covered by § 504. 49 Fed. Reg. 1631 (1984). And 
it is the parents' decision, not the hospital's or health care providers'-that determines 
whether medical treatment will be pursued or foregone. Discrimination under § 504 also 
is an ill-suited rubric to make sense of the complicated medical treatment decisions 
made by parents. Nor does § 504 authorize federal review of whether health care person-
nel are fulfilling their state law obligations to report or otherwise respond to instances of 
child neglect. Indeed, such an interpretation would convert § 504 into a master key to 
open all state law enforcement practices to federal scrutiny on the issue of 
discrimination. 
Should there be any ambiguity in the meaning of § 504 in this context, it should not 
be resolved to authorize greater federal control of the traditional areas of state concern: 
family law and regulation of medicine. The 1984 Amendments of the Child Abuse Act 
acknowledge as much in establishing a federal program that relies on state law and state 
law enforcement in these areas. See 50 Fed. Reg. 14,878, 14,879 (Apr. 15, 1985) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 1340). See also Letter from Senator Hatch to Senator Weicker, 
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Under this analysis, the HHS wrongly invoked the power of 
the federal court because the statute asserted to authorize fed-
eral involvement did not govern the case. The court thereby re-
moved section 504 from possible bases for invoking the power of 
the federal courts to review parental medical care decisions. New 
federal regulatory activity under the statute undoubtedly will al-
ter the course of future litigation. 25 
3. Federal regulatory action- The Second Circuit decision 
collided with an ongoing effort by HHS to regulate medical 
treatment for disabled newborns through administrative action. 
HHS began this effort in 1982 after an earlier Baby Doe case. A 
Down's syndrome infant died in Indiana in 1982 after the par-
ents declined to consent to surgery to remedy a malformed 
esophagus and to allow the hospital to provide nutrition to the 
infant. 26 Responding to public criticism from handicapped rights 
and right to life groups, President Reagan instructed the Secre-
tary of HHS to notify health care providers that section 504 gov-
erned the treatment of handicapped patients.27 HHS in turn no-
tified 7,000 hospitals of this requirement, and later issued 
130 Cong. Rec. 12392 (Sept. 28, 1984) ("Throughout the statutory language and accom-
panying explanatory material, we refer to authority under state law as the mechanism 
for pursuing legal remedies under our amendment. This legislation does not itself au-
thorize direct federal involvement in individual cases."). Federal hearings about alleged 
discrimination in parental treatment decisions thus have neither authority nor guidance 
from the language or legislative history of § 504, or from the traditional allocation of 
power between the federal and state government in these areas. Especially given the 
complexity and contest.ability of treatment decisions for severely handicapped newborns, 
this hardly seems a wise occasion for straining to invent new interpretations of federal 
discrimination law. 
25. New rules announced by the Department of Health and Human Services (a) add 
a new definition of "withholding medically indicated treatment" and new exceptions to 
the definition, see infra note 77; (b) detail the state child protective programs that must 
be in place before a state may obtain federal support under the statute; (c) provide 
model guidelines to encourage the development of Infant Care Review committees. Office 
of Human Development Services, Department of Health and Human Services, Child 
Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program, 50 Fed. Reg.14,878, 14,893 (Apr. 
15, 1985) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 1340). Some have argued that the proposed 
regulations violated the terms of the compromise struck in the governing statute, see id. 
at 14,879 (reporting comments on proposed rule, including objections by sponsors of the 
legislation) but the final rules eliminate most terms giving rise to such comments. Litiga-
tion challenging the regulations is foreseeable. Still, since the final version of the regula-
tion treats much of its interpretive language simply as guides rather than binding rules 
of law, id. at 14,880, the courts can hew closely to the language of the statute itself. 
26. Kuzma, supra note 3, at 378-79; see Lyon, Playing God in the Nursery, REDBOOK, 
Jan. 1985, at 112 (describing background of the Indiana Doe case). 
27. 49 Fed. Reg. 1622-23 (1984) (detailing history). Republicans interested in a con-
servative social agenda claim credit for this regulatory effort. See Bird, U.S. Role in 
'Baby Doe' Case Defended by Surgeon General, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1983, at B4, col. 3); 
Chambers, supra note 9, at 97-100, 105. 
SUMMER 1985] Beyond State Intervention 943 
regulations that required health care providers receiving federal 
funds to post large signs in public view warning that discrimina-
tory treatment of disabled newborns violated section 504, and 
that any observer should report suspected violations to a tele-
phone hotline maintained by HHS. 28 Calls made to the hotline 
triggered federal investigations.29 Presumably, if an investigation 
produced a finding of a violation of section 504, the Department 
could move to terminate federal funds to the offending facility. 30 
After a federal district court ruled the HHS regulations in-
valid on procedural grounds,31 HHS proceeded to reissue the 
regulations with a few changes. 32 The final version of the rule 
responded to comments from groups like the American Academy 
of Pediatrics. As a result, the rule encouraged the use of Infant 
Care Review Committees within the health care facilities, al-
though HHS refused to allow such committees to substitute for 
a continued federal presence through the hotline and 
investigations. 33 
28. 48 Fed. Reg. 9630 (1983) (interim final rule). The revised final rule requires notice 
that "[d]iscriminatory failure to feed and care for handicapped infants in this facility is 
prohibited by federal law. Any person having knowledge that a handicapped infant is 
being discriminatory (sic) denied food or customary medical care should immediately 
contact: Handicapped Infant Hotline .... " 49 Fed. Reg. 1622, 1625 (1984). 
29. In issuing the final version of its section rule, HHS summarized the cases it had 
handled by that time; most either had resulted in findings of no legal violation or were 
closed administratively due to insufficient complaint. 49 Fed. Reg. 1622, 1642-43 (1984). 
30. Chambers, Federal District Judge Dismisses U.S. Bid for Handicapped Records, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1983, at 1, col 4. The government also asserted it could terminate 
funds if the hospital failed to turn over the baby's medical records. Chambers, A Legal 
Knot in Baby Case, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1983, at Bl, col. 5. The federal district court, 
however, rejected the government's request for records. United States v. University 
Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607, 614 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. 
granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3040 (Aug. 6, 1985) (No. 84-1528). 
31. The American Academy of Pediatrics challenged the regulations in federal dis-
trict court as arbitrary and capricious, and on the ground that HHS erroneously issued 
the regulations without affording opportunity for advance notice and public comment on 
proposed regulations as mandated by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 
(1976). Federal District Judge Gerhardt Gessell accepted these challenges, and criticized 
the regulations on the merits as showing the shallow consideration behind the agency 
rule; the decision declared the entire interim final rule invalid. American Academy of 
Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 399-400 (D.D.C. 1983). In dicta, the opinion 
speculated on the applicability of section 504 and the Constitution. See American Acad-
emy of Pediatrics, 561 F. Supp. at 401-03. 
32. The required sign was smaller and could be posted in view of authorized medical 
personnel only instead of in public areas in the health care facilities. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 
(1984). Again HHS relied on section 504 as authority for the rules, but this time the 
agency made the regulations available for comment in proposed form before issuing final 
and effective rules. 
33. Boyd, U.S. Is Easing Rules on Birth-Defect Infants, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1984, at 
24, col. 1. HHS received some 17,000 comments on the proposed regulations. Chambers, 
Broad Effects Expected From Case of Baby Doe, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1983, at B2, col. 
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In summary, the federal agency sought to establish a direct 
federal review of medical treatment decisions for disabled 
newborns in addition to the state governmental involvement 
through parens patriae judicial review or state agency action. 34 
Yet the federal regulation again proved short-lived; a federal 
district court struck it down as exceeding the scope of section 
504. The court relied expressly on the Second Circuit's decision 
a few months earlier in the Baby Jane Doe case.35 
4. Federal and state legislation- Still another federal re-
sponse to the Baby Jane Doe case, and others like it, came in 
September, 1984, when both the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives agreed on an amendment to an appropriations pro-
gram intended to combat child abuse and neglect.36 The amend-
ment added a requirement that states receiving federal grants 
under the program authorize state child protective agencies to 
pursue legal remedies to prevent the withholding of "medically 
indicated treatment from disabled infants with life-threatening 
conditions. " 37 
4. 
34. State agency action did occur finally for Baby Jane Doe; New York State authori-
ties concluded a week and a half after the New York Court of Appeals decision that the 
Department of Social Services had no basis to intervene in the matter. United States v. 
University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 1984). State intervention again was given 
two meanings: the authority for an investigation of a parental decision, which the state 
did assert, and the exercise of that authority to seek a judicial review of the parental 
decision, which the agency declined to do here. 
35. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 541, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The 
district court declined to assess the effect of the Supreme Court's recent decision in 
Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), which ruled that federal antidiscrimina-
tion requirements associated with federal grants apply only to the programs directly 
funded by those grants rather than to the entire institution surrounding those programs. 
36. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (1984). The 
President signed the bill into law on Oct. 9, 1984. See 42 U.S.L.W. 5101. 
37. Pub. L. No. 98-457, § 122(3), 98 Stat. 1749 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)). 
Congress defined "withholding of medically indicated treatment" as: 
the failure to respond to the infant's life-threatening conditions by providing 
treatment (including appropriate nutrition, hydration, and medication) which, in 
the treating physician's or physicians' reasonable medical judgment, will be most 
likely to be effective in ameliorating or correcting all such conditions, except 
that the term does not include the failure to provide treatment (other than ap-
propriate nutrition, hydration, or medication) to an infant when, in the treating 
physician's or physicians' reasonable medical judgment, (A) the infant is chroni-
cally and irreversibly comatose; (B) the provision of such treatment would (i) 
merely prolong dying, (ii) not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the 
infant's life-threatening conditions, or (iii) otherwise be futile in terms of the 
survival of the infant; or (C) the provision of such treatment would be virtually 
futile in terms of the survival of the infant and the treatment itself under such 
circumstances would be inhumane. 
§ 121(3). Congress ·also required each state participating in the grants program to estab-
lish methods for coordinating and consulting with individuals designated within the 
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This enactment represents an elaborate version of the final 
method of governmental involvement, legislation, for here fed-
eral legislation seeks to produce state legislation. The child 
abuse amendment makes federal moneys available to states on 
the condition that the states undertake legal enforcement of 
standards established by the federal government to monitor the 
medical treatment decisions made by parents and their 
physicians. 38 
Thus, state and federal judicial, legislative, and regulatory ac-
tivity each constituted avenues for "state intervention" in the 
case of Baby Jane Doe. This range of possibilities is obscured by 
rhetoric favoring or opposing state intervention. Yet the simplis-
tic state intervention argument carries intense commitment and 
makes opponents appear irreconcilable. Such intensity and an-
tagonism over state intervention in the family, I will suggest, ex-
health care facilities, and notifying these individuals of suspected instances of medical 
neglect. The Act's requirements for infants specifically apply only to children under one 
year of age, but Congress also indicated that changes of care should not occur after a 
child passes that age. Regulations developed under the amendments elaborate these re-
quirements and also include a model for hospital infant care review committees. See 50 
Fed. Reg. 14,878-901. These provisions are discussed infra at text accompanying notes 77 
and 138. 
38. Any argument that this federal requirement might violate the autonomy of the 
states seems effectively eliminated with the Supreme Court decision overruling National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985). In Garcia, the Court ruled that any substantive restraint 
on the federal government's power under the commerce clause stems not from asserted 
spheres of state autonomy, but instead from the procedural nature of constitutional limi-
tations. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1020-21. Although family law has traditionally fallen within 
the domain of state sovereign power, the Garcia ruling suggests that this notion of tradi-
tional state sovereign powers would not place substantive limits on federal congressional 
power exercised under the commerce clause. Moreover, the increasing constitutionaliza-
tion of family law matters undermines the claim that the states alone govern domestic 
relations. Further, even under National League of Cities, states which chose to take 
moneys from the federal government subject to conditions like the enactment of state 
laws advancing specified federal aims may well have been bound to fulfill those condi-
tions, despite any claims of state autonomy. 
In any case, state statutory authority may be used to pursue directly the monitoring of 
parental medical treatment decisions, even absent federal pressure. Three states have 
already enacted laws that specifically deal with deprivation of care to newborns: ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620 (Supp. 1984-85) (requiring medical personnerto report to the 
state if they have reasonable grounds to believe there has been a denial or deprivation of 
necessary medical care, surgery, or nourishment with intent to cause or allow death of a 
child); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 40:1299.36.1 (West Supp. 1985) (forbidding denial of nutri-
tion, water, or oxygen with intent to cause or allow the death of a child, but not requiring 
medical or surgical care when child's parent or parents along with physicians conclude 
that potential risks outweigh potential benefits of treatment); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
3212 (Purdon 1983) (requiring customary infant medical care for any infant born alive). 
See also Feldman & Murray, State Legislation and the Handicapped Newborn: A Moral 
and Political Dilemma, LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE, Sept. 1984, at 156-63 (criticizing 
state statutes for sloppiness and faulty assumptions). 
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presses broader issues. What is at stake is not just the merits of 
arguments over state intervention, but deeper attitudes about 
the meanings and consequences of basic legal and political 
arrangements. 39 
B. Intervention: Hopes and Fears 
As a first effort to see beneath the surface of debates over a 
case like Baby Jane Doe's, it is worth asking what beliefs under-
lie arguments about the merits of state intervention into the 
family, distinct from arguments about the merits of the medical 
treatment question. Debates about governmental intervention in 
other issues of family law illuminate this question. Pro-choice 
advocates in the abortion debate consistently argue for freedom 
from state intervention in the private decision made by a woman 
in consultation with her doctor.40 Legal and political debate con-
cerning a minor's freedom to have an abortion focuses on claims 
that the state should require notification to the teen's parents 
before she may elect an abortion.41 Contraception and new pro-
creative technologies implicate similar questions.42 Violence in 
the family, notably child and spouse abuse, have garnered public 
and legislative attention, but controversy continues over when 
39. Similar debates over governmental intervention occupy the attention of scholars 
and policy makers concerned with state action in the context of federal constitutional 
law, and also governmental regulation of the marketplace and the workplace. See 
Friendly, The Public/Priuate Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982). State interven-
tion in the areas of family and sexuality may be opposed by the very people who favor it 
in the context of economic regulation and labor relations; similarly, those who oppose 
governmental involvement in the economy may favor it in the context of family and 
sexuality, see Mnookin, The Public/Priuate Dichotomy: Political Disagreement and Ac-
ademic Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1429, 1430-34 (1982). At work in these debates 
are deep disagreements over visions of society, virtue, and justice, rather than disagree-
ments over the issue of state intervention per se. 
40. See K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 98-100 (1984). 
41. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (ruling, over dissent, that notification 
requirement is constitutional for dependent, immature minor living with parents). Fed-
eral and state regulatory efforts to impose parental notification requirements for minors 
seeking abortions or access to contraceptives have triggered controversies. Note, Un-
emancipated Minors' Rights of Access to Contraceptiues Without Parental Consent or 
Notice-The Squeal Rule and Beyond, 8 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 219 (1982); See Com-
ment, The Distribution of Contraceptiues to Unemancipated Minors: Does a Parent 
Haue a Constitutional Right to be Notified?, 69 Kv. L.J. 436 (1980-81). Certainly, such 
notification requirements would put some minors at risk of interference or rejection by 
their parents. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S., at 425, 437-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
42. See generally Note, Reproductiue Technology and the Procreation Rights of the 
Unmarried, 98 HARV. L. REV. 669 (1985) (discussing state rules governing access to new 
reproductive technologies and related constitutional protections). 
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the state should intervene. 43 
In all of these areas, advocates sometimes treat state interven-
tion as an intrinsic evil that jeopardizes norms of freedom, au-
tonomy, and intimacy. At other times, participants in public de-
bate cast state intervention as an important force for good, 
necessary to protect the weak from private oppression and to 
ensure justice. In a profound sense, the state can be seen as both 
a force for good and evil. Yet the passions of public debate seem 
to lead people to emphasize one view and suppress the other. 
The particular policy context rather than consistent political 
philosophy appears to determine when a given group approves 
of state intervention; yet each view of state intervention invokes 
a contrasting picture of family and family law. 
1. The family-A haven of love and respect- One view 
identifies the family as a cherished enclave, removed from the 
hustle and cruelty of the marketplace, the impersonal treatment 
of the state, and the intolerances of majorities. In this view of 
the family, love and affection, rather than rules, govern; author-
ity should be trusted, not regulated; the powerful have the inter-
ests of the powerless at heart; members share property free from 
the marketplace rules of exchange; and sex between spouses is 
love and legal. Under this view of the family, the law should 
keep the state out of the family as much as possible and should 
shield the family from "state intervention.""" State control of 
43. Child abuse legislation may have resolved most of the controversy over state in-
cursion in the family sphere in this area by treating abuse as a medical issue and as an 
instance of individual deviance. See B. NELSON, MAKING AN IssuE OF CHILD ABUSE: POLIT-
ICAL AGENDA SETTING FOR Soc1AL PROBLEMS 17-19 (1984). Nonetheless, critics charge the 
state with overintrusiveness and arbitrary state intrusion under vague child abuse stat-
utes. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
16-18 (1979). Resistance to state intervention in spouse abuse matters may persist even 
after state legislatures adopt statutes authorizing state action: police, prosecutors, and 
clerks still resist the use of the state apparatus to deal with this problem in the family. 
See Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (citing police's 
and clerks' failures to process charges of spouse abuse), rev'd, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407 
N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979); 
DeRenzo & Strawn, Development of Policy for the Middlesex County District Attorney 
in the Area of Family Violence: Sentencing Guidelines and the Need for a Systematic 
Approach (Mar. 22, 1985) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.) 
(substantiating that police tend not to make arrests, clerks dissuade women from filing 
complaints). 
44. See- Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 
96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1501, 1504-08 (1983). Yet from another perspective, this same 
conception entails state ratification of particular family forms and family relationships. 
Id. The risk of analysis of this sort is its tendency to treat complex, human interactions 
as simplified abstract concepts like "family" and "state." Because this simplification 
characterizes much popular and legal analysis, I explore it in its own terms, infra text 
accompanying note 148. 
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how families live violates the purpose of the democratic order, 
which aims to constrain state tyranny and to promote private 
freedoms. 45 The law, consequently, should guard families from 
public intrusions in parents' special authority over decisions 
about conceiving and raising children. Similarly, the law should 
shield families from strangers or governmental authorities who 
might challenge family members' decisions about abortion, disci-
pline, and styles of living. In sum, risks of state abuse pose 
greater dangers than risks of abuse within the family. 
2. The family-a hell of oppression and brutality- A sec-
ond view portrays the family as a center of oppression, raw will 
and authority, violence and brutality, where the powerful eco-
nomically and sexually subordinate and exploit the powerless.46 
45. See P. BERGER & E. BERGER, THE WAR OVER THE FAMILY (1983). One traditional 
view conceived of the family as the arena of mutual benevolence and moral commitment, 
where concerns about rights and justice were virtually irrelevant. See M. SANDEL, LIBER-
ALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 31, 33-34 (1982) (discussing Hume); M. WALZER, 
SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 227 (1983) [hereinafter cited 
as M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JusTICE) (describing a view of family as beyond the reach of 
distributive justice, though threatened by the state and market). A modern version of 
this view identifies the psychological needs of the children as a reason to limit state 
intervention and assure parental autonomy. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, 
supra note 43, at 9-12. To some extent, contemporary constitutional law embodies this 
commitment to treat family relations as nurturing and conflict-free in order to promote 
such relationships, free from external control. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 
(1979) ("The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess 
what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment .... More impor-
tant, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in 
the best interests of their children."); Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 SuP. 
CT. REV. 329, 343 (discussing Supreme Court assumption of harmony between parental 
and children's interests). 
A related conception treats the family as refuge from the public world, but a refuge 
increasingly intruded upon by professionals and social service agencies. See C. LASCH, 
HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD xxiii-xxiv, 165-66, 172-73 (1979); W. MCWILLIAMS, THE 
IDEA OF FRATERNITY IN AMERICA 193, 469 (1973). A contrasting, but compatible, interpre-
tation suggests that the family was never a locus for liberalism, but instead embodied the 
fading values of an organic society amid the public commitment to "free men and 
women, tied together only by their contracts." Walzer, Nervous Liberals, in RADICAL 
PRINCIPLES: REFLECTIONS OF AN UNRECONSTRUCTED DEMOCRAT 92, 98 (1980). Rather than 
being unregulated, the family under this interpretation is the central locus of moral and 
religious socialization and the critical unit for establishing order within the state. See S. 
TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST INTEREST? CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 111 
(1982). This interpretation supplies a bridge to the second view of the family, as a center 
of oppression and domination over its members; the notion of a golden age of stable 
family authority itself comes under question here. Elder, Approaches to Social Change 
and the Family, in TURNING POINTS: HISTORICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS ON THE FAM-
ILY 57 (1978). 
46. This view is advanced in efforts to expose the prevalence of the physical and 
sexual abuse of women and children. See R. KEMPE & C. KEMPE, CHILD ABusE (1978); F. 
RusH, THE BEST KEPT SECRET: SEXUAL ABusE OF CHILDREN (1980); Eisenberg & Micklow, 
The Assaulted Wiie: 'Catch 22' Revisited, 3 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 138, 138-39 (1977). 
This picture also includes the violent responses of victims to their victimization. See 
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Many conclude from this version of the family as hell that law 
should protect individual family members from one another. 
The state should regulate or preclude parental decisions about 
whether children work, learn, drink alcohol, or drive automo-
biles. Similarly, state officials should scrutinize parental deci-
sions to abort a fetus and to discipline a child.47 Court orders 
should be available to individuals within the family to restrain 
other family members from hurting them or denying them their 
own freedoms of choice. 
I have described the alternative views of the family in stark 
and simplistic terms to clarify the hopes and fears underlying 
the state intervention debate. Some in the debate seem to fear 
the family more than the state and others reverse the order of 
fears. Opponents of state intervention in cases like Baby Jane 
Doe's argue, in effect, that the family represents a trustworthy 
enclave in which, presumptively, decisionmakers act from love 
rather than rules. Therefore, the delicate and anguishing deci-
sions about how to care for a disabled or even dying child should 
belong to the family.48 In contrast, advocates of state interven-
tion argue that society should not trust the family to make a 
Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623 (1980) (analyzing self-defense claims of battered wives). Re-
cent scholarship also pays attention to the family's oppression of men. See B. 
EHRENREICH, THE HEARTS OF MEN (1983). For a masterful argument that the family 
forges conceptions of self and sexuality that produce complex patterns of domination, 
see Benjamin, Master & Slave: the Fantasy of Erotic Domination, in THE POWERS OF 
DESIRE 280-99 (1983) (describing complex patterns of domination in conceptions of self 
and sexuality developed within the family). Cf. M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE, supra 
note 45, at 235 (emotional tyranny by parents over children intrinsic to sphere of 
kinship). 
47. See Swedes Outlaw Spanking, in WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, PARENTAL 
AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 70 (1980) (describing Swedish law outlawing all corporal 
punishment by parents). 
48. Big Brother Doe, Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1983, § 1, at 30, col. 1. 
What we most certainly know is that, barring the most extreme circumstances, 
we do not want the decision made by some bureaucrat or some coven of lawyers. 
The inevitable agony will be much less if these decisions, and any mistakes, are 
left to families involved; most often the families will decide on the basis of love, 
and in any event, it is the family that must live with the resulting burden or 
guilt. 
A New York Times editorial based its reasoning on a quotation from the infant's mother: 
"We know, [Baby Jane Doe's] mother said, that as she grew older she would always be 
an infant. She would never know love. And while she might feel sorrow and joy, her 
overall condition would be pain." Baby Jane's Defender, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1983 at 
A30, col. 1. The appellate division decision expressly noted that Baby Doe's parents were 
"concededly concerned and loving," Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 467 
N.Y.S.2d 685, aff'd, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, cert. denied, 464 
U.S. 1026; see also supra text accompanying note 13 (discussing appellate division 
decision). 
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proper decision about the medical care of a disabled infant be-
cause the family is an unruly center of oppression, victimizing 
the vulnerable. 49 
Yet this initial effort to peer beneath the surface of public de-
bate raises new questions. Why do alternate pictures of family 
and state animate public debate? How could anyone latch on to 
such simplistic images of family or state, when there are reasons 
to trust and distrust both? Perhaps particular understandings of 
recent history matter here. The state intervention debate may 
express varied responses to a widely shared belief that familial 
relationships have changed over the past several centuries. Fam-
ilies are no longer trustworthy, and professionals now serve func-
tions once served by family members. According to this view, 
increasing "legalization" of relationships emerges as family 
members neglect their duties and as individuals must negotiate 
relationships founded in contract to fill human needs. "0 Whether 
this shared belief is accurate,"1 people have demanded and cre-
ated legal solutions to their mounting distrust within social 
relationships. 
Yet a debate cast as though there is an either/or deci-
sion-either the state should intervene or not-may tap into 
these sources of distrust about both the family and the state. 
Such an either/or debate fails to offer bases for addressing the 
sources of distrust and obscures the complexity of family and 
state relations. This debate also hides the varied meanings of 
state intervention and mistakenly suggests that there can be a 
simple answer-yes or no-to the question, should the state in-
tervene. The next Section challenges a fundamental assumption 
that state intervention can be avoided and then examines the 
conceptual debates that remain after exposing that assumption. 
49. A New York Times editorial quotes Dr. Koop as saying, "[i]f we do not intrude 
into the life of a child such as this, whose civil rights may be abrogated? The next person 
may be you." Raby Jane's Defender, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1983, at A30, col. 1. See also 
Biklen & Ferguson, supra note 4, at 4-5 (criticizing those who would subordinate child's 
life to family's interests in avoiding burdens of disabled child). 
50. See C. LASCH, supra note 45; cf. Neal & Kirp, The Allure of Legalization Recon-
sidered: The Case of Special Education, 48 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., 63, 65-89 (1985) 
(describing educational relationships as increasingly regulated and due process norms 
interposed; legalization has costs and expresses distrust of the practices that would oth-
erwise prevail). 
51. The attribution to a prior era of all the longings of the present may well be at 
work here. See generally 0. BETIEMANN, THE Gooo OLD DAYS-THEY WERE TERRIBLE 
(1974) (using archival materials to expose pain and despair of periods called "the good 
old days"). 
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II. CHOICES FOR THE STATE 
951 
The existence of the competing conceptions of family and 
state partially explains the heat in debates over state interven-
tion in the family. People may fundamentally disagree about 
their conceptions; people also may be ambivalent and find them-
selves hotly disagreeing precisely because they can see the power 
of the opposing view. The debate concerning the propriety of 
state intervention remains futile because both sides of the de-
bate rely on the faulty assumption that state intervention can 
ever be avoided. I maintain instead that some degree of state 
intervention always exists. The argument is not simply that the 
state always has power to assess its own power to intervene, al-
though it is worth noting how this latent state power casts a 
shadow over parental decision making. But expressing more 
than this latent power, the state always intervenes because it al-
locates power over the medical care decision, whether it carves 
out a sphere of parental autonomy or instead permits strangers 
or state officials to challenge and supplant parental decisions.112 
There may be important conceptual differences between and 
among state decisions (1) to order medical treatment (or forbid 
it), regardless of what parents or doctors would want; (2) to ap-
prove or disapprove medical treatment (or nontreatment) as de-
cided by others; or (3) to assign unreviewable decisionmaking 
power over the medical decision to others (parents or medical 
personnel). Such conceptual distinctions do not capture the ac-
tual array of choices in the prevailing legal order which assigns 
the medical treatment decision as an initial matter to the par-
ents or guardians, but reserves to the state the power to review 
that decision. In essence, then, the current debate focuses on the 
52. This point is suggested by David Chambers's observation that "legalization" can 
mean both state rules prohibiting and state rules permitting a given human activity; 
either position taken by the state amounts to a legal choice. Chambers, The "Legaliza-
tion" of the Family: Toward a Policy of Supportive Neutrality, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 
805, 805 (1985). Even with this recognition, it is still meaningful to discuss the merits of 
state decisions to grant greater latitude of choice to family members. See id. at 807. 
Of course, a range of political and legal theorists argue that individuals, including par-
ents, enjoy rights prior to and beyond the control of the state, see, e.g., J. RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA ix, 113-14 (1974). The 
relevance of these claims diminishes, however, given the density of state regulation of 
family life, described in the text, and the historical context in which current controver-
sies occur against the backdrop of state-allocated power to parents. General efforts to 
define state power over freedom of association-including freedom to form fami-
lies-underscore the central involvement of state power in regulating such "free" as-
sociations. See S. BENN & R. PETERS, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL TuouGHT 344-49 
(1959). 
952 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 18:4 
range of meanings that could be contained within position (2) 
above, even though some spokespeople advocate positions 
sounding like (1) and (3). If all three options were real possibili-
ties, the state could be more or less directly involved in the ac-
tivities of ordering, approving, and assigning decisionmaking 
power, yet these distinctions do not touch the central point 
here-that the state cannot be neutral as to these allocations 
and their results. 
For example, the state intervenes through child abuse and 
neglect statutes and enforcement mechanisms in every state, 
even with regard to parents who the state never prosecutes, sim-
ply by enacting the laws. Like general criminal statutes that 
constitute state regulation even for the law-abiding, such stand-
ards of parental duty perpetually subject parents to review by 
state officials and induce parents to internalize norms estab-
lished by the state. The state also controls parents through rules 
obliging medical professionals who regularly deal with children 
to report to the state evidence of possible abuse or neglect of 
child patients by their parents or others.63 Further, all states in-
terpose public norms about aspects of child care by requiring 
attendance at school and regulating work opportunities. 64 The 
state licenses marriage, establishes child support obligations, 
and imposes sanctions on parents whose children fail to attend 
school or run afoul of other laws.116 Finally, many legal rules sup-
53. See V. DE FRANCIS, CHILD ABusE LEGISLATION IN THE 1970's 2-10 (1974); Sussman, 
Reporting Child Abuse: A Review of the Literature, 8 FAM. L.Q. 245 (1974). 
54. For a discussion of the multiple antecendants to state compelled education, see 
Tyack, Ways of Seeing: An Essay on the History of Compulsory Schooling, 46 HARV. 
EDuc. REV. 355 (1976). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (finding state 
authority to compel school attendance, but granting an exception for Amish who claim 
compulsory high school attendance undermines their religious way of life); Pierce v. Soci-
ety of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (finding state power to compel schooling, but not to 
preclude parental choice of private or parochial school). For consideration of state con-
trol of child labor, see Marks, Detours on the Road to Maturity: A View of the Legal 
Conceptions of Growing Up and Letting Go, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, 
at 78, and Stern, Smith & Doolittle, How Children Used to Work, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Summer 1975, at 93, 102-04. See also Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 
203, 212, 213 (1982) (restricting child labor). 
55. On marriage regulations, see H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 35-36 (1968). 
Blackstone described the parental duty of child support as longstanding even when he 
wrote. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 446-48. Recent federal 
efforts have strengthened and complicated state statutes obliging child support. See, e.g., 
Federal-state "Intercept" program, 9 FAM. L. REP. 2257 (1983); see also J. CASSETTY, THE 
PARENTAL CHILD-SUPPORT OBLIGATION (1983) (describing child support laws and enforce-
ment practices); H. CLARK, supra, at 187-89 (describing state statutes). Sanctions for par-
ents whose children fail to attend school were at issue in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 
205 (1972). Although the parents in that case were excused, the law itself remained in 
force. For careful discussions of power relationships among parents, child, and state, see 
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port a conception of parents as agents of the state, rather than 
vice versa, concerning matters of child care. 56 
Rather than marking a boundary limiting state intervention in 
the family, then, laws governing the family define the kind of 
substantive and procedural governance of the family that the 
state undertakes. Consequently, problems such as those in Baby 
Jane Doe's case present not questions concerning when the state 
should intervene, but instead substantive questions about which 
decisions regarding the child the state should approve, as well as 
procedural questions about which decisionmakers the state 
should permit, monitor, or supersede. 
Some may claim that the term "state intervention" means, in 
popular debate, excessive or overt governmental actions sup-
planting the decisions or freedoms of private persons. Such defi-
nitions, however, are deficient because they build into the very 
term the issues needing exposure to debate: what issues of state 
power are excessive, and when does a particular state allocation 
of power stir controversy rather than fade into routine? Accord-
ingly, this article will no longer use the phrase "state interven-
tion" except with reference to the debate itself, and instead will 
focus on the specific kinds of choices the state must make. 
Recasting the issues in this way does not resolve them, but it 
does lift the controversy from the wooden and ambiguous state 
intervention debate, with its false dichotomy of intervention ver-
sus nonintervention. When one acknowledges the state's sub-
stantive and procedural choices, the difficulty of those choices 
also comes into view. Substantive choices concern what kinds of 
medical care decisions one should make given competing ideas 
about life, death, and human relationships. Procedural choices 
concern who should make those decisions, what forums for chal-
lenge should exist, and who should resolve disagreements among 
the decisionmakers. These i'ssues of substantive and procedural 
choices present complicated alternatives and the potential for 
endless controversy. Indeed, the same tendency to oversimplify 
the problem into dichotomous choices reappears in discussions 
of the substantive and procedural choices. Yet once again com-
plex and multiple variations more accurately describe the 
choices for the state, rather than polarized, either/or alterna-
tives. This Section explores these choices. 
Kleinfeld, Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents, and the State, (pts. 1-2 & 3) 
4 FAM. L.Q. 320, 410 (1970); 5 FAM. L.Q. 64 (1971). 
56. See Kleinfeld, supra note 55. 
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A. Substantive Choices 
Substantive choices concern which results the state should 
favor, whether by approving certain parental decisions or order-
ing certain results directly. For Baby Jane Doe, one crucial sub-
stantive option did not exist. Her parents could not decide to 
transform the infant into a child who did not have multiple dis-
orders. No medical treatment now known could remedy the 
diminishment of her cerebral cortex and the paralysis of- her 
lower body.67 Available options included surgically sealing the 
spinal column to guard against infections and repeatedly drain-
ing the fluid from her brain. Baby Doe's parents, instead, ini-
tially elected antibiotic and nutritional care.68 After a short time, 
they agreed to surgery to remove excess fluid from the infant's 
brain.69 As a medical prognosis, the infant's life expectancy 
without surgery was two years, and with surgery many more 
years.60 
1. Contrasting medical treatment principles- Representing 
a choice in results, these different medical options match com-
peting substantive principles for medical treatment decisions. 
Electing surgery and lengthening the infant's life expectancy re-
lates to a "right to life" medical treatment principle.61 In an ab-
solute version, this principle demands that Baby Jane Doe's par-
ents should decide to undertake all measures to prolong and 
57. The fact that she has these conditions has not been disputed, but there has been 
dispute about the extent of disability posed by her microcephaly and hydrocephaly, see 
Baer, supra note 7, at 35, 36-37. This indicates the depth of controversy in such disputes; 
here the controversy included the meaning of the medical diagnosis in terms of cognitive 
deficits and life opportunities. 
58. Her spinal opening closed by itself over time, and a shunt operation to drain fluid 
was done when Baby Jane Doe was five months old. See Chicago Sun-Times, Oct. 11, 
1984, at 42, col. 1. 
59. Id. 
60. At trial, the parents' doctors testified that the life expectancy for the child if 
surgery took place could not be estimated, but conceded when asked that it could be 
twenty years. Some commentators reported twenty years as the maximum, although it 
would be plausible to construe this answer as a minimum or average. Tedeschi, Infanti-
cide and Its Apologists, COMMENTARY, Nov. 1984, at 31, 32. 
61. See R. WEIR, SELECTIVE NONTREATMENT OF HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS (1984), at 60-
86 (comparing positions of physicians); see also Chambers, Baby Doe: Hard Case For 
Parents and Courts, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1984, § 21, at 1, col. 1 (Long Island Weekly ed.) 
(describing right-to-life advocates); see generally Frankena, The Ethics of Respect for 
Life, in ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR Soc1AL PoucY 1, 2-6 (J. Howie ed. 1983) (articulating 
contrasting philosophic positions on respect for human life). Parents choosing surgery 
may experience their choice not as an expression of principle, but instead as an effort to 
secure any available help for their offspring; acting in this way nonetheless expresses a 
"right to life" notion in the very effort to protect and promote the infant's life. 
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preserve the disabled infant's life because preserving and sus-
taining life represents the primary human commitment. Other-
wise, no person's life stands secure from devaluation by others.62 
As Surgeon General Koop and others have maintained, opting 
for the conservative course in this case-choosing not to 
lengthen the infant's life expectancy-draws from the contrast-
ing principle of "quality of life."63 Varied formulations of this 
principle exist.6' In general, it postulates that medical personnel 
should undertake life-prolonging measures only if the infant 
could know love, form relationships, or partake of other dimen-
sions of human society that give human life a quality worth liv-
ing. 65 The quality of life position may support limited treatment 
to alleviate pain, withdrawal of life sustaining treatment, or even 
active acts of euthanasia. In any version, however, the position 
diverges from the right to life position by rejecting life as the 
most important human value. Thus, the state faces a substantive 
choice, whether it acts or approves the actions of others. Should 
there be efforts to preserve the child's life, whatever the quality 
of that life, or instead medical treatment based on the predicted 
quality .of the child's life?66 
62. Koop, The Slide to Auschwitz, 3 HuM. LIFE REV. 103, 107 (1977). See also Hent-
off, The Awful Privacy of Baby Doe, supra note 4, at 54, 58 (quoting Dr. Peter 
Huttenlocher). 
63. R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 60-86. Weir also notes the distinction between disease-
oriented care-which makes prolonging life the only goal and death the measure of fail-
ure-and person-oriented care-which "places primary emphasis on the quality of life 
that is to be lived." Id. at 63; see also 42 CoNG. Q. 1796 (1984) (presenting American 
Medical Association's opposition to compromise on Federal Child Abuse Amendments 
because of failure to consider quality of life for severely handicapped newborns). 
64. See Smith, Life and Death Decisions in the Nursery: Standards and Procedures 
for Withholding Lifesaving Treatment from Infants, 27 N.Y.L. Seu. L. REV. 1125, 1160-
64 (1982) (distinguishing decisions to prefer quality over length of life from decisions to 
end life because it is not worth living). 
65. Cf. Frankena, supra note 61, at 34 ("Mere life, whether that of a vegetable, 
animal, or human organism, has no moral sanctity as such, though it may have aesthetic 
and other kinds of nonmoral value, and may be a necessary condition of consciousness, 
rationality, or morality;" life acquires moral sanctity when "it is a condition of something 
more" like consciousness.). 
66. Another substantive principle commonly mentioned in this context is the vener- · 
able medical ethic of "do no harm." In the context of disabled newborns, this principle 
can be cited to support both the right to life and quality of life positions, for some would 
claim that neglecting any possible measures to prolong life is to do harm, while others 
would maintain that prolonging life may itself cause harm. R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 86. 
One expert acknowledges that the desire to do no harm makes him uncomfortable if it 
means withholding treatment from a child whose parents and doctors have decided to let 
die, because the result could be a slow and lingering death. Therefore, this physician 
finds himself at times "in the schizophrenic position of advocating either active euthana-
sia or vigorous treatment." J. FREEMAN, PRACTICAL MANAGEMENT OF MENIGOMYELOCELE 24 
(1974). 
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Advocates of both principles of medical treatment point to es-
tablished legal doctrines for support. Typical state child abuse 
and neglect statutes oblige parents to provide medical care for 
their children. Statutory language casting this obligation in 
terms of the "best interests of the child" supports either the 
right to life or the quality of life principle. Yet the right to life 
principle can draw more directly for support on general criminal 
statutes against murder and specific statutes punishing infanti-
cide or requiring medical care regardless of an infant's disabili-
ties. 67 At the same time, the quality of life principle gains sup-
port from adults' right to refuse treatment.68 The quality of life 
position also draws upon the wrongful life and wrongful birth 
doctrines. Under those doctrines, parents have argued success-
fully that incorrect medical advice about genetic risks or other 
predictable sources of an infant's disability warrants tort dam-
ages based on the diminished quality of the child's life and the 
burdens to the attending family. 69 
2. Inherent problems of the medical treatment principles-
Conceptual and practical problems abound with both principles. 
Initially, the right to life position appears to demand maximal 
treatment, which could produce, at the extreme, the absurd re-
sult of requiring heroic efforts to keep everyone alive forever by 
use of technological life supports. 70 Yet even this interpretation 
67. See Ellis, Letting Defective Babies Die: Who Decides?, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 393, 
401-10 (1982); Robertson & Fost, Passive Euthanasia of Defective Newborn Infants: Le-
gal Considerations, 88 J. PEDIATRICS 883, 884-85 (1976); Legal Issues in Nontreatment of 
Defective Newborns, in DECISION MAKING AND THE DEFECTIVE NEWBORN 370 (C. Swiny-
ard ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as SwINYARD]; see also Mnookin, Two Puzzles, 1984 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 667, 669 (stating that formal law denies parents' rights ever to deny treatment to 
their child). But see A. HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT MEDICINE 
114 (1977) (discussing latitude for medical discretion in treatment decisions). 
68. See J. ROBERTSON, THE RIGHTS OF THE CRITICALLY ILL 28-48 (1983); see also id. at 
49-70 (discussing right to stop treatment of incompetent patients); F. RozovsKY, CON-
SENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 424-30 (1984) (same). 
69. In a wrongful life suit, the infant claims injury and seeks recompense; in a wrong-
ful birth action, the parents sue for the injury to them posed by the economic and emo-
tional costs of raising a handicapped child. See Wrongful Life, 31 UCLA L. REv. 473, 
495-96 (1983). Compare Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. 
Rptr. 477 (1980) (allowing infant plaintiff with Tay-Sachs disease to recover damages) 
and Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982) (allowing 
infant with hereditary deafness to recover damages under wrongful life) with Park v. 
Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977) (recognizing causes of action for both 
parents and their child who died of kidney disease); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 
386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (permitting cause of action for parents but not 
for child, overruling Park in part); and Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) 
(permitting wrongful birth claims by parents but not claims of child having Down's 
syndrome). . 
70. See Fost, Proxy Consent for Seriously Ill Newborns, in No RusH TO JUDGMENT: 
EssAYS ON MEDICAL ETHICS 16 (D. Smith ed. 1978). 
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grants too much. The right to life position is more deeply flawed 
in its inability to guide particular medical care decisions. 
Given the variety of treatments, each with risks and benefits, 
that medical professionals can recommend in a given case with 
the aim of preserving life, the right to life position provides no 
selection criteria. Medical experts disagree about what consti-
tutes "standard medical practice" in the care of newborns with 
serious handicaps. 71 For example, parents may have a choice of 
surgery or no surgery; a choice from among surgical techniques; 
a choice in the timing of the surgery or the selection of the surgi-
cal team. Additionally, choices about the use of experimental or 
nonconventional treatments may arise. 72 The principle of "right 
to life" does not select from among these choices. A given treat-
ment could hold both great promise and great risk; an alterna-
tive could hold less promise and less risk. Either choice arguably 
could advance or defeat the simple goal of preserving life. 73 
Another set of problems for the right to life position arises in 
determining whether a decision not to act-an omission of possi-
ble medical care-violates the right to life principle. Societies 
historically assigned different consequences to acts of direct kill-
ing and more passive conduct producing the death of a child. 7" 
This problem raises the classic act-omission distinction drawn in 
criminal and tort law. In those contexts, an omission becomes 
culpable as an act where specified duties or obligations to act 
71. R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 59-61; Smith, supra note 64, at 1153-59. 
72. See R. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHIL-
DREN AND THE LAW 399-446 (1978). Commentators disagree about whether anyone should 
be allowed to consent to experimental treatment for a child. Compare P. RAMSEY, THE 
PATIENT AS PERSON 15 (1970) (opposing proxy consent for experimental treatment be-
cause no one can consent to making someone else an adventurer) with Fried, Children as 
Subjects for Medical Experimentation, in RESEARCH ON CHILDREN 107, 111-15 (J. van 
Eys ed. 1978) (arguing that children including infants should have opportunity to help 
do a good thing, like advance medical knowledge); McCormich, Proxy Consent in the 
Experimental Situation, 18 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY & MED. 2, 13-14 (1974) (presuming child 
would want promise of benefit from experiment). Comments to the Department of 
Health and Human Services regulations indicate that at least actions taken in light of 
the federal child abuse amendments do not require experimentation. 50 F'ed. Reg. 14,886 
(Apr. 15, 1985) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 1340). 
73. The right to life position also rests on a debatable assumption about the sanctity 
of human forms, regardless of their stage of development or any other characteristic. 
Medical experts pose one kind of criticism of this assumption by pointing to what they 
claim are vast differences in the nature of the life presented by individuals at different 
stages. One expert concludes that it is "as inappropriate to consider the neonate a small 
child as it is to consider the child a small adult." R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 31 (quoting 
Sheldon Kornones, director of newborn center at City of Memphis Hospital). 
74. R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 25 (discussing ancient Romans and Renaissance 
Italians; both societies permitted passive child destruction); see also Smith, supra note 
64, at 1166-68 (1982) (comparing active and passive euthanasia as artificial distinctions). 
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exist, and where the omission causes harm. n The right to life 
position, however, offers little guidance to establish what consti-
tutes a culpable omission by a parent. A culpable omission de-
pends on a failure to fulfill a well-understood duty, but the exis-
tence of such a duty is the unanswered question concerning a 
disabled infant, and the basis and content for such a duty raise 
additional unanswered questions. Such a duty could only come 
from a community consensus specifying what constitutes a cul-
pable omission. Yet this is precisely what is now missing, espe-
cially given the range of possible medical treatments. If right to 
life advocates wish to articulate a duty for parents always to un-
dertake any measures that could promote the life chances for 
the disabled newborn, they still have a problem in articulating 
the boundaries of this duty.76 
For example, the right to life principle leaves unanswered the 
problem of "futile" medical treatment, even though proponents 
of the principle invoke futility as its limit.77 Would the right to 
75. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF ToRTS § 56 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing 
acts and omissions). 
76. See Survey Shows Split on Issue of Treating Deformed Infants, N.Y. Times, 
June 3, 1983, at Al4, col. 1 (reporting Gallup poll showing the public evenly divided on 
whether a severely handicapped newborn should be allowed to die); see also Committee 
on Bioethics, Treatment of Critically Ill Newborns, 72 PEDIATRICS 565 (1983) (finding no 
consensus on treatment); cf. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1573-
79 (1979) (discussing good samaritan law). Difficulties arise from the view that there is a 
duty to act where life is at stake because it could also be argued that failing to authorize 
medical treatment for a disabled newborn would not clearly cause harm. Refusing to 
authorize surgery that would extend an infant's life may cause a shorter life for that 
person. But the cause may equally be assigned to the infant's disabilities at birth. This 
alternative causal argument may, however, prove too much; any infant at birth is utterly 
dependent upon others for nutrition and care, and omissions by parents to meet these 
needs are commonly treated as culpable omissions. What may distinguish a failure to 
meet nutritional needs is precisely how obvious this omission appears in light of clear 
parental duties. As public and professional opinions about children's needs and medical 
necessity crystallize with a majority view, parental obligations with accompanying culpa-
ble omissions can be articulated in terms of the outer limits of individual discretion. 
Although some would argue that such outer limits are reached in parental decisions 
about surgery for intestinal blockage in a Down's syndrome child, continuing controversy 
over that kind of decision shows that no prevailing view has yet emerged. See Summary 
and Analysis, 7 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 213, 217-18 (May-June 1983) (reporting that 
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical 
Research would direct surgery, but variety of medical and parental opinions remain); see 
also Gustafson, Mongolism, Parental Desires, and the Right to Life, 16 PERSP. IN BIOL-
OGY & MED. 529-30 (1973). In a sense, the debate over medical care for handicapped 
newborns expresses the search for new consensus in the face of shifting technological and 
moral landscapes. Cf. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974) (describing periods of 
clarity and chaos in law). See also infra text accompanying notes 167-68. 
77. The recent amendments to the federal child abuse statute redefine child abuse 
and neglect for purposes of the statute to include "the withholding of medically indi-
cated treatment" from disabled infants with life-threatening conditions: except if the 
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life principle require medical treatment where medical experts 
believe the effort would prove futile or where the patient would 
die soon regardless of treatment? Determining the meaning of 
"futility," of course, is the problem. 
As raised by those who articulate the right to life position, 
"futility" signifies the condition of a "dying" infant or an infant 
whose medical condition would remain unameliorated after 
medical treatment. 78 How would this meaning of futility apply 
baby is "chronically and irreversibly comatose;" or if "the provision of such treatment 
would (i) merely prolong dying, (ii)not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the 
infant's life-threatening conditions, or (iii) otherwise be futile in terms of the survival of 
the infant;" or "the provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in terms of the 
survival of the infant and the treatment itself under such circumstances would be inhu-
mane." Pub. L. No. 98-457, § 121(3), 98 Stat. 1749, 1752 (1984) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 
5102). Thus, Congress acknowledged the need for lines drawn between infants for whom 
medical treatment is worthwhile and those for whom it is not. The line-drawing problem 
itself is not resolved by the statutory language, although its terms importantly frame 
decisions with a focus on futility and inhumanity. 
In interpreting these concerns, the Department of Health and Human Services issued 
regulations under the amendments that acknowledge the Congressional commitment to 
balance "the need for an effective program and the need to prevent unreasonable govern-
mental intervention." 50 Fed. Reg. 14,880 (1985). The Department's interpretive guide-
lines, not intended to be binding rules, id., eliminate the language of a proposed inter-
pretation that referred "to situations where death is imminent and treatment will do no 
more than postpone the act of dying." Id. at 14,890. The Department explained that it 
still interprets the futility or "merely prolong dying" exception to the child abuse 
amendment's requirements not to apply to instances "where treatment will not totally 
correct a medical condition but will give a patient many years of life." Id. at 14,891. In 
other words, the Department interprets the federal definition of child abuse and neglect 
to encompass the withholding of medical treatment from handicapped newborns who 
could gain many years of life from the medical treatment, even if that treatment would 
not totally correct the medical condition. This gives more scope to the futility exception 
than at least some interpretations of the proposed regulations. There remains considera-
ble ambiguity in the final interpretation, which places renewed importance on the judg-
ments of medical professionals about "the degree of inevitability of death, the probable 
effect of any potential treatments, the projected time period within which death will 
probably occur, and other pertinent factors." Id. The meaning of "reasonable medical 
judgment" in this context is the same in the amendments as in the regulation, see id. at 
14,882, 14,888 (defining term to mean "a medical judgment that would be made by a 
reasonably prudent physician, knowledgeable about the case and the treatment possibili-
ties with respect to the medical conditions involved."). But this term, and the meaning 
of "treatment," will be subject to continuing debate. See id. at 14,890 (reviewing con-
trasting interpretations of treatment and reasonable medical judgment). The President's 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behav-
ioral Research recently acknowledged the lack of both certainty and knowledge within 
the medical profession about infants born prematurely, and/or with congenital defects 
and handicaps. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN 
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUS-
TAINING TREATMENT 198, 220 (1983). 
78. See Longino, Withholding Treatment from Defective Newborns: Who Decides, 
and on What Criteria?, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 377, 398-99 (1983) (arguing that the medical 
feasibility approach denies treatment where death is imminent even with treatment, or 
when treatment cannot restore consciousness); cf. R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 146 (es-
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to a low-birth weight, premature infant who cannot breathe or 
pump her own blood without assistance? Pulmonary and circula-
tory devices temporarily perform these functions for her, but no 
prospect of future independence from the machines exists for 
the infant. Using the machines may prolong her life for days or 
even weeks. Add to this situation the risk that the infant's unde-
veloped lungs and heart cannot long sustain life functions even 
with assistance, and indeed may rupture with the exertion.79 If 
the right to life principle requires treatment at this point, the 
meaning of the term "life" may be at issue, not the meaning of 
futility. 80 If the principle does not direct unquestioning use of all 
medical devices, then a line-drawing problem must arise under 
this principle as well as under the quality of life principle.81 In-
deed, the two principles merge in this respect, even though ad-
vocates of each may see only antagonism. 82 
Similarly, the right to life principle has been used in efforts to 
prevent discrimination on the basis of handicap; yet the results 
preserve rather than resolve the issue of when treatment must 
be authorized for the disabled infant.83 As Norman Fost ana-
lyzed the situation, "[w]e withhold dialysis from an anencephalic 
infant girl precisely because she is so handicapped that she can-
not experience any benefit from the treatment."84 Here the 
handicap itself supplies the reason for discriminatory nontreat-
pousing a position favoring treatment of all "nondying" infants). 
79. See R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 52 (case study); id. at 140 (discussing Custody of a 
Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 714, 434 N.E.2d 601, 610 (1982) and issue of prolonged or in-
creased suffering-competing with sheer life as value); for different estimates by differ-
ent people of same situation, see Tedeschi, supra note 60, contesting characterization of 
Baby Jane Doe's medical situation. 
80. In addition, the right to life position contains no instrinsic reason to value human 
life over other forms of life. See generally Singer, Ten Years of Animal Liberation, N.Y. 
REV. OF BooKs, Jan. 17, 1985, at 46 (reviewing emerging theories of equal rights for ani-
mals based on inherent value or equal interests of all living creatures). 
81. Longino, supra note 78, at 399 (arguing that the medical feasibility test does not 
resolve hard cases where there is no consensus about diagnosis and where people may 
dispute the value of a temporary extension of life). 
82. Ambiguity over this futility issue becomes a central problem in interpreting lan-
guage adopted by Congress in its amendment to the child abuse statute and in efforts to 
apply anti-discrimination principles to the treatment of handicapped newborns. The 
child abuse amendments excuse nontreatment where treatment would be "futile," or "in-
humane." See Pub. L. No. 98-457, § 121(3), 98 Stat. 1749, 1752 (1984) (amending 42 
U.S.C. § 5102). It also excuses treatment that would "not be effective." See id. 
83. Cf. Note, Employment Discrimination Against the Handicapped and Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act: An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97 HARV. L. REV. 997, 
1001-02, 1010-12 (1984) (noting ambiguity over whether "otherwise qualified" means 
qualified like a nonhandicapped person or qualified given reasonable accommodation for 
the handicap). 
84. Fost, Putting Hospitals on Notice, 12 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1982, at 7. 
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ment. In this instance, an assessment of futility stems from the 
fact of the handicap, making a rule against discrimination on the 
basis of handicap less than useful as a guide for treatment 
decisions. 
Problems beset t.he quality of life position as well. Most im-
portantly, it affords at best an uncertain guide about what con-
stitutes a quality of life worth preserving. The quality of life po-
sition corresponds to arguments favoring euthanasia, sought by 
people who anticipate their own degenerative prognosis and de-
sire to end their lives as their lives become, in their own eyes, no 
longer worth living. 811 In instances where the patient has already 
become comatose or otherwise incapable of deciding his or her 
own treatment, family members may choose euthanasia based on 
what they know about the patient's desires and values. Adher-
ence to the values of the patient continues to guide the medical 
treatment even in such circumstances.86 The self-determination 
theme of this euthanasia position obviously cannot govern cases 
involving a disabled newborn. Other people's assessments of that 
infant's potential quality of life will always control. Other people 
may orudely misjudge the effect of handicaps and grossly under-
value the life of a handicapped person.87 Or they may romanti-
cize life and underestimate the deprivations imposed by the 
handicap as experienced by the handicapped infant. Even if 
some agreement could be reached regarding what quality of life 
should mean, most imaginable meanings-some measure of con-
sciousness, ability to communicate, or to experience joy or relat-
edness-involve the internal world of the infant and of the ma-
85. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
86. See THE DILEMMAS OF EUTHANASIA (1975); EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO DEATH 
(A. Downing ed. 1969); Foot, Euthanasia, 6 PHIL. & PUB. Arr. 85, 109-12 (1977); see also 
Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1985) (au-
thorizing adults to sign statement permitting withdrawing of life sustaining treatment 
and freeing medical personnel from liability). See generally B. CLAR, WHOSE LIFE Is IT 
ANYWAY? (1974) (exploring voluntary euthanasia in dramatic form). 
87. Sondra Diamond, who has cerebral palsy, attended college, despite the prediction 
by doctors that there was little or no hope she would achieve meaningful humanhood; 
she had to fight for medical treatment when she suffered burns in her twenties because 
doctors believed treatment was not worthwhile as she could not lead a normal life. She 
herself concluded, "I do not believe that any human being does not deserve the opportu-
nity to Jive." "/ Am Not What You See" A Film Dialogue Between Sondra Diamond 
and Roy Bonisteel, reprinted in J. AREEN, P. KING, S. GOLDBERG & A. CAPRON, LAW, Sci-
ENCE AND MEDICINE 1199, 1202 (1984); Hentoff, The Awful Privacy of Baby Doe, supra 
note 4, at 57-58. See generally Riga, Privacy and the Right to Die, 26 CATH. L. REV. 113-
15 (1981) (noting undervaluation of life and conflicts of interests in proxy decisions); 
Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. 
L. REv. 213, 254 (1975) ("Life, and life alone, whatever its limitations, might be sufficient 
worth" to a disabled child). 
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ture person that infant will become, an internal world that 
others cannot know. 
Additional ambiguities arise over whether parents should pro-
long an infant's life if some possibility exists for achieving the 
requisite quality of life in the future. Such ambiguities acquire 
considerable importance in light of historical discrimination 
against and underestimation of disabled people.88 Reform efforts 
and increasing medical knowledge have in the past changed the 
social meaning of disabilities. Notably, Down's syndrome once 
spelled institutionalization based on very low estimates of 
mental and self-care capabilities, while more recent assessments 
of Down's syndrome urge community care and predict varying 
degrees of self-sufficiency. Today, society widely believes that a 
Down's syndrome individual can experience and generate con-
siderable love and joy. This transformation reflects both medical 
advances and advocacy activity designed to change public 
attitudes. 89 
Future political and scientific efforts might elevate the quality 
of life assessments for people now considered severely disabled. 
Changes in community attitudes and activities themselves could 
markedly affect the quality of life for the disabled person. The 
quality of life for a wheelchair-bound person, for example, de-
pends greatly on how· disabling the social and physical environ-
ment makes that person. As Norman Fost has written, "if build-
ings had ramps, if colleges would not exclude them from 
dormitories ... and if airlines would not require them to be ac-
companied by adult companions, many such individuals would 
not see themselves as significantly handicapped."90 If changes in 
the physical environment can bring about such significant 
changes in the social meaning of handicaps, the handicap itself 
does not reside solely in the handicapped person, but instead in 
the relationships between that person and the community. 
These relationships can change, and also can change to some ex-
88. See generally Smith, Notes on the History of Childhood, HARV. MAG., July-Aug. 
1984, at 64A, 64B-64C (describing the historical destruction of sick and crippled 
children). 
89. AN ALTERNATIVE TEXTBOOK IN SPECIAL EDUCATION (1977) (describing research and 
political action to challenge socially constructed category of mental retardation); cf. M. 
MACDONALD, MYSTICAL BEDLAM: MADNESS, ANXIETY AND HEALING IN SEVENTEENTH-CEN-
TURY ENGLAND (1981) (examining shifting conceptions of mental illness). 
90. Fost, How Decisions are Made: A Physician's View, in SwINYARD, supra note 67, 
at 224. How the handicapped individuals see themselves is interdependent with how 
others see them, and how others construct their shared environment. See Minow, Bilin-
gual and Special Education: The Dilemma of Difference, 48 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 
157, 204-06 (1985). 
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tent the effect of that handicap in the handicapped person's 
daily life. This understanding itself depends on a conception of 
the meaning of the handicap as an issue for people other than 
the handicapped person. If we conceive of the mobility problem 
for someone in a wheelchair as not simply her problem, but as a 
problem for others who may be deprived of her presence, we 
could find it important to devise new options, like equipping 
buildings with ramps and developing buses that can accommo-
date her. Her quality of life, in this sense, is mutable because it 
depends in significant ways on her relationships with others, and 
those relationships can change when others see her quality of 
life as an issue for them. Being bound to a wheelchair may seem 
less disabling than some other handicaps, like mental deficien-
cies. But recognizing the way social attitudes construct the 
meaning of disabilities holds promise for possible changes in the 
quality of daily life for mentally disabled persons as well as for 
the physically disabled. 
In the meantime, this mutability of the meaning of particular 
handicaps offers reason to doubt assertions that disabled people 
inevitably suffer from a lesser quality of life and greater unhap-
piness. 91 Indeed, asserted concern for the quality of life may be 
used to justify confining handicapped persons to a stigmatized 
status and depriving them of opportunities to become more than 
others expected.92 The quality of life position thus runs great 
risks of preserving old assumptions about the meaning of various 
disabilities. Parents or doctors who act on outdated assumptions 
about the meanings of particular disabilities should be chal-
lenged, and yet there remains no guarantee that the child-pro-
tective agencies or courts presiding over such challenges have 
any more reliable assumptions to guide their decisions. Contin-
ual process of research and advocacy could challenge old as-
sumptions and also guard against idealized misconceptions over-
91. See Zachary, The Neonatal Surgeon, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 869 (1976) ("extreme disa-
bility is not synonymous with unhappiness, and we are only at the beginning of finding 
ways of developing the capabilities of these patients to the maximum"). 
92. Taking this point a step further, nothing within the quality of life position offers 
a line against unlimited, indiscriminate termination of the lives of nonperfect infants. R. 
WEIR, supra note 61, at 181. For this reason, Weir recommends objective standards for 
the treatment decision that use diagnostic categories, relative to the status of medical 
technology available at a particular time and place. Id. at 240-41. A drawback to this 
approach is its tendency to rigidify the treatment decision based on existing practices, 
prevailing conceptions of given disabilities, and available technology, rather than sub-
jecting these very conventions to criticism. Perhaps the risks of perpetuating stereotypes 
and underassessments of the quality of life ahead for infants with a range of disabilities 
could be reduced by making such diagnostic categories an issue for public debate. See 
infra text accompanying notes 185-87. 
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estimating the life chances for particular severely disabled 
newborns. In what could well be painful confrontations, parents 
and their doctors could be challenged with the best available in-
formation about the meaning of the particular disabilities or 
deformities manifested in their child. Hospitals could help the 
broader medical community and advocacy groups to disseminate 
new information about the meaning and potential meanings of 
varied medical prognoses.93 With new information, predictions 
about future medical advances could push a quality of life as-
sessment toward a more positive assessment and support more 
efforts to preserve a severely disabled infant's life even under a 
quality of life principle. A commitment to guard against mis-
taken underestimations of the potential life experiences for 
handicapped persons would also move the quality of life assess-
ment toward more aggressive medical treatment. As a result, de-
cisions under this principle may well come to resemble decisions 
made according to the right to · life view. 
The quality of life assessment would increasingly find value 
where it had been underestimated, even where prevalent as-
sumptions deem the disabilities so severe that the fact of life 
alone supplies the core meaning to its "quality." Similarly, 
desires to avoid futile treatments could make the right to life 
position converge with the quality of life view. Efforts to weigh 
the benefits and costs of treatment will occupy the assessment of 
futility, much as they would in an analysis of the individual's 
potential quality of life. Nonetheless, neither position would dic-
tate a result in any difficult case, so ambiguity and controversy 
remain trapped within each position. 
Further, the quality of life position blurs the question of 
whose life is relevant to the medical care determination: the in-
fant's or other members of the family? The quality of a family's 
life may directly or indirectly enter into the calculus of the qual-
ity of the child's life.94 Moreover, the potential quality of life for 
93. It is undoubtedly with this in mind that Surgeon General Koop has called for the 
creation of comprehensive information services to make available to parents of handi-
capped newborns (1) information about competent diagnostic services; (2) a list of gov-
ernmental and private agencies able to help parent and child; and (3) names of parents 
"with similar situations who have managed the problem successfully." Koop, The Handi-
capped Child and His Family, 48 LINACRE Q., Feb. 1981, at 23, 29, quoted in R. WEIR, 
supra note 61, at 83. Given his commitment to the right to life position, however, Koop 
does not include in this proposal information about parents who have chosen not to au-
thorize aggressive medical treatment, or who have not been pleased with the results of 
such treatment. A full exchange of information should include these sources as well. 
94. See also Longino, supra note 78, at 389 (noting that the family's interests are 
seldom discussed expressly but courts may tacitly rely on them). Compare R. WEIR, 
supra note 61, at 78 (discussing Raymond Duff, who notes that "families need to be 
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the child may turn largely upon the opportunities that the par-
ents or custodians grant to that child in terms of the quality of 
care and quality of love that they offer.911 The quality of life po-
sition obscures how much the infant's relationships to others 
enter into the calculus; yet the relevance of those others to the 
decision itself deserves debate. Should the child's medical treat-
ment turn on the willingness or unwillingness of her or his par-
ents to provide ongoing care and love? Such a result seems to 
burden the child with an accident of birth beyond the disability. 
The potential availability of foster or adoptive parents, willing 
to care for a disabled child, could alter a quality of life assess-
ment made with the initial assumption that the biological par-
ents or institutions constitute the only relevant caretakers. 96 The 
quality of life position thus becomes more complicated and more 
contestable upon exposing its assumptions concerning the range 
of possible caretakers for the child. 
Both the right to life and quality of life positions rely on es-
tablished legal doctrines and yet both also give rise to concep-
tual and practical problems. The apparent certainty of the right 
to life position gives way under scrutiny to a more difficult set of 
assessments about the exact duties of parents and doctors in 
particular circumstances, and about the meanings of futility, dy-
ing, and life for specific infants born with severe disabilities. The 
quality of life position initially seems to offer protection for au-
tonomous choice-making, but who should be that decisionmaker 
where the medical choice concerns a disabled newborn poses a 
problem unanswered by the quality of life position itself. More-
over, the interdependence between any infant and the adults in 
his or her life significantly affects the quality of each of their 
lives. This interdependence is, if anything, even more pro-
nounced with a handicapped person whose relationships with 
other people critically affect the opportunities and experiences 
that will or will not become available. The quality of life princi-
spared the chronic sorrow of caring for infants with little or no possibility for meaningful 
lives") with id. at 81 (Surgeon General Koop "thinks that physicians who engage in se-
lective nontreatment of infants often do so primarily to prevent parents from having 
burdens they do not want to bear"). 
95. Shaw, Conditions in Newborns that Pose Special Problems, 11 CoNTEMP. SUR-
GERY, Oct. 1977, at 51 (arguing that assessment of the potential quality of life of an 
infant with Down's syndrome depends on home life with parents as well as the child's 
mental and physical abilities). 
96. In contrast, if the child's likely destination is a state institution, the quality of life 
would be predictably low-and yet this has less to do with the child than with the re-
sources society is unwilling to devote to him or her. See infra text accompanying note 
170 (discussing institutions like Willowbrook). 
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ple is not only highly ambiguous, it also obscures the centrality 
of other questions about who will become involved with the dis-
abled infant, and how. 
Both the right to life and quality of life principles also share 
the tendency of legal and philosophical reasoning to approach 
difficult problems with abstract standards, and to couch actual 
conflicts in terms of conflicting rights. The right to life position 
on its face fits this description. It translates these highly compli-
cated, emotionally charged medical care determinations as a 
conflict between the right to life and other rights, like parental 
rights. And it resolves this conflict with reference to an explicit 
hierarchy of rights: the right to life supersedes all others. The 
quality of life position is quite similar in its reliance on abstrac-
tions translating the complicated real situation into an ideal, 
claimed to trump others. A serious drawback to approaching 
problems in the world with abstract principles is their tendency 
to obscure the very ambiguity of those problems, and the com-
plex human relationships implicated in both the problems and 
their solutions. The abstract principles carry an illusion of un-
controverted answers and empower their advocates to treat op-
ponents as wrong, even though aspects of different positions 
may be simultaneously powerful and compelling. 
Perhaps a more serious difficulty arises when competing, ab-
stract standards become platforms for lofty and impassioned ar-
gument, removed from the particular case and invigorated by 
emotional commitments symbolized by the abstract standards 
themselves. Poised on their separate platforms, contending 
debators are unlikely to persuade each other or glimpse how 
much they have in common. This description may fit the emerg-
ing debate between advocates of the right to life and of quality 
of life in controversies like Baby Jane Doe's. This pattern al-
ready fits the debate in the related area of abortion; examining 
that area could shed light on the handicapped newborn issues 
for the future. 
3. The right to life principle and the quality of life princi-
ple in the abortion controversy- The right to life and quality 
of life positions share historic roles in the related, yet distinct 
controversy over abortion. The dichotomous quality of the two 
positions appears even more stark there.97 The abortion debate 
97. One aim of this analysis is to show how seemingly dichotomous conceptions, such 
as the right to life versus the quality of life and state intervention versus noninterven-
tion, obscure how each side of the dichotomy merges into the other, through shared as-
sumptions or shared problems. Once a focus for political debate, the dichotomous con-
ception remains rigid as a vehicle for expression of opposing groups and avenues for 
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also exposes the problems with each principle while suggesting 
how the appeal of the two principles varies according to the type 
of dispute in which the principles clash. As in the handicapped 
infant context, the "right to life" argument raised in the abor-
tion context stakes out an absolute position on life and leaves to 
opponents the more uncertain and controverted claims about 
quality of life. The quality of life argument, couched as the 
"right to choose" claim about abortion, stakes out an absolute 
position on private freedom that leaves the more uncertain 
claims about state intervention for its opponents.98 The quality 
of life position in both contexts expresses belief in the capacity 
and right of people to plan their lives.99 
rapprochement diminish, as the abortion debate exemplifies. Each side stereotypes the 
other, and also forces disagreements into crude oppositions. Geertz, Distinguished Lec-
ture: Anti Anti-Relativism, 86 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 263, 263-64 (1984) (criticizing view 
that anti-anti-abortion means pro-abortion rather than pro-choice). 
98. The Supreme Court's decisions on the subject of abortion have struck uneasy 
compromises, first by according different decisional power to the pregnant woman and 
her doctor in relation to the stage of pregnancy and notions of fetal viability, see Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and next by according the power to choose an abortion only 
to women who can afford it without state assistance, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 
(1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). These compromises grow increasingly unsta-
ble as new technologies alter the timing and meaning of fetal viability; see King, The 
Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of the Unborn, 77 M1cH. 
L. REV. 1647 (1979); R. ARDITT, R. KLEIN & S. MINDEN, TEsT-TuBE WOMEN: WHAT FUTURE 
FOR MOTHERHOOD? (1984) (estimating effects of new reproductive technologies), and as 
the economic discrimination in Maher undergoes criticism; see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 933-34 n.77 (1978). The abortion controversy in the future may well 
emerge in a new form, connecting the issues of new reproductive technologies, like artifi-
cial wombs, women's freedom from unwanted pregnancies, and the demand for babies by 
parents unable to bear their own. These new options may allow the legal issues to shake 
loose from unstable compromises between dichotomous right to life/right to choose de-
bates. The legal debate could focus instead on (1) the rights a woman would have to 
avoid carrying a fetus for nine months by giving it over to a substitute mother-real or 
artificial; (2) the rights the future child would have to a loving home if someone decides 
to complete its fetal development outside its mother's womb; and (3) the rights of adults 
who want to be parents to have children produced through new reproductive technolo-
gies. See HEW Support of Human In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, 44 Fed. 
Reg. 35,055 (1979) (responding to fears about effects of in vitro technology on family 
rights and privacy); King, supra (discussing embryo transfer). 
99. The "right to life" and "right to choose" positions rest on different conceptions of 
the problem, and perhaps different world views altogether. See K. LUKER, supra note 40, 
at 158-91 (describing world-views of activists on both sides of abortion debate). But see 
Addelson, Baby-Killers and Fetus Fetishists: Review of Abortion and the Politics of 
Motherhood, 2 WOMEN'S REv. BOOKS, Nov. 1984, at 14, 15 (arguing that Luker fails to 
uncover the complexity of coalitions within each side of abortion debate, and offering the 
fact that "each side includes some supporters who are closer to the other side's support-
ers on nearly every issue but that of abortion"). 
The Baby Jane Doe case draws the crossfire in the battle already raging on abortion. 
Many "right to life" activists spoke out for state intervention to help Baby Doe, and the 
lawyer who initiated the lawsuit against the infant's parents had previously initiated le-
gal action on behalf of fetuses to halt abortions. See supra note 9. In addition, the Doe 
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Despite apparent symmetry in the arguments available in the 
two contexts, the quality of life and right to life positions take 
on different casts with the different applications. The quality of 
life principle emphasizes free choice in the abortion context for 
the woman who seeks control over her life while the quality of 
life concern focuses on the life of the handicapped newborn in 
the medical treatment context. Although both versions express 
the belief that people can and should plan and control what 
happens in their lives, the argument for the pregnant woman's 
right to choose an abortion draws importantly on claims that 
women have not in the past had power over important decisions 
in their lives, and especially deserve power over decisions affect-
ing their own bodies. The analogous claim in the medical treat-
ment context urges autonomy for parents, who historically have 
had power over important decisions, and may even be suspected 
of abusing that power.100 At the same time, analogies to eutha-
nasia for dying adults may support a parental decision to refuse 
medical treatment for a severely disabled newborn in a way that 
pro-choice defenses of abortion cannot maintain. 
The right to life argument in the abortion context pits the 
rights of a fetus against the rights of a woman to control her own 
body while the right to life argument in the medical treatment 
context raises the rights of an infant against the rights of par-
ents whose burdens, however serious, 101 are not the same as the 
bodily burden for the woman facing pregnancy.102 Thus, the very 
question of whose individual rights and whose quality of life are 
in jeopardy is put to a contest in the debates over medical treat-
ment for disabled newborns and abortion. Who should be al-
lowed to exercise power over important choices arises as a cen-
case challenged the battle lines as drawn in the abortion context, as some participants in 
the debate expressly called upon liberals in the abortion context to side with the "right 
to life" position for the child who is already alive. See Hentoff, The Awful Privacy of 
Baby Doe, supra note 4, at 54-56. 
100. It is also possible that the notion of parental power is founded on illusory histor-
ical notions of a golden age of family autonomy and stability, but judicial power has 
often been used to reinforce parental authority, for whatever reason. Burt, supra note 45, 
at 331, 333-36. 
101. See generally H. FEATHERSTONE, A DIFFERENCE IN THE FAMILY (1982) (docu-
menting a family's ordeal with dying disabled child); Baldwin & Glendinning, Employ-
ment, Women and Their Disabled Children, in A LABOUR OF LOVE: WOMEN, WORK AND 
CARING 53-71 (1983) (reporting that the economic and emotional costs of caring for se-
verely disabled child tend to fall on mother). 
102. But see .C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 70-104 (1982) (noting that women 
characterize the abortion decision as a conflict between responsibilities rather than a 
conflict of rights; a conflict between responsibilities to care for the child and to care for 
the self). See generally infra text accompanying notes 169-75 (discussing responsibilities 
of caring for handicapped child). 
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tral question under both the right to life and quality of life 
principles, and the contrast between the situation of the preg-
nant woman and the situation of the parents of the handicapped 
newborn strikes different people differently. The rhetorical force 
of the right to life position may appeal to new constituencies in 
the medical treatment context, such as handicapped rights 
groups. The powerlessness of the infant may move people who 
are less moved by the powerlessness of the fetus, in part due to 
the significance people attribute to the moment of birth in moral 
status, and in part due to the contrast between the positions of 
the pregnant woman and the parents of a child who is already 
born. 103 The abstract principles alone do not determine the line-
up in political debates even though they may define the battle 
lines. 
In the context of handicapped newborns, the two substantive 
positions appear less polarized and rigidly positioned than they 
do in the abortion debate. Perhaps this reflects the relative 
length of time occupied by the two policy problems in the cruci-
ble of public debate. Rather than following the path of the abor-
tion debate, I suggest that we resist the tendency to polarize the 
infant care debate into dichotomous substantive positions much 
as I urge rejection of the polarized version of the state interven-
tion debate. This polarization may be tempting precisely at the 
moment of a tough decision, when the decisionmaker may feel 
both moved and repelled by the plight of the infant. Instead we 
should acknowledge the problems inherent in each side. Yet the 
substantive debate represents only half of another dichotomous 
treatment of the problem: the separation between substantive 
and procedural choices. As the convention goes, when substance 
confounds, procedure beckons. No panacea, however, lies there 
either. 
B. Procedural Choices 
Distinguishing between substance and procedure is a classic 
103. See Feldman & Murray, supra note 38 (discussing starvation of Indiana Baby 
Doe); Mnookin, supra note 67, at 675 (discussing political groups' responses to Baby Doe 
controversy); cf. R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS 19-20, 46-48 (1979) (describing the 
power of the powerless in compelling the attitudes and actions of others). The experience 
of being moved by the infant's powerlessness may, however, engender ambivalence by 
exposing the adult's power to influence both the quality and the fact of the infant's life. 
The substantive debate contrasting right to life with quality of life positions fails to 
expose to view just this problem, which will be explored in section III infra. 
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legal concern. This dichotomy makes procedure important pre-
cisely when the more obviously important substance hits a 
logjam. When we cannot agree about what to do, it becomes ur-
gent to know-and to control-who will have the final say. Not 
only will this procedural choice control the outcome of the sub-
stantive debate, it may also yield the independently desirable 
feature of some conclusive decision, or some apparent resolution, 
whatever its content. Thus, deciding who will decide shifts the 
debate from ambiguous substantive questions onto a procedural 
question that one can specificly answer. 
For example, the state may grant the infant's parents an abso-
lute or a qualified power to decide the medical treatment issue, 
give doctors and hospitals power to make or review the decision, 
accord public officials, judges, or court-appointed guardians th~ 
power to decide, or transfer the authority to treatment commit-
tees composed of lay and medical personnel. No neutral resting 
place exists on the issue of who should decide. One way or an-
other, the state approves or selects the decisionmaker, whether 
it cedes choice to parents or establishes countervailing deci-
sionmakers and processes for decision. And the state decides 
whether that decisionmaker's choice will constitute a final deci-
sion or will remain subject to review. If the decision remains 
subject to review, the state determines who will conduct the 
review. 
This inevitability of public choice imbues a case like Baby 
Jane Doe's with the dimensions of classic drama that have long 
captured public attention: inevitable suffering combined with 
the possibility that human will may avert disaster.10• Like Greek 
tragedy, the Baby Jane Doe case presents human suffering to an 
104. See W. KAUFMANN. TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 360-71, 373-76 (1968) (noting that 
elements of tragedy include great suffering, moral conflict, human intention to reduce 
suffering but guilt in continuing to inflict it); cf. Cavell, The Avoidance of Love: A Read-
ing of King Lear, in Do WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY 267, 309-10, 317-18 (1976) (discussing 
the tragic theme of judging a world where good is doomed and injustice may flourish; 
and human responsibility includes responsibility for fate). Cavell powerfully evokes the 
experience of a member of the audience who wants to alter what happens on stage but 
must learn he can do nothing to alter the choices the actors themselves must make: 
"There is nothing and we know there is nothing we can do. Tragedy is meant to make 
sense of that condition." Id. at 330. In a sense, public preoccupation with cases of medi-
cal care decisions for handicapped newborns enacts such a drama, where the observer 
can do nothing and must learn to deal with this without at the same time converting the 
agonizing choices of the actors into mere entertainment for the audience. See id. at 348; 
see also infra text accompanying notes 136-44 (discussing legal standing for strangers). 
Yet, in another sense, the tragedy arises because the very meaning of the handicap could 
be changed, in some measure, if the observer overcame paralysis and revulsion and 
treated the handicapped person differently. 
SUMMER 1985] Beyond State Intervention 971 
audience and suggests that at least one aspect of existence is ag-
ony that humans must live through rather than avoid. 106 Rather 
than turning heated debates into technical ones, the transition 
from substance to procedure preserves the difficulties in cases 
like Baby Jane Doe's. This Section explores the state's dilemmas 
in determining who decides, whether the initial decision is re-
viewable, and who conducts that review. 
1. Who decides?-
a. The distinction between substance and procedure- The 
move from substance to procedure recapitulates rather than by-
passes the inevitability of choice. Moreover, in choosing who 
should choose, the state must address the difficulties behind 
both the state intervention debate and the debate between right 
to life and quality of life advocates. The substantive choice be-
tween the child's right to life and the parent's right to choose 
incorporates a choice between decisionmakers. The state either 
lets the parents choose, or supervises the parents' choice and 
supplants it if necessary to attain the desired result, whether 
drawn from the right to life position or the quality of life 
position.106 
b. Self-determination or proxy decision making- The 
state's choice from among these alternatives draws back into dis-
105. See W. KAUFMANN, supra note 104, at 373. Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt 
explore the tragic dimension of social allocation of scarce resources, like artificial kid-
neys, in G. CALABRESI & P. BoBBl'M', TRAGIC CHOICES 21 (1978). In their analysis, the 
sense of powerlessness to remedy massive problems may be translated into societal sup-
port for extraordinary efforts to respond to limited crises. "[T]he United States will 
spend a million dollars to rescue a single, downed balloonist but will not appropriate a 
similar sum to provide shore patrols." Id. In the area of medical treatment for handi-
capped newborns, a similar dynamic could be at work. People feel powerless to solve the 
general problem of handicaps, and indeed, the problem of assuring every child opportu-
nities for a full and happy life. This sense of powerlessness may translate into pressure 
for extraordinary measures in a few, widely publicized cases where individual, disabled 
newborns face medical treatment decisions. 
George Eliot's conception of tragedy as the human struggle in spite of grand submis-
sion identifies the heroic dimension in choosing resignation before the inevitable; she 
also Jinks this attitude with a sense of connection with other people. Thus, she reasoned 
that the individual faces common misfortune best through acceptance, and "imagination 
actively interested in the lot of mankind generally." 3 GEORGE ELIOT'S LIFE AS RELATED 
IN HER LE'M'ERS AND JOURNALS 33-34 (1885), quoted in S. GRAVER, GEORGE ELIOT AND 
COMMUNITY: A STUDY IN Soc1AL THEORY AND FICTIONAL FORM 195 (1984). Here, then, is a 
conception of tragedy as deepening the sense of human connection rather than human 
isolation. 
106. The current argument includes no one urging state supervention of parental de-
cisions to authorize medical treatment; only decisions declining treatment trigger the 
demand for state review, even though the opposite is theoretically as plausible. This lack 
of symmetry in the actual debate strikingly reveals assumptions that parents rather than 
the state will be inclined to err on the side of nontreatment; it also reveals the political 
stance of the pro-interventionists as generally aligned with the right to life position. 
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pute the conceptions of family and state. If controversy arises 
over which decisionmakers can best approximate self-determina-
tion for the infant, the competing pictures of the oppressive 
family and the oppressive state underlie contrasting preferences 
for parents or other decisionmakers, just as these competing pic-
tures underlie discussions of state intervention. For instance, a 
parental decision to forego surgery for the child appears un-
problematic if one views the family as a source of love and self-
lessness. In contrast, if one distrusts the parents, a stranger's de-
cision approved by the state appears more promising as an 
approximation of the child's self-determination. 
But these contrasting conceptions of the family and the state 
should not obscure the problematic nature of the very notion of 
a "proxy" decisionmaker. The term "proxy" implies someone 
who knows the affected person's interests and indeed received 
decisional power directly from that person, as with proxy voting 
for corporate shareholders. Yet even in the corporate context, 
reasons exist to doubt that a shareholder knowingly assigns his 
voting interest and that the proxy assignment advances the 
shareholder's interest. In the medical care context, proxy deci-
sion making produces several more complications. The term re-
fers to decisions that someone other than the affected party 
makes under one of two approaches: best interests analysis and 
substituted judgment. Under substituted judgment, the deci-
sionmaker inquires into what the affected person would choose if 
he or she could choose. Evidence about the person's prior wants 
and express or implied direction inform the decisionmaker's 
judgment.107 This effort is fraught with guesswork. The substi-
tuted judgment approach claims to operate objectively through 
efforts to find evidence of the wants and concerns of the patient, 
but it also searches for the subjectivity of the patient by inquir-
ing into what the patient personally would want, which in turn 
107. 
In trying to make a decision for a patient who can't decide for himself about life-
sustaining treatment, we're after moral informed consent . . . It requires the 
surrogate decision-maker to try to determine what decisions the patient would 
make if he were able to at the time. This requires intense effort by the surrogate, 
and the health care team to find out what the patient may have communicated 
on the subject. 
Boisen, Mds, Lawyers Probe Ethical, Legal Issues in Ending Treatment, Am. Med. 
News, Apr. 6, 1984, at 17, 17 (quoting Frank Marsh); see also City Bank Farmers Trust 
Co. v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594, 599 (1945) (substituted judgment should be made acting 
"upon the same motives and considerations as would have moved" the incompetent). See 
generally Baron, Medicine and Human Rights: Emerging Substantive Standards and 
Procedural Protections for Medical Decision-Making within the American Family, in 
THE RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT 575 (1985). 
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depends upon who the patient is. It relies on the imaginative 
effort of the decisionmaker to construct what the patient would 
want, given what the surrogate knows. At its best, the substi-
tuted judgment approach may express concerns and sympathy 
for the patient, rather than actually divining that person's un-
known wishes. 108 Yet whatever the success of efforts by family 
and friends to imagine the past wants of a now comatose eighty-
year old, substituted judgment makes little sense for a newborn 
who has no history nor prior expressions of wants. 109 
Under the alternative form of proxy decision making-best in-
terests analysis-the decisionmaker determines from an external 
stance the needs, risks, and benefits to the affected person. 110 
This approach also appeals to objectivity, rationality, and con-
sensual assessments of the benefits and detriments of the pro-
posed medical treatment. m Best interests analysis addresses the 
interests, not the desires, of the patient.112 This decision making 
about the child's interests must treat the situation hypotheti-
cally and removed from the particular circumstances and iden-
tity of the infant, 113 although best interests analysis is intended 
to make that infant's interests paramount over all other inter-
ests.114 Subjective elements may emerge, however, as the partic-
ular views of the proxy decisionmaker enter into the best inter-
ests calculus.115 
More importantly, assessment of the child's best interests is 
also problematic because no one can be certain of another's in-
terests. The Western liberal commitment to individual auton-
108. Cf. S. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN: ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE 140 (1982) (dis-
cussing Wittgenstein's notion that one individual can conclude that another has pain by 
reference to his or her own experience with pain). 
109. See In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 440-41, 321 S.E.2d 716, 719 (1984) ("Under the 
doctrine of substituted judgment the decisionmaker bases the decision on what he be-
lieves the patient, if competent, would have done. While this analysis is useful in the 
case of adults, it is difficult to apply in the case of young children."); Riga, supra note 83, 
at 113-14 (discussing substituted judgment); Roberston, supra note 87 (same). It could 
be argued that substituted judgment at least invites an inquiry into an imagined experi-
ence for the child rather than an inquiry into the adult decisionmaker's view of the 
child's interests. Yet it will unavoidably be the adult decisionmaker who tries to imagine 
the child's experience. See Longino, supra note 78, at 396 (noting that substituted judg-
ment in practice becomes a question about what a reasonable person so situated would 
do). 
110. Macklin, Return to the Best Interests of the Child, in WHO SPEAKS FOR THE 
CHILD 265, 300 (1982). 
111. R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 198-99. 
112. Feinberg, The Child's Right to an Open Future, in ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR SO-
CIAL Poucv 97, 99 (J. Howie ed. 1983). 
113. R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 177. 
114. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A SoLNIT, supra note 43, at 5. 
115. R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 199. 
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omy and self-determination relies on a view that only the self 
can have the selrs interests at heart. 116 No way exists to achieve 
self-determination when one person makes decisions for another; 
this axiom holds true whether parents or others direct medical 
treatment or withhold it. The ref ore, even a proxy decision 
grounded in an assessment of the child's best interests disguises 
any decisionmaker's inability to know what a self-determining 
infant would choose.117 The best interests analysis remains as 
problematic as it was before being draped within the folds of a 
proxy decision. 
c. Closeness or distance- No decisionmaker for the infant 
can act in accord with an infant's self-determination; yet notions 
of proximity and distance from the infant's self affect the appeal 
of alternative decisionmakers. Parents appear to have the ad-
vantage of closeness, commitment to the child, and perhaps love 
and attachment through the parent-child relationship. From 
these sources, the parents may bring persistence and hope to the 
medical treatment decision, and work to preserve the child's 
life-or end it, if the child's suffering seems too great. From this 
116. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, supra note 52, at 136, 142. Individual autonomy, even under 
this tradition, must be fitted into the social and natural worlds that set some boundaries 
on individual power, and the very concept of autonomy incorporates these implicit lim-
its. See generally Benjamin, The Oedipal Riddle: Authority, Autonomy, and the New 
Narcissism, in AUTHORITY IN AMERICA 195, 199-205 (1981) (arguing that autonomy is de-
veloped in relation to authority and internalized norms). Thus, autonomy "can refer ei-
ther to the capacity to govern oneself, which of course is a matter of degree, or (on the 
analogy to a political state) to the sovereign authority to govern oneself, which is abso-
lute within one's own moral boundaries (one's 'territory,' 'realm,' 'sphere,' or 'busi-
ness.')," Feinberg, supra note 112, at 97, 114; cf. M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW 180-88 (1977) (arguing that the rise of the will theory of contract is linked 
to formalist notions of objectivity and bounded rather than subjective and equitable 
notions). 
Philosophers also debate the certainty with which anyone may know his or her own 
interests, Feinberg, supra note 108, at 116-19 (arguing that a person's good may not 
coincide with person's choices or desires; but person's preferences molded by others); 
others cast doubt on whether anyone may know even his or her own experiences and 
perceptions. See S. KRIPKE, supra note 108, at 60-83; H. PUTMAN, REASON, TRUTH, AND 
HISTORY 71-72 (1982). These two forms of skepticism produce some irony; while some 
philosophers maintain that no one can understand what goes on in another's mind, 
others maintain that no one can understand what goes on in his or her own mind without 
reference to communal enterprises like language. These positions are not, however, in-
consistent, in the sense that one can believe that one cannot know what another person 
knows while also believing that human knowledge is located and framed by the society 
and culture in which it forms-all larger than any given individual. Cf. Quine, Episte-
mology Naturalized, in ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND OTHER EssAYS 68, 89-90 (1969) (ar-
guing that building blocks of perception may be culturally variable). 
117. See supra text accompanying notes 83 & 104 (regarding substituted judgment, 
proxy decision, and best interests analyses); Minow, Why Ask Who Speaks for the 
Child, 53 HARV. EDuc. REV. 444, 446 & n.4 (1983) (describing conflict between self-deter-
mination goal and proxy decision-making). 
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vantage point, any decisionmaker other than the parents sits too 
far removed from both the emotional fabric and actual responsi-
bility in the situation for the state to entrust that decisionmaker 
with the medical treatment decision. 118 
Yet many observers cite parents' closeness as a disadvantage, 
a "conflict of interest," because their life-style and commitments 
depend on the child's future. 119 Parents may worry about the 
economic and emotional costs of raising a handicapped child. 
Consequently, their closeness to the child may disadvantage 
them in determining the child's own interests. Alternatively, 
parents' closeness to the child could disadvantage them because 
they may care and love the child too much. Their selfless love 
for the child, rather than their worries about the burden of the 
child, may lead them to choose medical treatment to prolong the 
child's life despite the pain or futility of such measures.120 On 
the other hand, parents may love the child too much to allow 
extended medical treatment that continues the infant's pain. In 
either view, problems of bias, subjectivity, or over-involvement 
persist. By contrast, decisionmakers other than the parents, such 
as doctors, guardians appointed by a court, or treatment com-
mittees, have the advantage of distance and objectivity. Thus, 
underlying assumptions about the consequences of parental 
closeness will guide the state's decision to grant or deny deci-
118. Arguments such as these have supported decisions recognizing the right of par-
ents or guardians to refuse treatment on behalf of another. See Superintendent v. 
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,355 A.2d 
647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Alternatively, it could be argued that the state's 
position bears a resemblance to the parents'. The very state which assigns parents the 
duty to care for children may then conclude that because of this duty, parents have a 
conflict of interest when facing a medical care decision. Still another approach would 
claim that if the state is behind the reinforcement of parental duties-and also holds 
responsibility for the child if the parents default on their duty-then the state itself is 
not without interests that could conflict with the child's. In terms of ultimate ignorance 
about the child's interests, and also ultimate responsibility for the child, the parents and 
the state are rather similarly situated. See infra text accompanying notes 170-75 (pro-
posing an increase in the state's duties to equate their conflicting interests with the 
parents'). 
119. See Capron, The Authority of Others to Decide About Biomedical Interven-
tions With Incompetents, in WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CHILD, supra note 110, at 115, 133; 
see also supra text accompanying notes 94-96 (noting that the quality of life analysis 
obscures question of whose quality of life is at issue). 
Medical personnel fall subject to the same charges of bias through proximity, espe-
cially to the extent that the medical personnel defer to the parents as clients whose 
wishes should govern. 
120. Knowing what kind of pain the infant may experience could prove as difficult as 
knowing what lies at the end of that pain-salvation or nothingness: The parents' views 
about the possibilities of an afterlife for the child could influence their decision, which 
could support claims on a freedom of religion theory for their privilege to decide what 
should happen to their child. 
976 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 18:4 
sional authority to parents. 
Like the competing conceptions of the nature of the family 
and the state, these contrasting assessments of closeness and 
distance underlie arguments about the choice of decisionmakers 
for the infant's medical treatment. Each view of parental close-
ness and subjectivity parallels a view of the virtues or defects of 
the distance and objectivity manifested by alternative deci-
sionmakers such as state officials, doctors, or treatment commit-
tees. Distance disqualifies a decisionmaker if the closeness of the 
parents signifies greater responsibility and care. The distance of 
another decisionmaker appears desirable for those who deem pa-
rental closeness disqualifying because parents may care more for 
their own needs than for the child's. Regardless of one's views 
concerning the relative advantages and disadvantages of close-
ness to and distance from the child, serious doubts persist about 
whether someone other than the parents can know the child's 
interests. 
To the extent that parents suffer from the limitation that one 
can neither know the interests of anyone but oneself nor achieve 
self-determination for anyone but oneself, so do state officials, 
doctors, and treatment committees. To the extent that parents' 
roles in the child's life and attitudes toward the child disqualify 
them as decisionmakers, the other possible decisionmakers suf-
fer from similarly prejudicial roles and attitudes. The very non-
involvement and freedom from continuing responsibility that in-
dividual state officials, doctors, or treatment committees enjoy 
influence their assessments of the child's future. Ultimately, the 
state, in selecting a decisionmaker, must determine what prox-
imity to the child and amount of continuing responsibility 
should qualify or disqualify a decisionmaker. The state will in 
effect select as decisionmaker parents, who will take into ac-
count the difficulties of raising a handicapped child, or deci-
sionmakers other than the parents, who either will fail to con-
sider these difficulties because these are not their problems, or 
will themselves need to determine whether such issues are con-
cerns relevant to the treatment decision. The evaluation of com-
peting decisionmakers turns, then, on assumptions about the ef-
fects of varied relationships to the child, and how these 
relationships influence perceptions of the child's interests. These 
assumptions, in turn, reflect the knotty substantive issues about 
the medical treatment decision that make procedural solutions 
appear more feasible. Procedure provides no escape. 
In sum, the three sets of dualistic concepts for analyzing "who 
decides" initially offer structure to the procedural analysis, but 
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that structure fades under scrutiny. The distinction between 
process and substance blurs as each procedural option exposes 
the ongoing substantive dilemmas. The contrast between self-
determination and determination by others recurs in formula-
tions of "proxy" decision-making notions even where the patient 
is incapable of self-determination. And worries about different 
decisionmaker's closeness to and distance from the child com-
bine with desires for subjectivity and objectivity even while 
echoing opposing notions of trust in family and state. Little res-
olution emerges by picking one side of any of these dichotomies. 
Focusing on a procedural choice revives substantive disputes. 
Conceding that the patient cannot make the treatment decision 
leaves the search for the infant's interests untethered; appeals to 
the infant's expected desires or his or her family's desires are 
not compelling. Yet seizing on the closeness of the parents as a 
basis for allowing them to decide for the child can provoke chal-
lenges that the parents fear or love too much. 
It is possible that each successive characterization may alter 
the seeming appeal of the opposing sides. An argument cast in 
terms of process may divert attention from substance, and tap 
into independent hopes for a legal regime that assures the free-
doms of private persons. An argument cast in terms of proxy 
decision making, in contrast, may soothe objections to intrusions 
on such freedoms. The proxy notion implies such close connec-
tions between the decisionmaker and the person affected by the 
decision that this exception to the self-determination principle 
appears relatively unproblematic-even though there is no pos-
sible chance of self-determination by the handicapped newborn. 
And the third formulation, contrasting the closeness and dis-
tance of a range of possible substitute decisionmakers, could al-
ter yet again the appeal of competing arguments. Here, suspi-
cions of parents could well become heightened, because parents' 
proximity to the situation may smack of bias, conflicting inter-
ests, and subjectivity, in contrast to the seeming objectivity of 
the more distant alternative decisionmakers. The alternative for-
mulations of the problem, then, may draw on images and ideas 
that influence the appeal of one outcome rather than another, 
even though the same problem could be tackled through each of 
the other formulations. The sheer choice of characterizations of 
the problem could then influence the likely result. 
Yet the failures of these alternative, dichotomous formulations 
stem not simply from their conceptual indeterminacy nor from 
their almost arbitrary influence on the appeal of contrasting out-
comes. The more serious defect is that these formulations ob-
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scure the ways in which any decision about the child will grow 
from and express relationships marked by ambivalence. It is not 
just the parents, but also the doctors and state officials, who 
have relationships with the infant and who may experience con-
flicting desires to help and to flee, to identify with the infant 
and to avoid identification. What happens, then, when deci-
sionmakers turn to .resolve particular cases with these less than 
helpful, dualistic categories of analysis? A case examined in the 
next Section suggests that the dualities, contrasting objectivity 
and subjectivity, and procedural and substantive issues, do not 
yield closure, and that an unusual judge may break their mold 
and acknowledge his own relationship to the child. 
2. Applying dichotomous concepts to procedural choices: 
the case of Phillip Becker- Each of the tensions described in 
the last Section appears in another case in which adults con-
tested both the medical care alternatives for a child and the se-
lection of a decisionmaker. Like Baby Jane Doe, Phillip Becker's 
case also captured public attention.121 Shortly after his birth, his 
parents discovered that Phillip had Down's Syndrome and insti-
tutionalized him. Phillip was also born with a heart defect.122 
His institutional caretakers and doctors repeatedly sought, with-
out success, consent from his parents for medical procedures to 
assess and repair the heart defect.123 Another family, the 
Heaths, then sought guardianship and court authorization to 
consent to the medical treatment. The Heath's guardianship pe-
tition requested authority to make the medical care decision, 
but also requested rights to custody and care for Phillip.124 Un-
like the stranger who initiated court action in the case of Baby 
121. E.g., L.A. Times, Oct. 21, 1981, at l; Parental Rights . . .'best interests,' 67 
A.BA J. 1552 (1981). 
122. He was born with a ventricular septal defect, a hole between his right and left 
ventricals, that produces greater strain on the heart, and ultimately leads to death. In re 
Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 
(1980). This decision affirmed a trial court's refusal to find the child a dependent of the 
court due to deprivation of the necessities of life. Evidence at trial suggested that surgery 
to correct the heart defect could be more risky for a person like Phillip who has Down's 
syndrome and with pulmonary vascular changes. Id.; see also Annas, Denying the Rights 
of the Retarded: The Phillip Becker Case, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1979, at 18, 19 
(criticizing court for approving nontreatment of handicapped child due to slightly 
greater health risks and presumptively lesser quality of life). 
123. A critical problem was the effect of delay which made medical procedures more 
risky as time passed. Guardianship of Phillip Becker, Order re Final Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, 75, 78, 82, No. 101981 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara). 
124. Guardianship of Phillip Becker, No. 101981, at 2 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1981). An ed-
ited version of this decision is reprinted in J. AREEN, FAMILY LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 
296 (Supp. 1983). See also Herbert & Patsy H. v. Warren B., 137 Cal. App. 3d 407, 188 
Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983) (affirming trial court decision on totality of circumstances). 
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Jane Doe, 1211 the Heaths had befriended Phillip, worked with 
him at the institution through a volunteer program, and over the 
course of several years, brought him into their own family's life 
through overnight visits, holidays, and close relationships. After 
an extended trial, the trial court concluded that the Heaths had 
become Phillip's psychological parents. The court awarded 
guardianship to the Heaths and permitted them to authorize 
medical treatment. The court also authorized a medical proce-
dure to determine the feasibility of surgery on the heart 
defect. 126 
Although the court started with the procedural choice, sub-
stantive choices preoccupied its opinion. The court began with 
the question, "Who speaks for the child?," but soon turned to 
evaluate the quality of parental care offered Phillip by the 
Heaths and by his biological parents, and the conceptions each 
set of parents had of Phillip and his quality of life. According to 
the court, Phillip's parents maintained a conception of an un-
skilled and devalued person, incapable of love, based on the ini-
tial advice of doctors that Phillip belonged in an institution. 
Phillip's parents clung to the assessment offered by doctors at 
the time of his birth while the Heaths acted on a changing con-
ception of Down's syndrome. The Heaths pictured Phillip as an 
educable and valuable person capable of love. In a sense, this 
case vividly presents how different understandings of a disability 
can have major consequences for the actual quality of life availa-
ble to the disabled person. And the court treated these compara-
tive assessments of Phillip's quality of life as central evidence 
concerning both the procedural question of who should make the 
medical treatment decision, and the substantive issue of whether 
treatment of the heart condition should go forward. 127 The 
choice of decisionmakers thus marked a choice in conceptions of 
the child's quality of life and in the substantive choices the deci-
sionmakers would reach about the medical treatment the child 
deserved. The court found the Heaths' conception-and their 
125. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
126. Guardianship of Phillip Becker, No. 101981 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1981). The trial 
court did not, however, terminate the parental rights of the Beckers. The appellate court 
affirmed; it emphasized that the fact of detriment to Phillip was established not by his 
parents' decision to institutionalize him, but by their decision to remain emotionally and 
physically detached. Herbert & Patsy H. v. Warren B:, 139 Cal. App. 3d 407, 188 Cal. 
Rptr. 781 (1983). After this decision, the parties reached a settlement, and successful 
heart surgery was performed on Phillip. J. AREEN, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d 
ed. 1985). The Heaths established a financial trust to assist Phillip. They believe he will 
be able to work in a semi-sheltered environment with other handicapped people. Id. 
127. Guardianship of Phillip Becker, No. 101981, 8-10, 12-14 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1981). 
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claim for guardianship-more persuasive, and likely to off er the 
least detrimental alternative for Phillip: a life worth living. 
Still, the procedural question of who should decide what 
should happen to Phillip remained for the court. Here the court 
sought some way to catch a glimpse of the choice Phillip himself 
would make; self-determination of some sort seemed more pref-
erable than arrogation of the decision by the court. The self-de-
termination cast to a quality of life principle thus guided the 
judge to search for some way to couch a decision about Phillip as 
a decision he wanted. Acknowledging that the state provided no 
method for a mentally retarded child to state a preference, the 
court adapted the substituted judgment notion from other juris-
dictions. 128 The court then applied an unprecedented approach 
to this substituted judgment method: a "[P]latonic dialogue 
with the court posing the choices to Phillip and Phillip's prefer-
ence being ascertained from the more logical choice."129 Through 
its Platonic dialogue the court turned the procedural problem of 
who should decide what should happen to Phillip back to the 
substantive choices of the care alternatives and quality of life 
estimates offered by the competing sets of parents. The court 
used the self-determination mode invited by the imagined dia-
logue with Phillip to frame the court's determination of the 
child's interest. 130 And the competing conceptions of Phillip's 
abilities, held by the Heaths and the Beckers, figured promi-
nently in the court's evaluation of what Phillip would want. 
The court did not discuss expressly whether closeness quali-
fied or disqualified either set of parents for decision making, al-
though it acknowledged the biological tie between Phillip and 
his parents, and refrained from terminating that relationship.131 
128. The court announced that substituted judgment entailed discerning "as nearly 
as possible the incompetent person's 'actual interests and preferences,' " and that other 
courts had found this method consistent with the best interests doctrine. Id. at 15-16. 
129. Id. at 16-17. 
130. "Phillip's case may pave the way for recognition of a developmentally disabled 
child's right to choose his fate or destiny by the substituted judgment approach, or by 
the type of legal proceedings we are presently engaged in." Id. at 17. Yet self-determina-
tion for the child is to be secured by decision making by the court. 
131. The court thus permitted the Heaths to act as guardians without terminating 
the parental rights of the Beckers. See Guardianship of Phillip B., 139 Cal. App. 3d 407, 
412, 188 Cal. Rptr. 781, 783-84 (1983). This amounted to an unusual decision to maintain 
through law multiple ties between the child and the two sets of parents. The traditional 
legal approach rests on the contrasting assumption that only one set of parents can have 
legal rights and responsibilities regarding a given child. Recent scholarship challenging 
this assumption has offered recommendations for facilitating through law several simul-
taneous adult relationships with a child. See Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Ex-
clusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Fam-
ily has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 886-89, 944-61 (1984) (exploring traditional notion of 
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The court also credited the psychological closeness between 
Phillip and the Heaths132 and did not suggest that the Heaths' 
closeness to Phillip caused them to act in their own rather than 
in his interests. Instead, the opinion registered considerable sen-
sitivity to the multiple relationships in the child's life, relation-
ships where neither closeness nor distance could direct who 
should decide the medical treatment. 
Nevertheless, an extraordinary expression of concern about 
closeness and distance, and objectivity and subjectivity appears 
in the judge's statements about himself. Judge Fernandez in-
cluded personal statements of great emotion and reflection. 133 
The judge asserted that while this court has tried to remain 
objective, 
[j]udges are humans and not machines. From my point of 
view I believe that we prefer to be judged by a real per-
son with emotions and common sense, and all those other 
important characteristics of a Homo sapien . . . . As I 
read his file and I could see that this little boy was begin-
ning on his trip towards death, and that he realized it, I 
was stricken with anguish and parental grief . . . . It 
may be argued that I used the footnotes too much to phi-
losophize and state some personal views, experiences, and 
anecdotes. My defense is that in a case like ours which is 
so fundamental and basic to life, people should know how 
some of their 'governors' think and have their opportu-
nity to judge the judgment of the judge.134 
exclusive parenthood, challenges in current patterns of divorce and child custody, and 
alternatives to exclusive parenthood); Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 
STAN. L. REV. 423, 439-48, 474-89 (1983) (discussing alternatives to permanency policy in 
foster care system and reviewing psychological evidence about children's needs). The 
lawyers for the Heaths constructed a theory of the case that transformed the medical 
treatment decision into a custody context-and then into an innovative arrangement 
shifting limited custody to the Heaths. The Beckers challenged this shift and lost. 139 
Cal. App. 3d 407, 188 Cal. Rptr. 781. 
132. The court did, in context, expressly chastise Phillip's parents for clinging to the 
assessement they formed of him at birth. Id. at 19 & n.69. It is important to note that 
the court's gesture of care and compassion towards the child may well punish others, like 
parents who have chosen a different position on the medical treatment issue. Parents 
may well experience a decision overruling their judgment as a serious rejection or even 
humiliation, yet these experiences are inevitable when their decision fails to meet a stan-
dard of care that legal authorities will enforce. 
133. See id. at 18-19 & nn.68, 68a, 70 (discussing how the case haunted the judge, 
brought to the judge's mind the treatment of disabled people in other cultures, in litera-
ture, and in the judge's neighborhood). 
134. Id. at 23 n.70 (emphasis added). Note how the judge placed himself within the 
case-"in a case like ours." Id. It is a moving opinion, and one that pierces the usual grey 
prose of official state documents. It gives both an encouraging sense of a real human 
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Thus, Judge Fernandez revealed his relationship to the child 
by breaking through the usual conventions of distance and ano-
nymity to share with the public his personal moral struggle be-
tween respecting and rejecting the parents' choice. In so doing, 
he exposed the decisional process as he experienced it: it impli-
cated his relationships to the child, to the two sets of parents, 
and to the general public as well. 
It is an unusual opinion, in an unusual case. For the usual 
frameworks for analysis that divide self-determination and 
proxy determination, procedure and substance, and objectivity 
and subjectivity, all appear in the opinion, and yet the opinion 
itself challenges these dualities, and reaches resolution outside 
their confines. Self-determination and proxy determination 
would both be problematic, given the child's mental retardation 
but also his evident personality and attachments to people. For 
Judge Fernandez, Phillip's own views could no more be ignored 
than they could themselves be determinative. Instead, the judge 
constructed a dialogue form in which the judge could combine 
what he had learned about the child with his best effort to imag-
ine what the child would want, in relation to how the judge him-
self saw the situation. Similarly, for Judge Fernandez, the sub-
stance of the medical treatment decision could not be separated 
from who should decide, nor indeed from questions about what 
kind of life Phillip would face in relation to people who had con-
trasting conceptions of who he was. These issues appeared inex-
tricably connected in the judge's opinion, for the kind of life 
open to the child seemed to depend on which relationships he 
could maintain. 
Acknowledging the central importance of relationships, the 
judge also acknowledged his own relationship to the child. He 
made it clear that he, Judge Fernandez, was undertaking some 
large share of the decisions for the child, even though the "who 
decides" question allows a judge to hide behind presumptions, 
precedent, and professional role. His personal involvement, and 
his honesty about it exposed the limits of the standard tensions 
between self-determination and determination by others, proce-
dure and substance, and objectivity and subjectivity. 
Other cases routinely express medical treatment decisions 
through these dichotomies, but imply that these somehow help 
being struggling with moral issues and a disturbing sense of how thin is the veneer of 
laws on a justice system of men. Compare B. BRECHT, THE CAUCASIAN CHALK CIRCLE 
(presenting a judge abandoning commitment to laws in favor of revealing personal di-
mension of justice) with R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975) (exploring how and why anti-
slavery judges enforced slave laws despite personal commitments to the contrary). 
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resolve the problem. 1311 Yet these dichotomies afford no basis for 
gaining insight into fears and hopes about the child, and no 
guidance for viewing how the child's relationships affect the op-
portunities that lie ahead. Nor do the dichotomies offer a way 
for the reviewing judge to recognize his or her involvement in 
and distance from the case-or the similar mix of involvement 
and distance for the watching public. A series of additional pro-
cedural choices surrounding judicial review also invoke the stan~ 
dard dichotomies without illuminating these complicated pat-
terns of relationships and ambivalence that surround the 
medical treatment decision for a severely handicapped child. 
These procedures may effectively allocate power or uncertainty 
in ways that in effect produce resolutions in particular cases, but 
they still fail to unearth, much less address, the deeper conflicts 
about relationships between handicapped persons and others 
that animate controversies over these cases. An examination of 
review procedure, burdens of proof and presumptions thus can 
reveal the persistence of the familiar dichotomies-and the per-
sistent patterns of distrust that remain to divide people over 
these controversies. 
3. Review procedures- The state makes additional proce-
dural choices in determining the methods of review available if 
someone wants to challenge a parental decision, and in assigning 
burdens of proof and presumptions in cases involving such chal-
lenges. Real consequences flow from these procedural choices in 
terms of the duration and costs of the medical care decision, and 
also in terms of the ultimate allocation of decisional power. 
First, the state establishes the availability of review of a pa-
rental decision concerning the medical care of their child. 
Should the state permit some other relatives, hospital personnel, 
or strangers to challenge that decision?136 Should the state en-
courage or require such challenges, by establishing a board to 
135. Compare, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979) (contrasting assump-
tions about effect of professional and parental proximity to child in making a civil com-
mitment decision) and In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942) (finding that 
the close bond between parent and child justifies entrusting parent with medical treat-
ment decision) with In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1970), aff'd, 37 
A.D.2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 
686 (1972) (holding that even religious belief of parent cannot support refusal of medical 
care; state must protect the child). 
136. The state should decline to recognize challenges brought by persons unrelated 
by family or professional contact to the instant case; although doctrines of standing per-
mit variable recognition by the judiciary of claims, C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL 
COURTS 59-74 (1983); one generally cannot assert the rights of another, id. at 73. If the 
rights of the infant are at stake, the state itself should represent them. See supra text 
accompanying note 15. 
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review whatever decision the parents make? Answers to these 
questions have made consultation with a medical ethics commit-
tee routine in some states. 137 
Federal regulations have also stimulated the use of hospital 
ethics committees.138 Such committees initially gather informa-
tion about the particular health of and treatment options for the 
infant, and then draw upon the interdisciplinary knowledge of 
the doctors, 1 nurses, theologians, philosophers, social workers, 
and lay people on the committee to decide the proper medical 
care for the infant.139 An advantage of such committees is their 
collaborative structure, in contrast to the adversarial format of a 
judicial proceeding. A disadvantage-shared by judicial re-
view-is the time the committee process may take, forcing in-
137. Boisen, supra note 107, at 17. In the Quinlan case, the court required use of the 
hospital ethics committee as a check on the doctors' assessment that there was no rea-
sonable chance of the patient's recovery. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Other courts have similarly relied on-and thereby en-
couraged the use of-ethics committees. E.g., In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 
1984); see Longino, supra note 78, at 402-03 (discussing ethics committees). 
138. See Boisen, supra note 107, at 19. The American Academy of Pediatrics sup-
ported the use of such committees in response to the proposed Baby Doe regulations. 
The proposed regulations provided guidelines for Infant Care Review Committees 
(ICRCs) to: 
develop policies and guidelines for the treatment of such infants; act as ~ re-
source to hospital personnel and families of disabled infants to provide current 
and complete information concerning medical treatment, procedures and re-
sources as well as community resources; and review decisions made in individual 
cases to assure that appropriate treatment is provided. Where medically indi-
cated treatment is not being provided, the ICRC will report such a case to the 
[state child protective service] agency for immediate legal intervention. 
45 C.F.R. § 1340.14. The final regulation clarified that the guidelines concerning these 
committees are purely advisory and no federal carrots or sticks would induce their adop-
tion. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,880, 14,896. Nonetheless, these advisory guidelines continue to pro-
vide a detailed model for such committees that combines information, resource, and re-
ferral with mechanisms to report cases to court or state child protective services. Id. at 
14,896. And the Department of Health and Human Services encourages the formation of 
such committees. Id. at 14,893. Although no particular substantive effect need follow 
from the use of such committees, the federal policy statement regarding the committees 
reaffirms the committment of the Department of Health and Human Services to promote 
institutional practices with a guiding principle "to prevent the withholding of medically 
indicated treatment from disabled infants with life-threatening conditions." Id. at 
14,898. 
139. Procedural ambiguity arises over who should sit on the committee, when and at 
whose instigations cases should be sent to the committee, and how weighty a committee 
decision should be. See Robertson, supra note 87. The advisory guidelines issued by the 
federal government recommend inclusion of: a practicing physician, a practicing nurse, a 
hospital administrator, a social worker, a representative of a disability group, a lay com-
munity member, and a member of the facility's medical staff. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,893-94. 
The guidelines also recommend procedures for review of specific cases, including ap-
pointment of a member of the committee as an advocate for the infant, and procedures 
for referring a case to court or to state child protective services. Id. at 14,896. Each of 
these features recapitulates issues about who should decide the merits and how. 
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terim treatment decisions and prolonging parents' agony. In-
deed, prolonging the decision may force one decision over 
another in many cases. For example, time delays may require 
treatment to preserve the infant's life pending a committee re-
view, or postpone treatment pending an appeal of a committee's 
decision reversing parental choice. 
Substantively, rationales for committees' judgments are as 
problematic as for parents' judgments. No societal consensus ex-
ists about these issues; the lack of consensus explains why these 
cases reach ethics committees. Additionally, no consensus exists 
about what ethical principles should guide the committees' deci-
sions. 14° Committees may simply approve the decision reached 
by parents and doctors, which makes the committee process 
seem redundant. Indeed if this is the result, the committee 
structure may simply provide a procedural evasion of the sub-
stantive issues. The procedural decision to create a committee 
itself represents a choice to disturb the traditional legal arrange-
ment that allocates power to parents, subject to the review only 
by a state social service agency or court. The committee process 
injects a new set of decisionmakers as a seeming answer to the 
troubling procedural problem of who should decide these cases. 
It only seems an answer because if committees reverse the par-
ents' and doctors' decisions, these people may pursue judicial re-
view, thereby further extending the decisional process,141 and re-
opening the question of who should decide. The reviewing court 
then would have to consider whether the parents' proximity to 
the problem disqualifies them from judgment, or instead privi-
leges their position. Similarly, the court could consider who can 
provide the most reliable proxy decision, given the impossibility 
of self-determination for the disabled infant. Whatever substan-
tive decision produced by the committee process and judicial re-
view, the review committees do not provide any way for parents 
or the larger community to develop understandings about types 
140. See R. VEATCH, CASE STUDIES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 40-41 (1977) (noting that cler-
gyman, judge, utilitarian, formalist each have special expertise). Veatch maintains that 
in an egalitarian society, debates about right and wrong in such situations express the 
values and epistemology of democracy. Id. Deciding whose values should prevail in medi-
cal ethics, then, raises the same problems as debates over values in the larger society: 
problems for debate, not deference to higher authority or special expertise. 
141. The state also could use the threat of malpractice charges should doctors fail to 
pursue medical treatment and thus encourage the doctors to seek state approval if they 
accede in a parental decision to forego treatment. Such a risk of malpractice charges 
would draw doctors into a search for administrative or judicial review. Both the ultimate 
decision by the committee and the standards for malpractice for the medical personnel 
directly draw the process back into the substantive debate over treatment. Rather than 
bypassing substance, these procedural choices depend on it. 
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of handicaps and treatment options, or about how parents and 
the community itself are implicated in the meaning of the in-
fant's disability and opportunities in the future. Instead, the 
committee process could play into tendencies to distrust the 
parents, and to force decisions into an adversarial mode. " 
One procedural alternative to the current review process 
would assign to committees the task of developing working 
guidelines for treatment based on diagnostic categories. 142 This 
alternative would address the confusion, inconsistency, and se-
crecy of treatment decisions by giving guidelines to parents and 
doctors, without exacerbating the difficult decisional process at 
the moment that they must make a treatment decision for a par-
ticular infant. Another alternative would place the parents on 
the review committee rather than treat them as witnesses or 
parties before it. This would give others a chance to talk with 
the parents in a context where the parents do not turn into de-
fendants but also do not remain inviolate decisionmakers. ua Fi-
nally, a third alternative would modify the methods of ethics 
committees. Ethics professionals would not make or review the 
treatment decision but would help the parents and doctors make 
that decision in light of the range of concerns that an ethics 
committee would deem important.144 Such an approach could 
challenge parents' overestimations or underestimations of the in-
fant's quality of life, while also helping parents clarify their as-
sessments of the relationship between their interests and the 
child's interests. 
Adopting any of these alternatives, however, involves a judg-
ment to assign the treatment decision, as a rule, to the parents 
in consultation with their doctors, rather than to the committee 
itself. This central judgment returns to the "who decides" ques-
142. Cf. R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 210-11 (recommending treatment decisons based 
on diagnostic categories); see also Hentoff, The Awful Privacy of Baby Doe, supra note 
4, at 54-55 (distinguishing treatment options by diagnostic category). See infra text ac-
companying notes 185-88 (proposing procedures to develop guidelines outside of the con-
text of any pending case). 
143. This alternative might be impractical for decisions that must be made shortly 
after the child's birth, when both mother and father may be physically and emotionally 
incapacitated. Yet even at this point, greater access to good information about the child's 
condition and prospects could help the parents and the decisions they and/or the doctors 
make. See infra text accompanying notes 176-83 (proposing nonadversarial exchange of 
information). 
144. Malcolm, Medicine, Law and the American Way of Death, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 
1984, § 4, at 7, col. 2, (hospital ethics committes that "don't actually make life-and-death 
decisions" but "dispatch individual members to meet with doctors, patients and family 
to insure specific treatment decisions are made in an ethical context" for chronically ill 
patients). 
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tion, and the state's task in resolving this question remains diffi-
cult, given reasons to distrust all available decisionmakers. In-
deed, the issue of parental bias due to their closeness to the 
situation is a major basis for the committee review process. If 
the committtee is created to alter the usual allocation of power 
between parents and state, it leaves judicial review as the avenue 
for parents to reassert their view-to reopen the questions of 
who should decide, and what should be decided. 
Issues about who should decide centrally recur in the state's 
procedural choices of burdens of proof and presumptions, with 
or without a review committee. For instance, should the law as-
sign a presumption in favor of any parental decision and impose 
a burden of proof on the state or any challengers to rebut this 
presumption? 1• 11 These procedural choices determine the routine 
handling of cases, and also what will happen in an unusual case, 
given doubt about the merits. The usual rule grants a presump-
tion that parents act in their children's interests.146 A legal 
framework in which parents are presumptive caretakers for their 
children casts any person who would challenge the parents' deci-
sion in the role of the accuser, and the parents in the role of 
defendants charged with violating the trust bestowed upon them 
by the state. Frequent challenges in practice, and institutional 
procedures like ethics review committees that second-guess the 
parents' decisions, erode a presumption for the parents simply 
by subjecting their decisions to review. 147 
The state's choices about review procedures, burdens of proof, 
and presumptions also revive substantive issues and debates 
concerning self-determination versus proxy decision making, 
closeness, and distance. Given the impossibility of self-determi-
nation by the handicapped infant, the state's choice of the 
proper nature and standard of review reflects trust and distrust 
of the family and the state. The conception of the family as an 
145. Variations in the formulation of the presumption are also possible. Compare In 
re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1984) (requiring clear and convincing evidence that child 
suffers from irreversible defect in order to sustain parental decision to withhold treat-
ment) with In re Becker, 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 801-02, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (1978) (de-
claring that the state has serious burden to overcome presumption of parental auton-
omy), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980). 
146. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Application of Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 
702, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965, 988 (1979); see also J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, supra 
note 43, at 19-21, 91-109 (proposing standards restraining state supervention of parental 
decision-making power over child's medical treatment). 
147. Of course, the presumption may serve the additional purpose of tilting the case. 
toward the parents' decision once review is underway, but even this function of the pre-
sumption may be undermined if review committees structure their process routinely as 
evaluating anew the parents' medical treatment decision. 
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enclave of love and selflessness removed from the untrustworthy 
power of the state supports arguments for allowing parents to 
make the medical care decision and for restricting the kinds and 
numbers of challenges and review by others. The contrasting 
conception of the family as a dangerous, unbridled area of dis-
cretion and the state as the source of law and justice supports 
substitute decisionmakers and vigorous review by the state. 
Each version expresses distrust of one set of authority figures 
and greater trust for another. 
Debates over cases like Baby Jane Doe's embroil the affected 
family and the watching community in a drama of blame and 
defense. The frameworks for analysis, cast in terms of substan-
tive versus procedural choices, and state intervention versus 
nonintervention, merely permit people to enact their distrust 
rather than to acknowledge it. When abstract principles and di-
chotomous concepts structure debate, impassioned, rigid and po-
larized stances can emerge, as in the abortion debate. Such de-
bates obscure the complexity of the connections between state 
and family, between the value of life and the relationships that 
give it value, and between procedural and substantive decisions 
on these matters. Abstract and dichotomous debate also oc-
cludes the ambivalence and distrust that can fuel controversy. 
Especially when forged in the crucible of adversarial processes, 
debates over medical treatment for handicapped newborns actu-
ally impede our recognition of and confrontation with the 
sources of emotional conflict that animate public fascination 
with the state's decisions in cases like that of Baby Jane Doe. 
This article has suggested thus far, in marginal ways, how this 
fascination may be linked to people's conflicting experiences of 
being moved and repelled by the plight of the infant, just as it 
has suggested how the meaning of life for a handicapped per-
son-or, indeed, any person-depends importantly on the rela-
tionships others are willing to undertake. Unusual mo-
ments-like Judge Fernandez's decision in the case of Phillip 
Becker-off er profound insights into this deeper level of under-
standing. There a judge was able to acknowledge the real differ-
ence particular relationships could make in the child's life, and 
the judge also acknowledged the complexity of his own relation-
ship with the child before the court. Yet these powerful effects 
of interpersonal relationships, and the significant role of emo-
tional conflict, barely surface for express acknowledgment in the 
usual legal and policy debates over individual cases or the issue 
in general. 
Rather than confining these matters to the corners of concern, 
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the next Section of this article proposes to address these issues 
directly. I will start with the theme of distrust, as a thread inter-
woven in public debates that hints at deeper conflicts, usually 
obscured by those very debates. The next Section thus asks, 
what conditions give rise to this distrust? 
III. CONDITIONS OF DISTRUST AND CONDITIONS FOR TRUST 
Distrust reverberates in the state intervention debate and in 
tensions between both substantive and procedural options con-
cerning medical care for disabled infants. Arguments over the 
merits of state intervention in the family in part express com-
peting views about whether the state or the family is more trust-
worthy in caring for handicapped newborns. Similar conceptions 
animate debates concerning who should serve as the presump-
tive decisionmaker and whose interests do not conflict with the 
interests of the infant. Yet explaining distrust by reference to 
these conceptions affords little insight or suggestion for change. 
To understand the sources of distrust, analysis must plunge 
deeper than these debates. These debates depend upon abstract 
conceptions of the state and the family. And these abstractions 
oversimplify what is at stake while tapping deep sources of 
distrust. 
Use of the "state" as a concept in the debate over intervention 
oversimplifies, because the state is not one entity but instead 
sets of institutions, employees, and rules subject to interpreta-
tion. The "state intervention" in the Baby Jane Doe case in-
volved half a dozen judges, many administrators and investiga-
tors, and several hundred legislators. Each of these individuals 
had a different relationship to the situation, a point obscured in 
the press and public debate by general expressions of trust or 
distrust of state action.148 Similarly, the "family" is not one en-
tity but a multitude of unique interpersonal relationships bound 
by complicated mixtures of biology, culture, love, and depen-
dence, and threatened by complicated internal and external 
pressures. It is too crude to assign genuine feelings of trust or 
distrust to the abstracted concept of "family." 
Yet the attribution of serious concerns to abstract concepts 
typifies legal and policy analysis. The tendency to translate com-
148. There may be a basis to distrust the state due to the very numbers of persons 
involved when the state acts. This marks a different point from a general statement of 
distrust of the state, compared with the family. 
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plicated emotional dimensions of the medical care decision into 
the choice between oversimplified, competing concepts recurs 
when observers box the medical care decision into procedural 
and substantive categories, and the substance of the decisiQn 
into the extreme alternatives of right to life and quality of life 
assessments. Such alternatives provide a rhetorical structure for 
debating what should happen, but it is a thin and limited rheto-
ric that obscures the ambiguity and line-drawing problems that 
arise with each substantive alternative. Similarly, casting proce-
dural choices among decisionmakers, review mechanisms, and 
burdens of proof provides outlets for debate but offers little in-
sight into continuing disagreements. 
A. Distrust and Identification 
I propose to examine deeper sources of disagreement than the 
abstract alternatives of state versus family, right to life versus 
quality of life, and procedure versus substance. This inquiry 
may help uncover what rivets public attention to cases like that 
of Baby Jane Doe, and also may open a new and more promising 
arena for attention. Informed by work in psychology and philos-
ophy, this inquiry will consider: (1) how might experiences of 
identification with Baby Doe, her parents, and others explain 
people's responses to the case; (2) how might the mass media 
coverage and the adversary system contribute to ambivalent and 
yet condemnatory responses to aspects of the case; and (3) how 
might psychological theories about the self illuminate sources of 
distrust in debates about the case. 
1. Objects of identification- The Baby Jane Doe case and 
similar tragedies capture the attention of the general public be-
cause almost all members of society can identify with one or 
more of the principal figures in such cases.149 This identification 
occurs on three levels. 
First, people may identify with the vulnerable infant. Every-
149. For discussions of the psychological concept of identification, see J. GREENBERG 
& S. MITCHELL, OBJECT RELATIONS IN PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY 70-72, 160-61, 171, 331 
(1983) (discussing internalization of aspects of others as developmental dimension; the 
authors are object-relations theorists); J. KAGAN, THE NATURE OF THE CHILD 139-43 
(1984) (discussing the process by which a child develops identification with distinctive 
qualities of others, and constructs standards of behavior on the basis of this identifica-
tion). I am using the term more generally to apply to the self-recognition adults as well 
as children may feel in perceiving the roles and attitudes of others; I mean to refer to the 
psychological notion that the individual's self-conception and repressed internalization 
of others is implicated by experiences of identification. 
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one has been an infant once, and everyone in that capacity has 
dealt from a position of vulnerability with powerful adults who 
make decisions for the child. Identification with the infant may 
exist unconsciously and subtly; it may also be intense and dis-
turbing. It may be intense because childhood vulnerability may 
undergird adult memory and identity. 1110 It may be disturbing 
because identification with the vulnerable infant does not itself 
help an adult know which choice about medical care to prefer 
even though the identification makes the choice itself seem terri-
bly important. 
Identification with the infant may support aggressive medical 
care and elaborate methods to preserve or prolong life, but it 
may also encourage more conservative treatment. An adult iden-
tifying with the disabled infant may imagine desires on the part 
of the child to live, to receive all possible care, and to gain assur-
ances of attention and comfort. Yet an adult identifying with 
the infant might as easily pref er suicide to extensive medical 
treatment that cannot ameliorate the underlying handicapping 
conditions. Or such an adult may imagine wanting to relieve 
family members from the burden of caring for a severely dis-
abled child. The adult may also imagine living inert and unloved 
in an institution, which might produce strong desires for treat-
ment, but also strong desires for nontreatment. Indeed, whether 
the competing choices about medical treatment seem in equi-
poise or yield a preference, an adult identifying with an infant 
may well distrust anyone else to know and understand what the 
infant needs. 1111 
At the same time, an adult can also identify with the parents 
of a handicapped infant. This identification may horrify the 
adult, for it can involve feeling both revulsion at having given 
150. Many theorists assert that the child's early life may be characterized by vulnera-
bility and helplessness, see J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, supra note 43, at 7-10, 
and that these experiences remain in the individual's psychic world even during adult-
hood; H. FINGARETrE, THE SELF IN TRANSFORMATION: PSYCHOANALYSIS, PHILOSOPHY AND 
THE LIFE OF THE SPIRIT 59 (1963); M. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOP· 
MENT, AND DEATH 104-05, 150 (1975). See generally J. GREENBERG & S. MITCHELL, supra 
note 149, at 105 (describing Harry Stack Sullivan's notion of foresight as anticipation of 
future interactions conforming to past experience, with the past shaping the anticipa-
tion); id. at 373 (discussing Joseph Sandler's theory of internalized representations com-
piling past experiences and perceptions that allow the individual to locate the present). 
151. See A. MILLER, THE DRAMA OF THE GIFTED CHILD (1983) (describing parents im-
posing their desires on children); A. MILLER, THOU SHALT NOT BE AwARE 7-8, 31-36 
(1984) (adults and psychoanalysis denying abuse of children by parents, ignoring pa-
tients' signals); see also R. BURT, supra note 103, at 13-44 (1979) (reporting that reasons 
to distrust both patient and doctors grow from their mutual impact on each other, stem-
ming from basic psychological construction of self and others). 
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birth to a handicapped newborn and revulsion at this revulsion. 
An adult identifying with the parents of Baby Jane Doe may 
discover both an inclination to abandon the child and disgust 
with that inclination. The identifying adult may also feel drawn 
by a moral view of duty to resolve this emotional turmoil by re-
nouncing instinct in favor of conscience. 1112 
Just as the emotional response may be deeply ambivalent, any 
duty the adult constructs from identification with the infant's 
parents may support opposite courses of action. For example, a 
duty of care, extrapolated from the role of parent, may com-
mand consent to all measures to preserve or prolong the child's 
life. Yet that same duty may also direct attention to the dignity 
of that child, including an entitlement to die with dignity. Iden-
tification with the parents' emotional ambivalence and role obli-
gations provides bases for distrusting those parents, because the 
identifying adult discovers through his or her identification a ba-
sis to distrust himself or herself. 1113 
Finally, some people may also identify with the medical and 
legal personnel and this too may produce ambivalence. They 
may feel drawn by medical personnel's commitment to preserve 
life. On the other hand, people may imagine and resent medical 
professionals' technological fix 11H or tendency to use all new 
152. See S. FREUD, C1VILIZATION AND ITS D1scoNTENTS PART VII, 793-96 (1930) (J. Ri-
viere trans.), in THE MAJOR WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD (W. Benton ed. 1952)(describing 
conscience emerging from renunciation of instinct); S. FREUD, AN OUTLINE OF PSYCHO-
ANALYSIS 42-43, 56-57 (J. Strachey, trans. 1949) (theorizing that the ego must fight inter-
nal instinctual demands and external pressures); J. KAGAN, supra note 149, at 143-53 
(arguing that moral standards subjugate dispositions in monitoring human behavior and 
rewarding self with sense of goodness). 
153. Moreover, observers may identify with both infant and adult and experience a 
conflict like the tension between the quality of life position and the right to life position. 
Advocates of a quality of life standard may focus on the risks of imposing pain or joyless 
existence on the helpless infant. They fear that someday the child they save will wish not 
to be alive, or will be incapable of expressing or even formulating that wish. They may 
also worry about the burdens to the family-the marriage, the other children-who will 
have to care for this infant with little or no financial or emotional assistance from the 
state. The right to life advocates in contrast fear that attempts to draw lines between 
different qualities of life devalue life, and start down a slippery slope where no one's life 
is assured value and protection. Some ignore or deem irrelevant the burdens to the fam-
ily from raising a severely disabled child, some assume institutional care will be availa-
ble, and a few argue for societal commitments to assist the family by improving the 
services for and social status of disabled people. See supra text accompanying notes 61-
62 and infra text accompanying note 171. 
154. See Boisen, supra note 107, at 17 (reporting hospitals' bias toward technological 
intervention); see also R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 30 (describing neonatal intensive care 
centers and technological sophistication of tertiary care hospitals). The fact that tertiary 
care hospitals are not the only place where babies are born poses problems of inequitable 
access to resources, which also influence the range of treatment options for infants. Thus, 
using "all available" methods means something different in different institutions. 
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techniques available to save life rather than estimate the sense 
or value of the procedure. 11111 People may identify with a judge 
and feel the isolation of that role. 
Furthermore, people who identify with the adult actors in the 
case have reason to distrust them, because they have reasons to 
distrust themselves. And people who identify in any way with 
the infant have reasons to distrust others, because they have 
memories of learning that no one could know their needs com-
pletely. However these feelings of trust and distrust arise, and 
however people deal with these feelings, a story like the case of 
Baby Jane Doe engages individuals' own senses of vulnerability, 
self-loathing, and aspirations for wisdom-much as medieval 
morality plays engaged their audiences.1116 The case of Baby 
Jane Doe may thus expose people's fears about their own vul-
nerability to the power of others. The case may also invoke fears 
about betraying a sense of duty with emotional responses, and 
also fears about cutting off emotional impulses with a sense of 
duty. 
The case may at the same time nurture hopes for resolution of 
these fears. 1117 People may view the parents as good or evil, and 
similarly evaluate the state. But in any case, the story itself may 
capture their own self-distrust and distrust of others, while of-
fering an occasion for judgment. In judging parents, doctors, and 
other decisionmakers in this context, a watching public audience 
risks projecting self-distrust onto any of these actors. Observers 
may also project onto others one side of their ambivalent feel-
ings, such as the fear of emotional impulses, while waiting ready 
to condemn those others based on the contrasting side of ambiv-
alence, such as the fear of cutting off emotional impulses 
through a sense of duty. One observer may blame parents for 
underestimating the value of the life of the severely disabled 
child; another may blame the parents for clutching at technology 
155. The practice of "defensive" medicine, in the face of malpractice risks or other 
worries, may lead medical personnel to use whatever techniques are available. See R. 
WEIR, supra note 61, at 138. But see Longino, supra note 78, at 401-02 (describing physi-
cians torn between their own moral judgments and desires to remove burden from 
parents). 
156. See F. ARTZ, THE MIND OF THE MIDDLE AGES 359-60 (rev. 3d ed. 1980) (reporting 
that medieval morality plays used actors to represent virtues and vices and other ab-
stractions; usual theme had evil forces pursue Everyman and Wisdom rescue him); see 
also M. BALL, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW: A THEOLOGICAL HUMANISTIC VIEW OF LE-
GAL PROCESS 42-59 (1981) (contrasting law's and theatre's techniques for redirecting pas-
sion and comparing trials and morality plays). 
157. Cf. R. BURT, supra note 103, at 55, 65, 134 (arguing that interaction between 
patient and doctors reveals power and powerlessness of both, and opportunity for contin-
uing struggle for choice making). 
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only to prolong the process of the child's death. Both the adver-
sarial structure of legal proceedings, and the media's tendency to 
cast news events as moral tales with good and evil figures exac-
erbate this risk of mutual blame and projected self-distrust, and 
deserve fuller consideration. 
2. Fomenting distrust- The media news coverage gives the • 
story of decisions about medical treatment for a handicapped 
newborn a sense of crisis even as it may prolong, through each 
daily update, the ambivalence and conflict people may feel 
about each alternative.m Nonetheless, mass media attention has 
severe limitations as a vehicle to resolve or accomodate these 
fears. Media coverage focuses longstanding emotions on a crisis, 
and plays into desires for ad hoc judgments rather than for 
working solutions amid acknowledged complexity. A dramatic 
presentation of legal and medical debate does not address the 
relationships where vulnerability arises but merely attracts the 
feelings those relationships generate. Distrust relates to fears 
about how people treat others who are vulnerable. The media 
portrays the treatment of the vulnerable but does not elevate to 
express discussion the feelings this treatment may arouse. More-
over, the media presentation fails to emphasize the relationship 
between the witnesses and the witnessed. The presentation fails 
to reveal that the future meaning of the life of the handicapped 
person depends in part on the meaning the watching society 
gives to the handicap-that the offering or withholding of help 
expresses as much about the helper as it does about the helped. 
The public audience in these cases, then, in a real sense, are 
related to and involved in the drama. Perhaps because the 
drama involves the universally familiar subject of family 
life-and the double vulnerability of a handicapped child-the 
audience identifies even more powerfully than they do in other 
public dramas, like those involving terrorists or trapped coal 
miners. In addition, there may be a special fascination with the 
communities' own power and powerlessness to alter the meaning 
of disabilities. Our attitudes about particular handicaps, about 
parents of handicapped children, and our priorities for medical 
expenditure construct the moral and social universe in which 
handicapped infants and their parents live. 
Yet these dimensions of interrelationship remain obscured by 
158. In a sense, readers of the unfolding news story are like the audience watching 
tragic drama. As Stanley Cavell describes, tragedy occurs in a continuous present de-
manding attention and immobilizing the audience which can do nothing but witness. 
Cavell, supra note 104, at 314, 322, 329-30. 
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the adversarial character of the legal drama that the media pub-
licizes. Adversarial decision making may heighten the conflict 
over a case like Baby Jane Doe's, and feed rather than resolve 
the sources of distrust. lli9 Indeed, administrative and judicial re-
view of parental medical care decisions for handicapped 
newborns may reenact and refuel exchanges of distrust. Hospital 
review committees, even with their internal collaborative struc-
ture, may establish adversarial relations between hospital and 
parents, and parents and child. The media's tendency to cast 
villains and heros, combined with the adversarial posture of le-
gal and administrative decision making, conveys the ways the 
players are opponents and strangers, and submerges the ways in 
which they-and we-are connected to one another. 
3. The relationship between self and other- Each of these 
dimensions-the adversarial structure, the public audience ob-
serving a distant but enthralling media drama, the possible iden-
tification by many people with the relationships between vulner-
able infants and more powerful adults-exposes a psychological 
issue about the relationship between self and other. Is the self 
separate from others-free from their power, abandoned to care 
for itself? Or is the self connected to others-receiving care but 
also subjected to oppression?160 Some elements of the debate re-
flect the first view, some the second. The notion of the separate 
and isolated self underlies adversarial problem-solving, where 
opponents perceive each other as separate and antagonistic. 
Similarly, the sense of an audience removed from the actors in a 
drama, and the infant with interests at odds with her parents, 
depends upon the view of the self as separate· and open to harm 
from others. Each of these conceptions has an either/or struc-
ture, dichotomous like the duality of self and other. To some 
extent, psychologists off er support for this view of the self. They 
159. See K. SCHNEIDER & M. SCHNEIDER, DIVORCE MEDIATION 23-30 (1984) (critiquing 
of adversary system's winner-take-all approach, exacerbation of conflicts, bitterness, hos-
tility, and misunderstandings). But see J. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAw? 124-37 
(1983) (noting that alternatives to adversary system also give cause for distrust). 
160. These themes have occupied some recent legal scholarship. See R. UNGER, PAS-
SION 20-21 (1984); Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO 
L. REV. 205, 211-13 (1979); Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 11-15, 20-26 
(1984); see also Weinreb, The Complete Idea of Justice, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 757, 799-800 
(1984) (arguing that a notion of self develops through interaction with environment; rela-
tionships to others important in construction of self and in diminution of se!O. These 
themes also figure prominently in psychological works, see C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT 
VOICE (1982); Benjamin, The Oedipal Riddle: Authority, Autonomy, and the New Nar-
cissism, in AUTHORITY IN AMERICA 195 (1981), and in political and social theory, see M. 
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 179-83 (1982); R. SENNETI', AUTHORITY 27-
40, 84-88, 116-21 (1981). 
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tell us that the child develops a sense of self by seeing parents, 
and all others, as separate. 161 
Yet these theorists also emphasize that even this development 
of a separate self depends on the child's relationships with 
others to discover and delineate a boundary between self and 
other.162 Moreover, some theorists maintain that the individual 
self is more than a bounded separate identity. Instead, the per-
son continually negotiates an identity in relationship with 
others, with varying degrees of dependence and interdepen-
dence, distance and closeness.163 These theorists suggest that the 
individual depends on others in the very creation of a sense of 
self, and this dependence persists even in the process of separat-
ing, emotionally and cognitively, from others. The development 
of a sense of personal boundaries-where the self ends-in this 
sense is entwined with continuing awareness of where others be-
gin. Finally, the self may continue to depend on experiences 
with others that become internalized as part of the individual's 
sense of self. These notions of the self, forged in ongoing rela-
tionships, support a view of inevitable, interpersonal connection, 
attended by risks of domination but also opportunities for mu-
tual care. 
This excursion into psychology suggests that debates over the 
medical treatment of an infant like Baby Jane Doe may raise 
intense and complicated psychological aspects of the relation-
ship between the self and others. A limited notion of self as sep-
arate may underlie and animate the issues of trust and distrust 
as expressed in the varied dichotomous debates over state inter-
vention, substance and procedure, quality of life and right to 
life. A richer sense of the interdependent self may highlight 
ways in which these dichotomies are misleading-for a right to 
life depends on relationships that can give it meaning, procedure 
and substance intertwine, and the state cannot avoid intervening 
in the family it defines and regulates-just as the self depends 
161. See J. GREENBERG & S. MITCHELL, supra note 149, at 274-81, 345-46 (describing 
Margaret Mahler's and Edith Jacobson's theories of individuation and selO. 
162. Id.; see also N. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1978) (reports 
that male and female children both construct gender identity in relationship to mother); 
D.W. Winnicott, Mirror-Role of Mother and Family in Child Development, in CHILD, 
PLAYING AND REALITY 30-138 (1971) (reporting that the child needs to see mother seeing 
him to develop sense of selO. 
163. See R. KEGAN, THE EVOLVING SELF 73-110 (1982) (synthesizing work of Piaget, 
Kohlberg, Loevinger, Maslow, McClelland, Murray, and Erikson). See generally R. BURT, 
supra note 103, at 97-99 (criticizing static view of a priori selves; self as more fluctuating, 
oscillating; and challenging paradigm of autonomy); N. NoDDJNGS, CARING: A FEMININE 
APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION 40-49 (1984) (reporting that the self learns 
to care for self by caring for others and being cared for by others). 
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on others in establishing boundaries, integrity, and internalized 
identity. At the same time, knowing that the self depends on 
others even in its separateness and that another may betray you 
out of care as well as out of unconcern, a healthy individual may 
experience conflicting desires for both separation and interde-
pendence. People may distrust both state officials and parents as 
"others" adverse to the child's interests, and yet appreciate both 
as the sources of support. From this complicated posture it is 
easy to find grounds to distrust anyone's claim to be acting in 
the interests of the child. Efforts to acknowledge the relation-
ship between the adults and the child-and the interaction be-
tween their interests-may eliminate fears of undisclosed con-
flict, but only by disclosing the possibility of actual conflict. 16" 
Thinking about problems in either/or terms fits neatly into 
the psychological problem of constructing a self in relationship 
to others; and yet the either/or terms may hide the very bases of 
relationships between the alternatives, and among those af-
fected. 1611 Thus, the adversary structure may overemphasize sep-
164. Reasoning with a focus on relationships between individuals has been a concern 
for feminist theorists. See C. GILLIGAN, supra note 160; N. NooDINGS, supra note 163. An 
interesting parallel occurs in the approach advanced by pragmatists like William James, 
whose thinking, according to Jacques Barzun, is: 
held fast by as many demands and duties as the moral agent can think of. His 
relativism relates, which means many links to fixed points . . . . In thus relating 
one's decision or conduct to several needs and ideals, one gives the observer as 
many chances to criticize, whereas the absolutist relates his act to only one 
thing: the fine abstraction that his God or his grandfather once uttered 
emphatically. 
J. BARZUN, A STROLL WITH WILLIAM JAMES 156 (1983). See w. JAMES, PRAGMATISM AND 
THE MEANING OF TRUTH 32-39 (1975) (theorizing that ideas are true insofar as they help 
us reach satisfactory relations with experience). See also Rorty, Pragmatism, Relativism, 
and Irrationalism, in CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 160, 165 (1982) (noting that prag-
matism rejects notion of constraints by objects; constraints come only in conversation 
with other people). 
165. Legal categories themselves may be thought of as dichotomous choices; a given 
problem either fits in a legal category or it does not. Interpretation problems arise but 
can be solved by reference to the purposes of the categories. See E. LEVI, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO LEGAL REASONING 18-27, 29-54 (1962). Yet there are many serious critics of this 
approach to legal problem solving. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE Jumc1AL PRO-
CESS 46-47 (1921); J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 8-13, 62-74, 127-58 (6th ed. 
1970); L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF LAW 8-18 (1968); L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 106-51, 
266-334 (1969); G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 14-16, 68-98 (1977); K. LLEWL-
LYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 62-157, 178-91 (1960). In a recent opinion, Judge Bork 
wrote for the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: 
The temptation to adhere to sharply-defined categories is understandable. 
Judges generalize, they articulate concepts, they enunciate such things as four-
factor frameworks, three-pronged tests, and two-tiered analyses in an effort, 
laudable by and large, to bring order to a universe of unruly happenings and to 
give guidance for the future to themselves and others. But it is certain that life 
will bring up cases whose facts simply cannot be handled by purely verbal for-
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aration and antagonism while obscuring commonality and mu-
tual need. The public drama may exaggerate the separation of 
the audience from the anguish of the actors. Conceptions of the 
vulnerable infant may underestimate the vulnerability of the 
adults to the infant, and the interdependence of interests. The 
conception of decision making as a task to be completed alone 
may exaggerate a need for separation and undervalue a need for 
consultation. And the tendency to carve problems into rigid di-
chotomies between the self and others, substance and procedure, 
intervention and nonintervention, may emerge from psychic pre-
occupations only partially understood. 
I· off er these views in the belief that greater efforts to under-
stand such psychic preoccupations can free us from simply en-
acting them. Where those preoccupations give rise to distrust in 
matters of public policy, such efforts at understanding may be 
the only way to escape polarized, rigid debates. Distrust, unex-
amined, cannot be cabined. Attributing it to an abstraction, like 
the family or state, simply preserves it; assuaging it with proce-
dural solutions leaves its sources unexplored.166 An alternative 
approach to a case like that of Baby Jane Doe would break out 
of the ill-fitting dichotomies of state and family, objective and 
subjective, substance and procedure, and instead work for condi-
tions of trust. The principal premise behind this approach would 
assert that trust cannot be announced, but must be achieved. 
Just as the self develops through struggles with others for both 
separation and connection, the foundations for trust must grow 
through human encounters and public struggles over the mean-
ing we give to the fact of our shared humanity. Pursuing condi-
tions for trust, I offer the following suggestions to attend to dis-
putes in cases like Baby Jane Doe. 
B. Conditions for Trust 
Media and legal attention to cases like Baby Jane Doe will 
probably continue for some time, given these conditions of un-
mulas, or at least not handled with any sophistication and feeling for the under-
lying values at stake. When such a case appears and a court attempts neverthe-
less to force the old construct upon the new situation, the result is mechanical 
jurisprudence. 
Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring). 
166. Cf. Gabel, Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the With-
drawn Selves, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1563, 1572-81 (1984) (describing alienation and false self 
linked to rights consciousness). 
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certainty and distrust, and little said in this article or elsewhere 
can change these conditions. No new substantive rule, proce-
dural technique, or new position on the state intervention de-
bate will promote trust between people concerning this subject 
that so invokes personal vulnerabilities. New medical knowledge 
and changes in the social meaning of various handicapping con-
ditions may partially address the current uncertainty that un-
dermines settled expectations. Over time new rules may well se-
cure public confidence through new routines that recede into the 
background of settled expectations much like the old routines, 
where parents or doctors quietly made decisions about infant 
medical treatment with the tacit or express endorsement of legal 
and community authority. 167 Such developments seem distant 
now, however, largely because distrust and controversy in this 
area are increasing, not abating. The debates over state inter-
vention, right to life versus quality of life, and procedural alter-
natives themselves express dimensions of distrust between peo-
ple-distrust that runs deeper than the particular medical 
treatment decisions at issue. Addressing the conditions of dis-
trust themselves may open the way for new routines to gain wide 
acceptability for dealing with medical treatment decisions for 
handicapped newborns. Because sharp disagreements are bound 
to persist, these routines will chiefly involve ways of channeling 
disagreement away from simplistic, adversarial alternatives, and 
toward contextual discussions that address what really could 
and should happen in the lives of disabled newborns. Such dis-
cussions require at minimum the kind of trusting relations that 
allow people to move beyond polarized, rigid positions, and sim-
plistic conceptions of their opponent's positions. Achieving this 
kind of trust will require encounters, conversations, and con-
frontations between people in ways that will make vivid the 
shared condition of humanness and vulnerability.168 
167. See infra note 182 and text accompanying note 184. New routines could-and 
should-involve careful and difficult efforts to think through individual cases not general 
rules. See R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 139. 
168. Sociologists and anthropologists who study the conditions of trust in varied soci-
eties emphasize the role of exchange in the development of interpersonal relations. See S. 
EISENSTADT & L. RoNIGER, PATRONS, CLIENTS AND FRIENDS: INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 
AND THE STRUCTURE OF TRUST IN SocIETY 29-42 (1984) (discussing work of John Bowlby, 
George Homans, Peter Blau, Claude Levi-Strauss, Emile Durkheim, and Michael 
Mauss). One variant on exchange as a basis for trust is conversation-the exchange of 
words-as a basis for trust. In contemporary scholarship, the prevalence of "conversa-
tion" and "dialogue" as models for moral and political discourse is striking, especially 
because these models are adopted by authors who represent a range of views on other 
matters; see also T. TODOROV, MIKHAIL BAKHTIN: THE DIALOGICAL PRINCIPLE 60-74 (W. 
Godzich trans. 1984) (theorizing that every utterance is related to every other utterance; 
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The first step in building conditions for trust occurs simply by 
asking what state decisions about medical care for handicapped 
infants would promote trust in the processes and results. How 
can a decision about the medical treatment of a handicapped 
newborn avoid the assignment of blame by people who disagree 
with the decision? How can parents, medical personnel, and 
others appreciate the great degree to which they share the prob-
lem, and ambivalences about it, rather than only the degree to 
which they desire different medical care for the infant? How can 
each of these actors note how each has a relationship with the 
infant, and how these relationships will deeply influence 
whatever future awaits the child? These questions differ from 
the usual frameworks for debating medical care for handicapped 
newborns by rejecting questions that ask for either/or answers 
and by expressly addressing the objective of acknowledging am-
bivalence while promoting actual care for the child, whatever the 
medical treatment decision. Asking such questions represents a 
gesture toward commonality and an effort to resist antagonistic 
problem solving. Asking such questions embraces the paradox 
that opponents share their controversy, and the fearful self 
shares with other persons the psychic construction of self and 
other. Embarking on this inquiry expresses a small act of trust 
and permits a glimpse of how the problem would change if we 
viewed all the actors involved, the parents, the infant, the medi-
cal personnel, and the legal officials, as standing on the same 
side rather than on opposing sides. Posing trust as part of the 
agenda will not cause it to emerge. But turning public attention 
requiring study of dialogical relations in all texts). Compare Habermas, Toward a The-
ory of Communicative Competence, 2 RECENT Soc. 134, 146 (H. Dreitzel ed. 1970) with 
B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 4, 10 (1984). The Supreme Court itself 
has expressed a notion of due process as a conversation-and both as representing fair-
ness. In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), the Court ruled that due process requires an 
informal hearing in the form of a conversation before suspending a student from public 
schools. The Court reasoned that this requirement is, "if anything, less than a fair-
minded school principal would impose upon himself in order to avoid unfair suspen-
sions" -and the Court concluded that the procedural requirement would permit the stu-
dent to give his version of the facts and allow the school official to respond. 
A commitment to conversation-or any participatory process resembling it-is not a 
neutral stance, at least from the vantage point of anyone who would rather not partici-
pate. Cf. W. ARNEY, POWER AND THE PROFESSION OF OBSTETRICS 240-42 (1982) (noting 
that the one freedom currently unavailable to pregnant women is the freedom to remain 
unseen, unmonitored by the obstetrical system). Yet in a democracy, public knowledge of 
important decisions is central to the commitment to decentralized power. See Bazelon, 
Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 817, 823-25, 
824-32 (1977). Acknowledging that the commitment to conversation embraced in this 
article is not neutral, I support it in part as a way to check the power of parents, doctors, 
and the state officials who make treatment decisions for handicapped newborns. 
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to this issue could help establish a context in which the needs of 
the infant and the family involved can be addressed rather than 
deployed in a public drama of blame and controversy. 
1. Addressing the relationship betweeen treatment deci-
sions and care-taking responsibilities- Several elements of 
public debate cast distrust on the parents as ultimate deci-
sionmakers for their child. The conception of the family as a 
center of law]ess oppression and domination of the powerless by 
the powerful depicts the parents as untrustworthy. Similarly, 
quality of life arguments raise suspicions about the parents who 
may have their own quality of life at heart rather than the 
child's when they make their treatment decision. Grounds for 
distrust may increase with the claim that the parents' own 
stance toward the child deeply affects that child's potential 
quality of life because that quality depends on the quality of 
interpersonal interactions. Further, the premise that the parents 
have a conflict of interest because they are too close to the child 
implies that those who will bear the burden and benefits of car-
ing for the child should be disqualified from making the medical 
treatment decision. Parents might want to avoid the financial 
and emotional burdens of caring for a disabled child and there-
fore their possible opposition to aggressive medical treatment 
could be distrusted as self-interested. 
These kinds of claims in the public debate play into the ad-
versarial mode of problem solving by suggesting grounds to dis-
trust parental decisions and grounds for state supervision of 
medical treatment for disabled infants.169 This line of thought 
fails to disclose analogous reasons for distrusting the state. The 
state, as well as the family, runs the risk of insensitivity to the 
needs of the child, and also risks underestimating the quality of 
the child's life. A serious form of state insensitivity appears in 
the unrealistic and abstract legal analysis that addresses the 
medical treatment decision disconnected from other issues about 
the child's future. State decisionmakers, or hospital review com-
mittees permitted by the state to second-guess parental choices, 
may assume that the parents will continue to care for the infant 
at home, while the parents may assume that they will ultimately 
send the child to an institution. Whether the parents or the 
state have the final word on the medical treatment decision, and 
whether or not that decision directs treatment, the severely 
169. These sources of distrust seem to lie behind the movement for hospital ethics 
committees to review infant care decisions. Such committees could serve more construc-
tive roles in sharing information with parents, rather than judging parental decisions. 
1002 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 18:4 
handicapped child faces a possible destiny in a poorly main-
tained and staffed institution.170 These issues-and the child's 
ultimate destination-are obscured by the usual frameworks of 
analysis because the questions about state intervention, right to 
life versus quality of life, and who should decide, all neglect the 
relationships between the infant and those who will care for him 
or her. The usual analysis fails to address this matter of care 
even when the state itself may become the caretaker with its 
own conflicting interests. The state's own goals include protect-
ing life and reducing budgets. These goals pose a conflict that 
makes the state no less free from bias and conflicting interests 
than the parents. Analysis that focuses chiefly on reasons to dis-
trust the parents' medical treatment decision fails to expose 
similar reasons to distrust the state. 
Policy makers committed to building trust rather than dis-
trust should strive for an understanding that both the parents 
and the state can inspire distrust, and both share responsibility 
for the child that can be abused. Acknowledgment of the respon-
sibilities both parents and the state have for children in need 
could usefully focus public debate on the relationship between 
the medical treatment decision and the ongoing caretaking the 
child requires, whatever medical steps are pursued. Rather than 
disqualifying parents from the decisional process because they 
bear the burden of caring for the child, we should develop deci-
sional processes that emphasize the state's obligations for the 
child's future care. Although state officials and members of hos-
pital ethics review committees may not personally feel responsi-
bility for the child's future care, they should feel responsibility 
for that child's future if they exercise institutional power to af-
fect that future. To make these institutional responsibilities pal-
pable, treatment decisions made by actors other than the par-
ents should carry with them the financial support to pay for that 
medical treatment, and to assist the parents or others who end 
up caring for the child.171 This approach resembles the proposal 
that the state should not conclude a medical care decision for a 
child while refusing to assume responsibility for the subsequent 
170. See D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS 15-44 (1984) (describ-
ing scandal-ridden institution for the mentally retarded). 
171. This·solution might mean that the state would undertake a cost/benefit analysis, 
and decide to discontinue treatment because of cost reasons. Yet the same risk currently 
arises in less explicit ways when the state countenances cost/benefit decisions made by 
parents or hospitals. Making the basis of the decision more explicit will enable broader 
public debate, and improve chances that solutions will be chosen rather than merely 
tacitly accepted. But see G. CALABRESI, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978) (noting the use of subter-
fuge to allow society to accept painful cost/benefit decisions). 
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costs of the child's medical care.172 The joint responsibility sug-
gested here builds on this proposal by connecting decisional au-
thority with subsequent responsibilities for the child, and by di-
recting the state to alleviate the financial and emotional burdens 
on the parents that may bias their decision.173 The parents' con-
flict of interest then will present no greater problem than the 
conflict for the state or the ethics committee, because each deci-
sionmaker will have future caretaking responsibilities. 174 
This approach calls for identifying the large problem that the 
parents, the state, the public, and the disabled infant share: how 
can the patterns of relationships and care among all these actors 
acknowledge the infant as someone deserving to live and die 
with dignity? This is a problem that is larger than the medical 
treatment decision alone. The problem reaches the t.reatment of 
handicapped people in a society not constructed with them in 
mind. For example, child-care and job arrangements make car-
ing for a severely handicapped child a difficult task for parents. 
172. See, e.g., Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk, in WHO SPEAKS FOR THE 
CHILD (1982) at 169: 
If society insists through law that such children, indeed any children, receive 
medical treatment rejected by the parents, the state should provide the special 
financial, physical, and psychological resources essential to making real for the 
child it 'saves' the value it prefers. The state should become fully responsible for 
making 'unwanted' children 'wanted' ones. 
173. The parents' financial burden, for example, could be extreme when medical and 
legal costs are both involved. See Rankin, The Staggering Cost of Baby Fae, N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 9, 1984, at Fll, col. 1 (discussing costs not covered by insurance). 
174. Determining exactly what rules should govern the availability of state financial 
support for the medical treatment and care of a disabled child poses a complicated task. 
If the state reimbursement is available only when the state supersedes a parental deci-
sion to forego medical treatment for the child, there is a risk that parents will deliber-
ately refuse treatment in the belief that the state will displace their judgment and then 
pay the costs. Cf. DoNZELOT, THE POLICING OF FAMILIES (1979). Taking seriously the risk 
of a perverse incentive means attributing considerable instrumental thought to parents 
at the moment of a significant and often urgent decision about their child, and yet such 
consequences of governmental rules should not be overlooked. At the same time, devel-
oping some contrasting set of criteria for state reimbursement will be difficult. Should 
state payment apply to treatment for all disabled newborns, or only treatments that 
would not be futile or inhumane, or only treatments where the quality of the child's life 
meets some state-defined requisite standard? The reimbursement program will expose 
once again the tensions behind the treatment decision itself. In addition, equity 
problems arise given the large numbers of persons in other age groups who face consider-
able medical costs. The elderly are an obvious group with analogous needs. Perhaps the 
state should promote the development of private insurance programs to cover the medi-
cal costs for disabled newborns as a way of avoiding some of the equity problems that 
accompany a program of direct state subsidies. Here another problem arises: third-party 
reimbursement will require yet another set of criteria for eligibility, and may also pose 
cost containment issues for the medical system generally. All of these problems require 
serious study and debate. Yet they remain hidden from view as long as the medical treat-
ment decision alone remains as the focus for debate. 
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The problem also includes the state and private institutions that 
at best off er less to the child than a home with individuals who 
love the child, and at worst off er neglect and degradation. This 
large problem is the proper framework for the issues of state in-
tervention, right to life versus quality of life, and procedures for 
medical treatment decision making, for it connects the treat-
ment decision with the issues of care for the handicapped infant. 
Within this framework, other alternatives could appear such as 
state-provided homemaker support for the parents, or state-fa-
cilitated adoption connecting the child with a family willing to 
provide care in their home for someone with severe handicaps. 
Developing such options would engage state and private actors 
in comprehensive planning and struggles to reallocate funds to 
address this large problem. 
Within the institutional structures currently in place, no sin-
gle set of decisionmakers may feel able to engage in such com-
prehensive planning and resource allocation. In part, then, I of-
fer this analysis as a way to highlight how limited the medical 
treatment decision is, given the range of issues implicated in it. 
Greater humility about the scope of issues left unresolved after 
the medical treatment decision is made might help alleviate the 
blaming and defensiveness that accompany review of parents' 
decisions by hospital review committees or courts. In addition, 
more modest activities could contribute to larger reforms. For 
example, people who wish to improve the parents' decision and 
help them better provide care for their child could develop and 
distribute information to parents about the next or final destina-
tion of the child and about the full array of alternatives for car-
ing for the child. 1711 This call for information relates to a second 
suggestion for structuring conditions for trust, the sharing of in-
formation among actors involved in the medical treatment deci-
sion for disabled infants. 
2. Sharing information- Parents, doctors, and representa-
tives of the state should have opportunities to exchange infor-
mation and to discover in nonadversarial settings whether com-
peting sets of information support or challenge assumptions 
about the infant's prognosis, the risks of various decisions, and 
the trustworthiness of potential decisionmakers.176 Intense de-
175. The infant's family may not now know what it can offer the child, and it may 
wisely demand room for flexibility to respond to shifts in the stamina and emotional 
resources of the parents and siblings. Such a demand can be made explicit, and help 
eliminate the falsely idealized or falsely underestimated family response. 
176. The amendments to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act and the 
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Reform Act of 1978 provide for information and 
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bate in the Baby Jane Doe case-and in the Phillip Becker 
case-concentrated in part on clashing estimates of the meaning 
of the child's medical condition both in terms of quality of life 
and proximity to death. 177 Conflicting estimates of the child's 
medical condition became entrenched by the time the parents, 
the doctors, and state decisionmakers assumed formal roles and 
defended their positions in a context of distrust. 178 Shared infor-
mation may have alleviated some needless confrontation. 
Although gathering information may pose difficulties for the 
parents immediately after the child's birth, the hospital or state 
could operate a clearinghouse and channel information from 
medical associations, organizations for the rights of the handi-
capped, and groups committed to research and support for spina 
bifida, Down's syndrome, and other disabling conditions to par-
ents and their doctors. The specific means for exchange are less 
important than the practice of exchanging information in a 
nonadversarial context, free from assigned blame or judgment 
against alternatives to be considered by the parents and 
doctors. 179 
educational programs to improve services to disabled infants with life-threatening condi-
tions. See H.R. REP. No. 1038, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2947, 2951. The advisory rules issued by the Department of 
Health and Human Services under the amendments elaborate model guidelines for in-
fant review committees that would provide for this information exchange. 50 Fed. Reg. 
14,893-94 (1985). But since these model guidelines also direct the same committees to 
develop treatment policies, id., to work to facilitate coordination with the law enforce-
ment activities of the state child protective service system, id. at 14,895, and to review 
specific cases and refer some to court or to the state child protective services agency, id. 
at 14,895-96, this model undermines the chances for nonadversarial exchanges of infor-
mation for families facing a medical treatment decision. I propose instead a separation of 
these functions, as described infra note 179 and accompanying text. 
177. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8 and 126-28. 
178. See Baer, supra note 7, at 35-38 (describing conflicting estimates of baby's disa-
bilities and suffering). Yet as adversarial decision making occurs, individuals may be un-
able psychologically to reevaluate their assessment of the child. The Beckers may have 
felt a need to defend the position they had taken at the time of Phillip's birth and as a 
result they may have been unable to conceive of the child differently from their first 
impression. See Becker & Becker, Mourning the Loss of a Son, NEWSWEEK, May 30, 
1983, at 17 (defending their position in the case and objecting to the state's 
involvement). 
179. The role for Infant Care Review Committees contemplated by the federal regu-
lations suggests a problem in this respect. The committees are to be entrusted with both 
the task of gathering and sharing information with parents, and the job of reporting 
cases to state child protective agencies for legal action. See supra note 176. This enforce-
ment function means that such committees would become unlikely settings for parental 
trust. The committee's role in sharing information could be problematic because there 
may simply be no time; the parents may face an immediate medical care decision at the 
moment of birth. Yet even in these situations, decision points down the line would look 
different to parents who have access to a richer array of information, especially informa-
tion from parents who have undergone similar experiences. As an alternative to the com-
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Exchanged information should address the medical treatment 
options and the range of possible capacities and abilities that 
the child could develop. Information about the child's potential 
personal development could challenge parental and medical atti-
tudes about handicaps and also disclose how contingent the 
child's quality of life may be in relation to the opportunities par-
ents and society provide. 180 Information of this sort exchanged 
before the parents reach their decision could make a difference, 
unlike the effect of information exchanged in an adversarial set-
ting. The adversarial posture rests on and promotes distrust.181 
Others have extolled the value of the adversary process to pre-
vent indecision, to require public decision, and to promote con-
sistent decisions.182 I suggest that these concerns are less impor-
tant values than working to promote trust in disputes regarding 
the care and treatment of disabled infants. Parties must earn 
one another's trust; and it is more likely earned in settings 
where parties can safely share information.183 Ethics review 
panels and courts may still review a decision reached by the par-
ents and their doctors, but the review may accord greater trust 
to initial decisionmakers who have extensive information prior 
to such review. 
3. Drawing public attention to rule making- Over time, 
rules and routines, like common law developments, emerge from 
crisis decisions with case-by-case review. 184 To facilitate this 
mittees described in the regulations, states could have parents consult with professionals 
who could help the parents make their own decision, based on a broad range of informa-
tion and serious moral inquiry. This alternative could help parents deal with the prob-
lem in response to social concerns without altering the usual presumption of parental 
choice. See supra text accompanying note 144. 
180. See, e.g., D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, supra note 170, at 112, 122, 177-79 
(describing a struggle for community placements for handicapped people). See generally 
text accompanying notes 90-93 (meaning of handicaps partially contingent on social 
response). 
181. See supra text accompanying note 159; see also Nader & Todd, Jr., Introduc-
tion, in THE DISPUTING PROCESS: LAW IN TEN SOCIETIES 1, 17-40 (1978) (noting that 
strangers who have disputes typically have imbalance of power, exacerbated by profes-
sionals, and distance of law from community culture). 
182. Baron, Medicine and Human Rights: Emerging Substantive Standards and 
Procedural Protections for Medical Decision Making Within the American Family, 17 
FAM. L.Q. 1, 20-23 (1983). 
183. Counselors trained to help parents deal with their feelings while sorting through 
the information would also improve the decisional process. 
184. See supra text accompanying notes 167-68. This notion is the familiar explana-
tion of legal change that displaced an earlier notion that the law consisted of eternal and 
unchanging principles from which just applications could be deduced. See B. CARDOZO, 
supra note 165, at 23-28, 99; G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 97-103 (1974); C. 
REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND: THE EVOLUTION OF OUR LEGAL SYSTEM 43-48 (1980). At 
work in this currently dominant idea of legal change is a conception of authoritative 
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process, and to draw public attention away from private family 
pain, hospitals and states could engage in a form of rule making 
to set temporary and mutable treatment guidelines based on di-
agnostic categories. 1811 As medical knowledge and social attitudes 
constructing the meaning of a given handicap change-and 
change more quickly in some communities than others-public 
debate about prospective treatment decisions could accomplish 
the purposes of education and participatory decision making. 
The social meaning of Down's syndrome, for example, has 
changed over the past several decades.186 Consequently, states 
could develop guidelines stipulating that the deprivation of 
medical treatment solely because an individual has Down's syn-
drome is an action triggering judicial review. 
Any general rules would incorporate values and social atti-
tudes as well as medical information. Moreover, medical profes-
sionals, political authorities, and lay citizens should share in this 
rule making process before individual cases capture public at-
tention. Thus, prospective rules and standards should emerge 
through public debate, whether in reaction to a state rule mak-
ing process or through a citizens' advisory review of hospital 
guidelines. Advocacy groups for people with various handicap-
communities-like judges-whose interpretations can develop a set of conventions for 
given periods of time. Cf. Fish, Interpretation and the Pluralistic Vision, 60 TEx. L. 
REV. 495, 498-99 (1982) (finding that community of meaning establishes conventions to 
interpret texts). But see Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEx. L. REV. 527 (1982) 
(noting that interpreters make meaning by exploring the purpose of the enterprise); Lev-
inson, Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 373 (1982) (reporting that legal interpretation, 
even seen as interpretation of texts, repeats fragmented discourse that fractures society). 
Also at work here is a powerful assumption that law evolves, that is, that the changes in 
law point in a direction and that this direction brings improvement and progress. See 
Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 CoLUM. L. REV. 38, 55-59 
(1985) (discussing Corbin and others). Cf. R. NISBET, HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 
297-316 (1970) (noting that the notion of progress in history is linked to theories of or-
ganic evolution and carrying optimism for future). 
Without embracing either an idea of change as progress, or an idea of conventional 
interpretations as immutable, I do suggest that routines for handling problems can 
emerge from debate and can assist individuals and society in negotiating problematic 
and painful experiences. It is also possible to develop rituals of self-reflection to accom-
pany decision making shared by clients and professionals; see D. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE 
PRACTITIONER 295-325 (1983); using such routines of practice involves a continuing pro-
cess of submitting to and challenging the apparent consensus; see M. PoLANYl, PERSONAL 
KNOWLEDGE 207-09 (1962). 
185. See R. WEIR, supra note 61, at 210. Ellis proposes legislative guidelines to make 
the treatment decisions more predictable and in accord with community values. Ellis, 
Letting Defective Babies Die: Who Decides?, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 393 (1982). Although I 
agree with his advocacy of a legislative process to express public values-and his ac-
knowledgment that consensus will be impossible-I find less compelling his emphasis on 
testimony by medical experts and his concern for the integrity of the medical profession. 
186. See supra text accompanying notes 126-32 (discussing In re Phillip B.). 
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ping conditions could use such debates to educate the public.187 
Working guidelines could emerge, but the prospect of ongoing 
conflict should not be understated. The point of the proposed 
process for public debate is not that some noncontroversial con-
sensus will emerge, but that a process promoting genuine argu-
ment would be better than the current combination of media-
hyped morality plays and drawn-out legal proceedings. 
Even working guidelines emerging from public debate still 
would inevitably give rise to conflict, and occasions where par-
ents, physicians, and public observers distrust one another. In 
areas unresolved by diagnostic and treatment guidelines, hospi-
tal review committees could be shaped to provide nonadversarial 
settings where medical and nonmedical personnel could contrib-
ute to the decision. Including parents as participants in the dis-
cussions would be a worthwhile experiment, even if they and the 
other committee members share mutual distrust. 
These proposals for public rule making and nonadversarial 
hospital review committees suggest incremental steps by which 
methods of problem solving could teach us more about who we 
are and how and why we mistrust one another. Trust in a de-
mocracy comes not through announcement by the powerful but 
rather through continuing conversations between people who 
both need and fear each other.188 In a related context, Dr. Jay 
Katz has argued that doctors and their patients can remedy 
their mutual distrust through conversations and sharing of infor-
mation and decisional authority. He suggests that physicians 
must first face the limits of their own professional knowledge, 
and acknowledge their distrust of themselves, in order to learn 
to trust their patients and share authority with them.189 Simi-
larly, medical professionals, legal authorities, media commenta-
tors, and parents need to acknowledge their distrust of them-
selves in order to resist projecting that distrust onto others when 
difficult decisions arise concerning the medical treatment of a 
handicapped newborn. As Dr. Katz concludes, such a climate of 
trusted decision making "cannot be implemented by judicial, 
legislative, or administrative orders. At best, such outside inter-
ventions can prod doctors; at worst they only substitute bureau-
187. See Biklen & Ferguson, supra note 4, at 8 (comparing views of Down's syndrome 
of Congress, Spina Bifida Association of America, and American Academy of Pediatrics). 
188. See Kann, Consent and Authority in America, in THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY 
IN AMERICA 59, 66-67, 76-79 (1981) (discussing tradition of consent of the governed and 
shared decision making, jeopardized by centralized power and withheld information). 
189. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 102-03, 228-29 (1984). 
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cratic authority for professional authority."190 Similarly, neither 
external authorities nor public enactments of private ambiva-
lence can attend to the sources of distrust that fuel public de-
bate and fascination with medical treatment decisions for se-
verely disabled infants. Instead, a process of education, self-
examination, and genuine controversy provides the best hope for 
building the kind of trusting relations where real disagreements 
can be acknowledged and worked through. 
CONCLUSION 
Medical treatment decisions for severely handicapped 
newborns have become public cause celebres as well as private 
crises. In an important sense, this article is about the limits of 
law in dealing with these situations. The problems explored here 
cannot be resolved by lawsuits, statutes, or regulations, for these 
legal vehicles replay the ambivalence that underlies our fascina-
tion with and perplexity over medical treatment for severely dis-
abled newborns. 191 The public debate has focused on arguments 
for and against state intervention, with a tendency to treat these 
alternatives as dichotomous. Similar polarized claims gather 
under the banners of two substantive principles, the right to life, 
and the right to make medical choices based on assessments of 
the quality of life. Adversarial themes permeate disputes over 
who should decide these cases, who should review such deci-
sions, and what presumptions and burdens of proof should gov-
ern. Such disputes carry an intense emotional charge, because 
almost all members of society can identify with one or more of 
the principal figures in cases like Baby Jane Doe's. This identifi-
cation hardly resolves the issues, and instead may occasion the 
projection onto public debate of deep sources of distrust and 
self-distrust located within individual psyches. The very pattern 
190. Id. at 228. 
191. Federalizing or constitutionalizing the law in this area seems especially unwise, 
given these deep-seated feelings on contrasting sides, and given the ambiguous and 
quickly changing medical understandings about infants with severe deformities or handi-
caps. See supra note 24 (criticizing application of § 504 to these cases). Yet I do not 
believe that law should-or could-be cordoned off from any involvement here, just as 
state intervention in the family cannot be avoided once there is a backdrop of state 
regulation of the family. In this regard, legal settings could strengthen efforts in adminis-
trative and counseling settings to confront the ambivalence and interpersonal relation-
ships implicated in these medical treatment decisions. Law in this sense is no special 
source of answers but neither is it disqualified as one of the possible terrains where en-
during human dilemmas can be acknowledged. 
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of either/or problem-solving that underlies the debates over 
state intervention, right to life versus quality of life principles, 
and procedural techniques to give or deny power to parents may 
be rooted within the psychological development of individual 
identity where the self stands in contrast to the other.102 
This article has argued, however, that the either/or notions in 
each of these contexts fail to capture the variety and inter-rela-
tionships of the concepts and practices they represent. Thus, the 
article has argued that the debate over state intervention, when 
couched in either/or terms, neglects both the variety of mean-
ings state intervention has in practice, and the ubiquity of state 
involvement in family relations. Similarly, the article has argued 
that the polarized substantive debate between advocates of a 
right to life principle and advocates of a quality of life principle 
neglects the line-drawing problems each engage in, and the de-
pendence of both principles on procedural issues. At the same 
192. This analysis has been influenced by developments in psychological theory that 
explore the interconnection between the individual's self and others in the very construc-
tion of a sense of personal identity. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text. 
These works reject a simple dichotomy of self and other by showing the interrelation of 
both, much as other work in psychology explores the relationships between therapist and 
client through the shared symbolism of language. See M. EDELSON, THE IDEA OF A 
MENTAL ILLNESS 105-36 (1971); R. KEGAN, THE EVOLVING SELF 76-110 (1982). This article 
also draws on emerging work in philosophy, which challenges the traditional Cartesian 
distinctions between subjectivity and objectivity and explores the relationship between 
the two through the significance of shared, human enterprises, like language, that have 
qualities of both. See R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTMSM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HER-
MENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS 71-108 (1983); R. RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM xiii-xliv, 
160-75, 191-208 (1982); see also S. CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON: WITTGENSTEIN, SKEPTI-
CISM, MORALITY, AND TRAGEDY (1979) (exploring the meaning of Wittgenstein's work for 
philosophic problem of other minds and for moral philosophy); H. GADAMER, PHILOSOPHI-
CAL HERMENEUTICS (D. Linge trans. 1976) (containing essays exploring the phenomenon 
of understanding through the conditions that constitute it and lie beyond conscious or 
obvious meanings). Similar developments in other fields emphasize the process of inter-
pretation that relates the reader to the text rather than other theories of knowledge that 
separate the knower and the known. See T. EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUC-
TION (1983) (presenting theories about literature); D. LACAPRA, HISTORY & CRITICISM 
(1985) (presenting intellectual and social history); see also R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. 
SULLIVAN, A. SWINDLER & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE HEART: INDMDUALISM AND COMMIT-
MENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985) (adopting an interpretive approach to social science study 
of American culture). These efforts in quite varied fields all mark an important challenge 
to traditional ways of understanding by searching for how our ways of knowing consti-
tute what we know and who we are. Such enterprises can be criticized as self-absorbed 
and as spending too much time challenging conventions and canons within existing disci-
plines rather than addressing their supposed subjects. Yet these efforts also hold promise 
of richer kinds of knowledge that may free us from puzzles and problems that have been 
a function of the very intellectual approaches to analysis that have been used in the past. 
See R. RoRTY, supra, at xuvii-xlv. It is in this spirit that this article has tried to probe 
beneath the prevailing patterns of argument to ask why we talk about problems the way 
we do, and how focusing on our relationship to these problems may provide a vantage 
point that breaks free from approaches that have not been especially fruitful in the past. 
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time, the division of problem solving into substantive and proce-
dural concerns underestimates the interpenetration of these two 
sets of concerns. Finally, although the very notion of a "self' 
distinct from an "other" may supply a psychological root for the 
either/or patterns of problem solving, and trust and distrust, the 
"self and other" construct should be located within a develop-
mental process in which each individual develops a separate self 
only in relation to others. 
And yet the patterns of either/or problem solving obscure and 
impede recognition of these very psychological dimensions of 
public and private responses to the situation of the handicapped 
newborn. Ambivalence about feeling both moved and repelled by 
the handicapped newborn propels adversarial debate, and the 
debate itself fails to help people acknowledge this ambivalence, 
much less the role of the community in the life opportunities 
available to any handicapped person. The persistence of the di-
chotomous formulations of problems cannot be due to difficul-
ties in pointing out how oversimplified and unsophisticated they 
are. Intellectual assaults on crude absolutist positions can be 
readily forged, and can handily win superficial victories. In de-
bate over these matters, it is not too difficult to obtain a conces-
sion, such as: "state intervention is not a yes or no proposition," 
or even, "the right to life position at some point has to draw a 
line." And yet beyond such concessions, there is a structure of 
talk that sticks. Crude versions of the problem as a contest be-
tween either/or alternatives remain and largely frame the debate 
among key public officials as well as in the media and popular 
discussion. 
These debates express genuine differences between those who 
prefer to emphasize the right to life without regard to quality or 
cost and those who in contrast focus on quality and cost ques-
tions. Similarly, some people express strong commitments to 
combating anything that looks like state imposed restrictions on 
parental decision making, and others as adamantly call for ag-
gressive state activity to review or challenge what parents decide 
about treatment for a severely handicapped child facing serious 
medical problems. Further, people who feel strongly on both 
sides of these issues have seized the instruments and categories 
of legal analysis and taken their disagreements to legislative and 
judicial forums at both the federal and state level. 
Finally, genuine conflict persists in these legal contexts. Peo-
ple still conflict over medical treatment decisions for handi-
capped newborns and on these occasions they may win or lose. 
In particular, parents, and those identifying with them, lose if 
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they choose a position that so underestimates the life chances 
for the .infant that others can demonstrate to the satisfaction of 
legal authorities that this estimate amounts to illegal neglect. Al-
though this very notion of neglect will remain contestable in 
many cases, some parents will lose, or feel forced to a position in 
order to avoid legal battle. The same will hold for doctors and 
legal decisionmakers. Similarly, strangers to families with se-
verely impaired newborns lose because they cannot gain legal 
power to stop parents from sometimes making a decision against 
possible medical treatment; such strangers experience this result 
as an assault on their deeply held beliefs. Thus, conflicts over 
where to draw the line between condemnable neglect and ac-
ceptable decisions will be fought with real winners and losers. 
In this light, it may seem impossible to conceive of parents, 
doctors, legal decisionmakers, and the severely disabled infant as 
standing on the same side of the medical treatment problem. In-
deed, the debate over medical treatment for disabled newborns 
risks becoming as polarized and rigid as the debate over abor-
tion. Yet I have suggested that the very pattern of distrust that 
underlies these debates offers a starting point of commonality 
for all participants in these debates. Hovering between tragedy, 
where choice and human will play a role, and pathos, where 
human pain constitutes the story, everyone who deals with the 
infant treatment decision shares the inability to remove the in-
fant's disability along with the power to affect the meaning of 
disability in this society. And everyone shares the lack of knowl-
edge of the infant's interests and the risk of distrusting others' 
assessments of those interests. 
This article has suggested that starting with what we share, 
even if it is simply our mutual distrust, affords a promising ap-
proach to resolving medical treatment problems, or at least en-
gaging in more productive forms of disagreement. Asking what 
we share can also reveal opportunities for sharing information, 
sharing responsibility for the meanings society gives to disabil-
ity, and strengthening the relationships between the infant and 
those who will care for him or her. 
Both as ways to promote these kinds of understandings, and 
as initial steps we could take based on these insights, this article 
proposes processes for decision making that (1) underscore the 
obHgations of both state and family in the care for the infant, 
whether or not medical treatment is authorized; (2) provide for 
exchanges of information in nonadversarial settings to improve 
the parents' and other parties' understandings of the medical 
condition and the ways in which the meaning of that condition 
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can change over time, partly in light of how the child's caretak-
ers respond; and (3) develop settings where guidelines about 
treatment can be debated, removed from crisis situations, and 
assisted by the participation of medical professionals, political 
authorities, and members of the public. Unlike the infant care 
review committees currently under development, these proposals 
separate the exchange of information and the development of 
policy from law enforcement activities against individual parents 
and from the heat of particular controversies. In addition, these 
proposals call for building within the decisional processes we use 
acknowledgment of the ambivalences and tensions aroused by 
these medical treatment decisions, and recognition of the way 
these emotional responses express our relationships with one an-
other. Thus, these proposals call for less adversarial and more 
constructive processes. The proposals also prefer local, contex-
tual approaches in specific cases over abstract debate over prin-
ciples. At the same time, the article urges serious efforts to de-
vise policies about the continuing needs of handicapped people 
rather than the largely symbolic struggles over treatment deci-
sions about handicapped newborns. Over specific cases and 
broader policies, we will still disagree, yet we may learn to un-
derstand how our disagreements show what we share. One im-
portant basis even opponents share is our complicated relation-
ships to the handicapped person, and indeed, to others engaged 
in the debate. 
The vantage point afforded by our relationships with one an-
other here offers an important corrective to the perspective that 
focuses on our separateness. Most important, however, are ef-
forts to keep in view both angles of vision, for our ambivalence 
about wanting to feel connected and also wanting to feel sepa-
rate is especially pronounced in relation to a severely handi-
capped person, who can inspire a sense of recognition and con-
nection but also feelings of revulsion and separation. This very 
focus on our relationship with a handicapped infant may illumi-
nate how our wanting that inf ant to disappear is part of our re-
lationship with him or her. Yet the relationship also invites care 
and sense of connection. This article has described the possible 
forms such ambivalence may take as an effort to acknowledge 
what underlies legal responses to and public fascination with 
cases like Baby Jane Doe's. Bringing this ambivalence to the 
surface as an express subject for public debate will not eliminate 
it, but neither will ignoring it. Addressing such ambivalence can 
allow deeper understanding of the shortcomings of prevailing so-
lutions, which often appear to take rigid and polarized alterna-
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tives. Talking about the ambivalence behind these alternatives is 
at least a way to gain freedom from the ignorance about what 
may propel debate. And acknowledging ambivalence about the 
severely handicapped child could help people understand why 
they may oscillate between feeling that this could be my 
child-and this has nothing to do with me. A similar under-
standing could emerge about the real possibilities that the 
meanings of various handicaps can change, given changes in the 
opportunities and resources society makes available to the hand-
icapped-but also an understanding that actual people with ter-
ribly difficult burdens are involved. 
Although the steps proposed by this article are small and in-
cremental, they stem from this diagnosis of the deep, psychologi-
cal sources of debate over cases like Baby Jane Doe's. Taking 
steps that incorporate an understanding of the deep sources of 
dispute will not end the dispute, but may lead to more produc-
tive ways of disputing. Embarked on these routes, we may suc-
cessfully turn our fascination with other people's tragedies into 
commitments to share vulnerabilities and strengths. 
